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I. INTRODUCTION
Even the longest, most complicated, and divisive appellate court decisions do not come 
with code books.1 Appellate court decisions increasingly involve complex constitutional, 
statutory, or administrative law issues, and include lengthy discussions of case facts,2 findings 
below, hypothetical disputes of varying significance to legal issues presented, and discursive and 
sometimes tendentious treatment of precedent. Judges sometimes identify their holding with 
1
 In contrast, legislatures routinely offer contemporaneous materials to assist in the task of statutory interpretation, including 
cross-referencing provisions and definitions of terms. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 413, 680-82 (3d ed. 2002). Legislative history also informs 
statutory interpretation, and occasionally Congress will give explicit instructions about interpreting legislative history. For 
example, following a dispute concerning the meaning of “business necessity” for purposes of § 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1981 (Supp.1992)), members of 
Congress included a three paragraph memorandum within the Congressional Record. This was then referred to as “exclusive 
legislative history,” see 137 Cong. Rec. S 15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991), and was later recognized as such within the statute. 
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(b). In contrast, appellate opinions do not generally include contemporaneously produced 
materials designed to assist future courts in discerning which aspects of those opinions are or are not controlling, and where 
“judicial history” exists, it is generally considered to be irrelevant to interpretation. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judicial 
History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311 (1999) (exploring the parallels and differences between legislative and judicial history).
2
 For general statistics on the increasing length of judicial opinions, see RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND 
REFORM 112-16 (1985).
3precision, and in so doing, imply that all other aspects of the discussion, however persuasive and 
seemingly relevant those discussions might be to the immediate case disposition, are instead 
dicta.3 More frequently, however, judges offer looser characterizations, and sometimes none at 
all, leaving the task of decoding dicta and holding entirely to the reader.
A judge’s failure to delineate the scope of the holding within an opinion might not be a 
disservice to the judicial process. Even punctilious judges arguably should not be allowed the 
final word on the extent of their authority to resolve legal issues, and even a judge’s claim to 
have produced a holding on a particular issue should perhaps be open to challenge when the 
issue seems distant from the central concerns of the case. The failure of a judicial opinion to 
supply reliable guidance distinguishing its holdings from its dicta, moreover, poses little 
difficulty to the extent that legal actors agree upon the definitions of holding and dicta. With 
shared understandings, future courts could be expected to follow a case’s holdings and consider 
its dicta only to the extent that such discussions prove helpful. 
Although judges and scholars share intuitions that frequently lead them to the same 
conclusions in particular case settings, our analysis will reveal the absence of a shared 
conceptual foundation for analyzing even modestly complex cases. This deficiency might reflect 
the tendency in recent decades of scholars interested in precedent to focus significant attention 
on the nature of stare decisis. A considerable literature studies the emergence, scope, and limits 
of stare decisis,4 the doctrine through which courts use opinions not merely to resolve cases, but 
also to make law in the form of at least presumptively binding precedents.5 Stare decisis plays a 
3
 A usage note: Like “data,” “dicta” may be used as a collective noun to refer to a mass that may be singular or plural in number. 
See generally Dmitry N. Tychinin & Almut Beate Heinrich, On the Correct Use of ‘Data,’ 9 INT’L J. LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT 73 
(2004), available at http://www.scientificjournals.com/sj/lca/Pdf/aId/6510 (collecting sources on the proper use of the word 
“data”). While the word “dictum” may encompass only a single statement, the word “dicta” may refer to one or more statements. 
Thus, we use “dicta” as the analogue to “holding,” which also may refer to one or more statements, and we use “dicta” whenever 
referring to the status of one or more propositions as holding or dicta. We use the singular “dictum” only where referring to a 
single proposition. Thus, we would say either “this proposition is dicta,” or “this proposition is a dictum.”
4
 For a discussion that draws upon a portion of that literature, see infra Part III.A.
5 See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 65 
(1993) (“Although horizontal stare decisis creates a strong presumption that prior judicial articulations of the law are correct and 
should generally be followed by the rendering court, the rule is far from absolute.”); Abner Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal 
Topography, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)) 
(positing that “such common law doctrines as stare decisis would presumably constrain courts applying statutes to the same 
extent that they constrain courts making common law decisions”); Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New 
Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 89, 109 (2003) (observing that “common law precedents enjoy a presumption of 
correctness stronger than applied to constitutional cases, but not as constraining as that enjoyed by statutory precedents”). In his 
famous Commentaries on American Law, James Kent provided a similar early account of stare decisis. See 1 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 475 (O.,W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 14th ed. Boston, Little Brown, & Co. 1896) (explaining that “[i]f 
a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is in favor it its correctness; and the 
community have a right to regard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by 
4central role in our common law system, whether in horizontal form, for example within the 
Supreme Court and across federal circuit court panels, or in vertical form, for example from the 
Supreme Court to lower federal courts and from circuit courts to district courts.6 This scholarly 
attention is thus warranted.
As a practical matter, however, judicial analyses of precedent rarely require that courts 
test the contours of stare decisis doctrine directly. When stare decisis applies, a court rarely 
needs to consider the relatively narrow exceptions to stare decisis. Vertical stare decisis is 
generally considered absolute,7 and in the federal appellate system, en banc rehearing is required 
before a circuit court can overturn the precedent of a panel or an earlier en banc court. Even the 
Supreme Court overturns its precedents only rarely, and it debates the scope of stare decisis even 
more rarely.8 In contrast, evaluating a claimed precedent to determine whether an identified 
proposition is holding or dicta occupies a great deal of judicial attention. Indeed, before a court 
can decide whether to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to a given case, it must first determine 
just what that case purports to establish. Because holdings in prior cases are at least 
presumptively binding, while dicta is not, this task requires an understanding of these terms.9
it”).
6
 At the federal level, within circuit courts, en banc panels are uniquely empowered to overturn the precedents of three-judge 
panels and prior en banc panels. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (listing intracircuit conflict as one of two grounds for granting en banc 
review). There are, however, two caveats. First, all circuits recognize that an intervening Supreme Court decision can undermine 
a decision of the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (1992) (“As a general rule, one three-judge 
panel of this court cannot consider or overrule the decision of a prior panel. An exception to this rule arises when an intervening 
Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit.”). This, however, is not so much an exception to 
horizontal stare decisis as it is a recognition that vertical stare decisis trumps horizontal stare decisis in a lower court to which 
vertical stare decisis applies. See infra note 9. Second, some circuits follow a rule that a prior panel decision may be disregarded 
in “those relatively rare instances in which authority that postdates the original decision, although not directly controlling, 
nevertheless offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light of fresh developments, would change its collective 
mind.” Williams v. Ashland Engr. Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 
1123 (7th Cir. 1987)).
7
 For an article that questions this conventional wisdom, see John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 
50 DUKE L.J. 503, 519 (2000). While Harrison acknowledges that the Supreme Court has admonished lower federal courts not to 
anticipate its own overrulings, see DeQuijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989), he observes that the 
rule is not grounded in the Constitution and suggests that when a lower court determines that a higher court would not adhere to 
its own precedent, the obligation to follow vertical stare decisis might not be absolute.
8
 For what is perhaps the most recent self conscious exercise among Supreme Court justices considering whether to adhere to or 
abandon the controversial decision, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9
 In our judicial system, the general rule is that courts must apply stare decisis to the decisions of courts above them in the 
judicial hierarchy. See Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 
(1994) (observing that “longstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a court 
‘superior’ to it”). This is the principle of vertical stare decisis. The force of horizontal stare decisis is not always so strong. The 
Supreme Court, for example, may decline to follow precedents of its own, particularly when those precedents concern 
constitutional law. See Mark Tushnet, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores: Two Versions of Judicial Supremacy, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 945 (1998) (observing that “the Supreme Court acknowledges its power to overrule its own precedents more 
readily in constitutional law than elsewhere”). District courts, meanwhile, may decline to follow even precedents of other district 
courts in the same district. See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003) 
(noting that “[a]s a general rule, the district courts do not observe horizontal stare decisis”).
5While the literature on stare decisis is broad, despite the growing need for a clear 
distinction to accommodate increasingly complex opinions, in recent decades the literature on 
the distinction between holding and dicta has been comparatively tiny.10 An earlier generation of 
scholars, in contrast, devoted considerable attention to the holding-dicta distinction.11 While no 
satisfactory definition has yet to emerge, legal scholars have largely turned their attention 
elsewhere. The questions whether to apply precedent, and how to construe a particular precedent 
in a given case, are intertwined. But they are not the same inquiry. Even an opinion without 
precedential value contains a holding. If anything, the more relevant inquiry in most cases is the 
one that has been given scant attention among the current generation of legal scholars. Courts 
themselves have not filled the theoretical void, and so the American judicial system lacks clearly 
defined rules on an important aspect of the process through which judges resolve cases and make 
law. Through a loose set of practices that vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and, 
perhaps more problematically, from court to court and case to case, judges define such terms as 
needed to assist in the task of resolving particular cases entirely on their own.
Despite the absence of any single governing source or universal agreement on how to 
define dicta, the legal system does not threaten to devolve into chaos or general incoherence. 
Rather, disagreements as to whether a claimed proposition is part of a court’s holding, or is 
instead merely dicta, surface in discrete disagreements over particular cases without unraveling 
the fabric of the law. There is no denying, however, the importance of understanding—both as a 
matter of theory and at the level of practice—how to approach such a central task as sorting 
holding and dicta. This query goes to the heart of the business of judging, which itself goes to the 
essence of the Anglo-American system of interpreting and making positive law. Even if there is 
broad agreement on a range of issues related to decoding dicta and holdings, it should not be 
10
 Indeed, our research revealed only one major law review article in the past fifty years exclusively focused on offering a broad 
theoretical treatment of the distinction between holding and dicta. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
1997 (1994). We will find much to commend in Dorf’s analysis. See infra Part IV.A. Dorf’s focus, however, is on “the 
jurisprudential implications of Article III for determining how federal courts ought to distinguish between the holdings and dicta 
of past cases.” Id. at 2025-40, 2049-66. All courts, including courts not bound by Article III, must distinguish holdings and dicta, 
and our analysis will be quite general. Dorf emphasizes that courts have not applied the holding-dicta distinction consistently, id.
at 2040-49, and explains the importance of a clear definition of the holding-dicta distinction, id. at 2024-28. We accept his 
conclusions on both points and believe that they suggest that a clearer definition of the holding-dicta distinction is necessary. 
Dorf himself, however, spends just a few pages on our interest, the practical problem of how to draw a distinction between 
holding and dicta See id. at 2040-49. We will conclude that the definition Dorf offers, though inventive and arguably superior to 
previously offered definitions, is neither easy to apply nor normatively justifiable. See infra Part IV.A.4.
11 See, e.g., EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES § 13, at 18-19 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1894); Arthur L. 
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 180 (1930). For our analysis of the distinctions between 
holding and dicta offered by these scholars and others, see infra Part IV.A.2-3.
6surprising that in the cases in which these issues matter most, the conceptual uncertainties that 
result from a lack of rigor in categorizing holding and dicta give rise to the greatest practical 
difficulties.
One difficulty in developing theoretically satisfying, and operational, understandings of 
the terms holding and dicta is that the most commonplace—and frequently cited—definitions of 
these terms are problematic in profound ways. Appreciating both why these definitions emerged 
and what is problematic about them is essential to our project. Consider, as perhaps the most 
prominent illustration, the definition of “Obiter dictum” in Black’s Law Dictionary: “[a] judicial 
comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to 
the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.”12 We will argue that the definition is 
indefensible,13 and at least inconsistent with the general understanding that alternative holdings 
in a case all count as holdings.14 In fact, we will demonstrate that as a core element in the 
definition of holding, necessity, is itself not necessary,15 and might not even be sufficient to 
ensure holding status to a given proposition.16 The intuition that underlies the definition, 
however, is easy to appreciate, because the definition works well for simple cases. In a case in 
which there is just one issue, and just one logical argument that can take a court from the facts to 
the judgment, discussions that do not lie along that path are unnecessary to the decision and are 
therefore dicta.
In this Article, our ultimate aim is not produce a holding/dicta code book, but instead a 
straightforward definition of the terms “holding” and “dicta.” Like any legal test, our definition 
will leave some gray areas, but we are confident that the definition is both theoretically sound 
and functional. It reflects the issues issues for which we are able to achieve relatively clear 
resolutions, while also providing a framework for confronting those issues for which competing 
policy considerations render the task of providing determinate outcomes particularly difficult.
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004).
13 See infra Part IV.A.3.
14 If a court has two possible means of achieving a disposition, for example if a challenged state law violates both equal 
protection and due process, then under this definition, neither basis for striking the challenged law down standing alone would be 
a holding. Yet, it cannot be the case that an opinion that strikes down a law on two grounds rather than one expresses no holding. 
For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see infra Part IV.A.3.
15 See infra Part IV.A.3 (demonstrating based upon alternative holdings that necessity is not a necessary element in affording 
holding status to actually decided propositions).
16 See infra Part IV.B.1 (suggesting that necessity might not be a sufficient condition in affording holding status to unresolved 
propositions that are logically required along the chosen decisional path from facts to judgment).
7We thus offer not only our recommendations for resolving even the closest conceptual issues, but 
also a framework with which scholars can approach such questions even if they do not embrace 
our specific conclusions on specific problems. By clearly identifying the issues that the literature 
has not directly addressed and the legal values at stake, our analysis will at least allow the courts 
to reach their own resolutions of these issues with greater conceptual clarity.
In the course of our analysis, we will categorize the various types of judicial assertions 
that can credibly be classified either as holding or dicta using a coherent and comprehensive
logical structure. For example, in addition to considering the problem of alternative holdings, we 
will ask whether a court is generally empowered to issue what we term biconditional holdings—
“if and only if” statements rather than mere “if, then” statements—one of several fundamental 
questions that to our knowledge has been overlooked in prior discussions of holding and dicta.17
The approach that we offer proves essential not only in ensuring analytical clarity and 
consistency, but also in exposing nuances that more impressionistic methodologies have failed to 
identify. In addition, using the methodology of rational choice, we consider the emergence of 
stare decisis and its role in limiting overreaching by judges in their attempts to transform dicta to 
holding. The analysis helps to explore both the function that stare decisis serves and how that 
function relates to the proper definition of holding and dicta.
We proceed as follows: Part II relies upon the famous Supreme Court case, Board of 
Regents of the University of California at Davis v. Bakke,18 to develop an analytical approach 
that we use to classify various judicial assertions as either holding or dicta. Part III explores the 
connections between stare decisis and the distinction between holding and dicta, in tailoring 
appropriate judicial incentives. We begin Part III with a rational choice model that identifies
endogenous incentives among judges to respect precedent, even when they disagree, and to limit 
the scope of opinions. Most importantly, the model exposes the limits of any resulting 
endogenous rules or norms, and the importance of meaningful and shared definitions of holding
and dicta in enforcing and in giving content to whatever general limits on judicial overreaching 
that the rational choice model helps to identify. Part III then establishes the foundation for our 
normative critique of existing definitions of holding and dicta by evaluating the various 
17
 The closest discussion that we have found to the biconditional statements question is Goodhart, supra note 11, at 180. For our 
analysis of Professor Goodhart’s discussion on this point and others, see infra Part IV.A.2 and accompanying text. 
18
 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
8categories of judicial assertions described in Part II based upon four normative considerations:
constraint, consideration, clarity, and candor.
In Part IV, we evaluate past definitions of holding and dicta and develop our own. While 
our analysis in this part accommodates the analytical categories developed in Part II, and builds 
upon the positive and normative analyses developed in Part III, the definition of holding and 
dicta that we offer is at once straightforward and comprehensive. In Part IV, we propose and 
defend the following: “A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen decisional path 
or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and 
(3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”19 While 
we provide a careful discussion of each element in our definition, the definition is intended to be
free standing, and to provide the basis for assessing holding and dicta even in most complex 
appeals court decisions. In Part V, we evaluate several prominent (and complex) cases, 
presenting issues such as the identification of a holding in a balancing test, in light of the
definition of holding and dicta that we offer. 
II. THE PROBLEMS OF DICTA
We begin our inquiry with a well known Supreme Court case: Bakke v. Board of 
Regents.20 We are aware that this is among the most written about, and contentious, opinions in 
modern jurisprudence.21 Our purpose is not to take a position on or even to enter the protracted 
debates as to its normative merits. To the contrary, we have chosen the case in part because more 
recent Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action make inquiries into what might count as 
holding or dicta in Bakke almost purely academic.22 Nor is our purpose to focus on the unique 
role of the Supreme Court in developing law and public policy in such divisive matters as 
affirmative action, or on the relevance of particular institutional features of the Supreme Court.
19 See infra Part IV.B.
20
 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
21
 For assessments of Bakke and its aftermath, see JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE, THE BAKKE CASE (1979); BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE (1988); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Piercing the Veil: William J. Brennan’s Account of Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 341 (2001); Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative 
Action Retrospective, 87 GEO. L.J. 981 (1999); and Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke Matter? Affirmative Action and 
Minority Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 697 (1999).
22 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program 
over a constitutional challenge); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down as unconstitutional the University of 
Michigan’s undergraduate affirmative action program).
9At least initially,23 we will assume that a single definition of the distinction between holding and 
dicta applies to all courts, including trial and appellate courts, and that a single definition applies 
to both courts in which single judges hear cases and to courts in which groups of judges hear 
cases.
We hope that the familiarity of the case will make our exposition more accessible. We 
will, however, focus on features of the discussions that were not the main object of academic 
attention in debates on the merits of the rulings. Our aim is to use the case to clarify the 
analytical structure of legal reasoning by identifying the relationship between individual 
statements in the controlling opinion and the overall argument in that opinion. This approach will 
expose a set of problems about what counts as holding and what counts as dicta. Bakke turns out 
to be a particularly useful case for exploring the holding-dicta distinction because it touches on 
all of these problems, though at points we develop hypotheticals variations on Bakke to explore 
problems not directly implicated in Bakke itself. The problems that we set out vary considerably 
in the level of analytical difficulty that they present. When the problems that we explore have 
easy answers, to simplify our exposition, we will anticipate our ultimate conclusions, even 
though a full justification must await the analytical framework that we will develop in Part III.
Other problems, though representing reasoning patterns or structures commonly found in 
judicial opinions, turn out to be difficult. While our ultimate goal will be to shed light on these 
problems, our immediate goal is simply to identify concrete questions that previous 
commentators have not identified, let alone resolved, about what counts as holding and dicta. We 
also acknowledge that in setting up our analytical framework, we adopt an admittedly technical 
terminology. Our ultimate objective is to provide a workable and nontechnical definition of 
holding and dicta that captures our eventual resolution of all the problems that we have 
identified.24
A. Bakke
In the contentious series of cases that culminated in the Supreme Court’s tandem rulings 
sustaining the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program,25 and striking 
23
 We will consider the institutional difference between the Supreme Court and ordinary appellate courts, and the relevance to the 
definition of holding and dicta infra Parts III.C.3 and IV.B. 
24 See infra Part IV.B. 
25
 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
10
down that university’s undergraduate affirmative action program,26 a central issue for the 
deciding courts was to discern the meaning of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.27
In Bakke, the Supreme Court considered Allan Bakke’s challenge to his rejection from the 
Medical School at the University of California at Davis. Bakke, who was white, alleged that the 
medical school denied him admission based upon race, and he argued that the medical school’s 
use of race violated the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.28 Justice Powell issued an 
opinion in Bakke that delivered the Court’s judgment.29
Justice Powell concluded that the medical school’s admissions program violated Bakke’s 
equal protection rights, but he concluded that the Equal Protection Clause did not prevent the 
medical school altogether from considering race in its admissions process. Justice Stevens, with 
the support of three others,30 agreed with Powell’s conclusion that Bakke’s rights were violated. 
There were thus five Justices altogether who voted that Bakke be admitted. Unlike Powell, 
however, Stevens would have held that any use of race in admissions in a state institution of 
higher education violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Meanwhile, a separate group 
of four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, agreed with Powell that the medical school 
constitutionally could consider race,32 and so a total of five Justices, including Justice Powell,
endorsed that proposition. Unlike Powell, however, Brennan would have applied the more 
relaxed intermediate scrutiny test to sustain what he determined was a benign race-based 
classification.33 Brennan would have determined that applying that test, remedying the present 
26
 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
27
 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke is discussed extensively in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314, 322 -25, 328-30, 335, 337, 341, and in Gratz, 
539 U.S. at 257-58, 269, 270-75.
28 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276-80 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
29 Id. at 269.
30
 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens. Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).
31
 “Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program.” Id. at 418. Justice Stevens, 
however, did not reach the Equal Protection Clause issue, arguing that because Bakke should prevail on statutory grounds, there 
was no need to consider the statutory issue. Id. at 412-13. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only “insofar as it affirms 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of California,” adding that “[t]o the extent that it purports to do anything else, I respectfully 
dissent.” Id. at 421. The words “purports to” may reinforce that Justice Stevens believed there to be an argument that some of 
Justice Powell’s opinion may have been dicta.
32 Id. at 326 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justices White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun).
33
 “[R]acial classifications designed to further remedial purposes must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Id. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted).
11
effects of past discrimination substantially furthered an important governmental interest, thus 
satisfying intermediate scrutiny, with the result of sustaining the Davis program.34
Because of the multiple opinions and partial concurrences, the most obvious place for 
lower federal courts and state courts to begin their search for Bakke’s holding was by considering 
whether Powell’s opinion resolved the case on the narrowest grounds, applying the framework 
articulated in Marks v. United States,35 and thus counted as the controlling opinion. Indeed, this 
question was vigorously litigated after Bakke.36 We believe that Powell’s opinion was the 
controlling narrowest grounds opinion in Bakke,37 and the Supreme Court eventually focused on 
the Powell opinion, albeit without conclusively resolving the Marks issue.38 Our concern in this 
Article, however, is not with Marks and the narrowest grounds rule. Rather, our question is 
whether particular statements in an opinion count as holding or dicta, given that the opinion is 
controlling. We will therefore assume without further analysis that the Powell opinion is 
controlling, and we will place the other opinions aside. In the next section, we will provide a 
summary of Powell’s opinion, identifying several propositions of interest to our later analysis, 
and we will then analyze these propositions in the sections following.
34 Id. at 362-79.
35
 433 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Marks held that when the Supreme Court decides a case and no opinion commands majority 
support, the opinion consistent with the outcome that resolves the case on the narrowest grounds is controlling. See id.
36 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 780-85 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (arguing against the application of 
Marks to Bakke and providing an overview of the treatment of the Marks-Bakke issue in the lower courts); Johnson v. Board of 
Regents of University of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to apply Marks to Bakke); Hopwood v. 
Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 275 n.66 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding Marks inapplicable to Bakke); Smith v. University of Washington, 233 
F.3d 1188, 1199-200 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Marks to Bakke).
37
 We believe that Marks did apply to Bakke and that the application is neither difficult nor indeterminate. See MAXWELL L. 
STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 130-33 (2002) 
(providing detailed analysis). Justice Powell’s opinion was the narrowest ground for both aspects of what he presented as the 
Court’s judgment. Powell claimed to have resolved both that state institutions of higher learning are permitted to use race in 
admissions, and that the Davis approach, a quota, is not permissible. Under the narrowest ground rule, the relevant question may 
be cast as follows: (1) Of the opinions that would allow the use of race, which would be most restrictive in allowing race to be 
used? (2) Of the opinions striking down the Davis quota, which would strike down the fewest potential state law affirmative 
action programs? In both instances, the unmistakable answer is the opinion of Justice Powell, and his opinion is therefore the 
narrowest grounds opinion. 
38
 Before the United States Supreme Court, litigants debated how to apply Marks to Bakke. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 
32-33, 2003 WL 164186, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516); Respondent’s Brief at 15 n.17, 2003 WL 402237, Gratz 
(No. 02-516). Once the case arrived there, however, the Marks analysis was beside the point. While Marks analysis binds lower 
federal courts and state courts in their efforts to construe fractured Supreme Court decisions, the Supreme Court itself is only 
obligated to give stare decisis effect to its prior majority decisions. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) 
(noting that only four Justices supported the reasoning of a prior precedent). Once the Supreme Court elected to reenter the 
affirmative action controversy, one might have expected that in the quest for Bakke’s meaning, all bets were off. Surprisingly, 
perhaps, while Justice O’Connor declined to clarify the application of Marks to Bakke, she did not maintain that doing so was 
irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s construction of a fractured panel case. Instead, she asserted that the Marks analysis simply did 
not matter given that the Grutter Court agreed with the merits  of Powell’s Bakke’s analysis. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
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1. Justice Powell’s Opinion
Justice Powell undoubtedly produced confusion concerning the holding in his Bakke
opinion by making determinations concerning a program other than the one immediately before 
the Court. Although Powell found that the Davis medical school’s affirmative action program, 
which had set aside sixteen out of one hundred seats for specified racial minorities,39 constituted 
an illicit quota,40 Powell also suggested that an alternative program used by Harvard University, 
which instead used race as one plus factor among many, and which evaluated all files as part of a 
combined admissions process, would withstand equal protection scrutiny.41 While the Regents of 
the University of California at Davis Medical School (the “Regents”), because they are not an 
elected policy making body, had improperly used race to remedy the present effects of past 
discrimination, Powell found that the Harvard program permissibly used race instead to promote 
its compelling interest in promoting student diversity in institutions of higher education. 
To assess what counts as holding and dicta, let us break down the Powell opinion. A 
careful reading of Powell’s opinion reveals an attempt to resolve no fewer than the following ten
propositions: 
(1) The medical school’s “special admissions program,” which set aside a 
prescribed number of seats for disadvantaged students,42 “is undeniably a 
classification based on race and ethnic background.”43
(2) “The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons,”44
including non-minorities, or more specifically, whites. 
(3) A race classification is permissible only when the classification satisfies the 
strict scrutiny test, i.e. when it is narrowly “tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.”45
(4) A desire to help groups of people who have suffered discrimination from 
society at large by admitting them on the basis of race “does not justify a 
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like [Bakke].”46
39 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 (opinion of Powell, J.).
40 Id. at 315.
41 Id. at 316-18.
42 Id. at 274-76.
89.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 299. Justice Powell used the phrase “precisely tailored” rather than “narrowly tailored,” id., but we have substituted the 
latter, more common statement of the strict scrutiny test.
46 Id. at 310.
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(5) A desire to improve delivery of health care services to underserved 
communities was not sufficiently compelling to justify the special admissions 
program, because “there is virtually no evidence in the record indicating that 
petitioner’s special admissions program is either needed or geared to promote that 
goal.”47
(6) The goal of “attainment of a diverse student body . . . clearly is a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institute of higher education,”48 and “the 
interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s admissions 
program.”49
(7) Nonetheless, by focusing on race or ethnic origin alone, the special admissions 
program “would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.”50
(8) A program like Harvard’s, in which “race or ethnic background may be 
deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet . . . does not insulate the 
individual from comparison with all other candidates,”51 would not share this 
defect.
(9) Someone rejected under the Harvard plan “would have no basis to complain of 
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.”52
(10) “[T]hat portion of the California court’s judgment holding petitioner’s 
special admissions program invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
affirmed.”53
We recognize, of course, that by identifying these ten propositions as representing the 
essence of Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, we are necessarily simplifying. Justice Powell made 
many more statements than these, which one might parse to determine whether they are holding 
and dicta. We focus on these ten statements, however, because each served an important role in 
Powell’s analysis, and we believe that the general principles that we develop here could be 
applied to any remaining propositions that Powell articulated in the rest of his opinion. Even if 
one disputed that these ten statements accurately capture the central assertions that Powell
endorsed in his analysis, doing so would not undermine our project. There will often be 
ambiguities about just what propositions a particular opinion endorsed, and where the boundary 
47 Id.
48 Id. at 311-12. Justice Powell stated that this conclusion had First Amendment implications. Id.
49 Id. at 314.
50 Id. at 315.
51 Id. at 317.
52 Id. at 318.
53 Id. at 320.
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lines of those propositions lie. Determining the extent to which a prior opinion binds a current 
court requires both the resolution of ambiguities and a determination of whether propositions 
given such resolutions are holding or dicta.54 Both of these are critical aspects of jurisprudential 
reasoning, but we are taking up only the latter challenge.
2. Analysis of Justice Powell’s Opinion
The following subsections will analyze Justice Powell’s opinion. We will divide our 
analysis into two subsections. The first subsection produces a presumptive definition of holding 
(and thus by negative implication, of dicta), counting all “supportive propositions” as part of the 
holding. A supportive proposition is one that is necessary or sufficient for the case disposition or 
for the disposition of another proposition that itself expresses a holding. Thus, if proposition A is 
sufficient for proposition B, and proposition B is necessary for the case disposition, then 
proposition A would count presumptively as a holding. This presumptive definition itself reflects 
the resolution of two significant problem categories: alternative justifications and alternative 
possible justifications. The second subsection considers a variety of additional problem 
categories, each representing a possible reason to depart from, or rebut, the presumptive 
definition, either by discounting a presumptive holding as dicta or by crediting presumptive dicta 
as holding. Constructing a definition that takes the form of a rebuttable presumption makes our 
analysis more manageable because it allows us to place aside, at least temporarily, some of the 
most difficult (and not surprisingly, more significant) issues. Our ultimate task, however, will be 
not only to defend our presumption-based definition, but also to offer satisfactory resolutions to 
the more difficult problem categories.
a. A Presumptive Definition
i. Necessary propositions and sufficient propositions
Let us start by considering the first two propositions together. Statement (1) (the Davis
program is race based) might be categorized as a resolution of a mixed question of fact and law,55
while Statement (2) (equal protection protects nonminorities, including whites) appears to be a 
54 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 64 (identifying a possible ambiguity in Justice Powell’s opinion).
55
 A mixed question of law and fact asks “whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). 
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resolution of a pure issue of law. Resolutions of both types of holdings potentially count as 
holdings, though holdings resolving pure questions of law may have broader application in 
subsequent cases.56 Statements (1) and (2) are both necessary propositions to the disposition of 
the case in statement (10) (the program is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment). A 
statement is a necessary proposition to a second statement if the court logically could not make 
the second statement while denying the first. On the facts of Bakke, the Court logically could not 
have concluded both that the Davis program was not race-based and that the program violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could the Court have concluded that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not protect whites while concluding that the program violated the Clause.
The classification of statements (1) and (2) as necessary propositions to the disposition of 
the case could not be reached by considering statements (1) and (2) in isolation. Suppose that 
Bakke had also claimed that he was a victim of sex discrimination. Statement (1) then would be a 
necessary proposition for the proposition that the Davis plan violated Bakke’s right to equal 
protection on the basis of race. That proposition in turn would be only a sufficient proposition for 
the conclusion that the Davis plan violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the Court could 
have found an Equal Protection Clause violation without finding a race-based classification. A 
statement is a sufficient proposition to a second statement if the court logically could not make 
the first statement while denying the second. Note that in Bakke as written, neither statement (1) 
nor statement (2) is a sufficient proposition for the disposition of the case. If, for example, the 
court had endorsed statement (1) but rejected statement (2), thus finding that the while the Davis 
program is race based, the Equal Protection Clause does not protect whites, the Court would not 
have concluded that the program was unconstitutional. As a result, statement (1) is a necessary 
but not a sufficient proposition for the disposition.
56
 Statement (1) appears to hold that any program identical to the special admissions program counts as a race classification, but 
it does not indicate whether other programs considering race count as racial or ethnic classifications. In theory, a subsequent 
court might have determined that some differently structured program did not employ a race classification even though it 
considered race. For example, a court might have distinguished this holding in Bakke in a case involving an admissions program 
in which there was no official policy about affirmative action, but individual admissions officers considered race. Of course, 
other cases might well have provided holdings that foreclosed this approach. The line between resolutions of mixed questions of 
law and fact and pure questions of law is often fuzzy because mixed questions can usually be restated as questions of law. See 
generally Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions 
Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1991) (discussing the difficulties that appellate courts face in deciding how to approach mixed 
questions). Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion might have reworded statement (1) in more general terms, specifying that whenever a 
particular plan has certain specified features, it would be considered a race-based classification.
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Crediting necessary propositions that a court has actually decided as holdings is 
obviously important. A legal system that did not count decided propositions that are necessary to 
the disposition as holdings is effectively a legal system without holdings. Thus, we can at least 
tentatively conclude that decided propositions that are necessary to the disposition of a case are 
holdings, even if those propositions are not sufficient for the result.57 This conclusion helps 
explain the visceral appeal of a definition of holding as any statement necessary to resolving the 
case, a definition that we shall criticize in detail later.58 But the conclusion does not justify this 
definition, and there is a strong argument for presumptively counting sufficient propositions to 
the disposition as holdings as well. The sex discrimination hypothetical may make this intuitive. 
Suppose that Bakke had raised a sex discrimination claim, and the Court concluded in one line at 
the end of the opinion that it did not need to consider that claim. As we have already seen,
statements (1) and (2) would no longer be necessary to the result of the case (nor necessary to a 
proposition that itself was necessary to the outcome). Even so, one might well conclude that 
statements (1) and (2) should count as holdings even though the unresolved sex discrimination 
issue was also before the Court.
ii. The problem of alternative possible justifications
Statement (4) (remedying the present effects of past discrimination does not justify using 
race as a factor in admissions) and statement (5) (improving health services for underprivileged 
communities does not justify using race as a factor in admissions) raise the issue of sufficient 
propositions directly. These statements are both responses to claims by the medical school that 
certain social interests should save the program from being struck down. Under the Court’s 
selected test in Statement (3) (all race classifications are subject to strict scrutiny), which we will 
return to in a moment,59 any proffered interest will suffice to save the program if and only if that 
interest is found to be compelling and the program is found to be narrowly tailored to further that 
compelling interest.60 Statement (4) appears to reject the claim that remedying the present effects 
of past discrimination is a compelling interest. Statement (5) appears to reject the claim that 
57
 For confirmation of this tentative conclusion, see infra Part III.C.1.
58 See infra Part IV.A.3. As we have previously asserted, see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text, as a free standing 
requirement, necessity is not necessary and might not be sufficient for a proposition to be classified as a holding. See also infra 
Parts IV.A.3, IV.B.1.
59 See infra text following note 62.
60 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
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downstream benefits to underprivileged communities can justify an affirmative action program 
on narrow tailoring grounds, although the court leaves open the possibility that a plaintiff might 
be able to establish narrow tailoring with stronger evidence, even for a similar program.61 Thus, 
both statements (4) and (5) respectively imply sufficient propositions (lack of compelling 
interest, lack of narrow tailoring) for propositions (the past discrimination argument cannot save 
the statute, the health services argument cannot save the statute) that, because a contrary finding 
would produce the opposite result, are necessary for the disposition.
This presentation reveals our first problem category, which we will call the problem of 
alternative possible justifications. As an alternative to statement (4), Justice Powell might have 
concluded that the Davis plan was not narrowly tailored to remedying the present effects of past 
discrimination, but Justice Powell did not consider that issue. Similarly, as an alternative to 
statement (5), Justice Powell might have concluded that benefiting underprivileged communities 
is not a compelling interest. The issue is not whether the alternative possible justification has the 
status of dicta; after all, Justice Powell said nothing as to its resolution. Instead, it is whether the 
potential alternative means of reaching a conclusion through the alternative possible justification 
renders the actual means of reaching the conclusion dicta. Eventually, we will conclude that the 
answer is “no,” and that the existence of alternative possible justifications does not turn what 
otherwise would count as holding into dicta.62
Statement (3) (all race classifications are subject to strict scrutiny) also raises the problem 
of alternative possible justifications, though in a more subtle way. Justice Powell’s opinion does 
not reach a conclusion about whether the Davis program would have failed intermediate scrutiny, 
61
 Statement (4) is a holding about what courts should do in the absence of evidence on the record about downstream benefits of 
diversity. On its own terms, statement (4) does not purport to determine whether a university could rely on the benefits of an 
affirmative action program in generating doctors for underserved communities. Thus, while Bakke resolved the question whether 
an affirmative action program could be justified by its benefits for those advantaged, it did not resolve whether it could be 
justified by its benefits for those not advantaged. It was at least conceivable in Grutter that the Court could have stated that the 
University of Michigan Law School, unlike the Davis Medical School, had presented data sufficient to demonstrate that the 
challenged affirmative action program significantly promoted access to legal services among minorities and the poor. See Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Michigan Black Law Alumni Society in Support of Respondents at 21-24, 2003 WL 537217, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241) (making this argument). The basis for Justice Powell’s rejection of statement (4), unlike that for his 
rejection of statement (3), invited the future possibility of such a fact-based distinction. 
Interestingly, in Grutter, Justice O’Connor ignores this distinction even though it might have made he r argument more 
persuasive. O’Connor states, “Justice Powell rejected an interest in ‘increasing the number of physicians who will practice in 
communities currently underserved,’ concluding that even if such an interest could be compelling in some circumstances the 
program under review was not ‘geared to promote that goal.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306, 310 
(opinion of Powell, J.)). This statement mischaracterizes Justice Powell, who stated only that there was insufficient evidence that 
the program was geared to promote that goal.
62 See infra Part III.C.2.
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had that been the appropriate test. Thus, as an alternative means of justifying the conclusion that 
Davis’s race classification was impermissible, Justice Powell might have found that the Davis 
program failed intermediate scrutiny. This conclusion would have relieved Justice Powell of the 
need to determine whether strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate test since a 
state proffer that fails intermediate scrutiny necessarily fails the more stringent strict scrutiny.
Justice Powell’s opinion can be read as assuming arguendo that the Davis program would pass 
intermediate scrutiny. The problem of alternative possible justifications thus arises generally 
when an opinion author either explicitly or implicitly makes an assumption that, if successfully 
refuted, would provide further justification for the eventual result.
iii. The problem of alternative justifications
Statement (8) (a plus factor plan would not hinder the attainment of diversity) might at 
first appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for any other proposition. Regardless of 
whether facts about Harvard’s plan were formally part of the record, Harvard’s plan was not the 
plan that the Court was evaluating. This analysis, however, turns out to be simplistic, because it 
could be argued that statement (8) and statement (7) (the Davis program hinders genuine 
diversity) are both sufficient propositions for the broader proposition that the Davis program fails 
narrow tailoring. Although Justice Powell does not explicitly identify statement (7) as responsive 
to the narrow tailoring analysis, a demonstration that a program hinders a goal shows a fortiori 
that the program is not narrowly tailored to achieving that goal. Identification of a more narrowly 
tailored program also may show that the challenged program is not narrowly tailored.
Justice Powell prefaced his comments on the Harvard plan as follows: “The experience of 
other university admissions programs . . . demonstrates that the assignment of a fixed number of 
places to a minority group is not a necessary means toward that end.”63 Powell’s discussion of 
the Harvard plan might be seen as sufficient to resolve the constitutionality of the Davis plan. 
The discussion of the Harvard plan demonstrated that an alternative plan existed that was more 
narrowly tailored than the Davis plan. Thus, even if the Court had not concluded that the Davis 
program hindered genuine diversity, which itself was a sufficient basis for concluding that a 
program is not narrowly tailored, Justice Powell can be interpreted as having believed that his 
analysis of the Harvard plan established that the Davis plan was not narrowly tailored.
63
 438 U.S. at 316 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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There remains, to be sure, ambiguity about whether Justice Powell actually considered 
the existence of a more narrowly tailored plan by itself sufficient to conclude that the Davis plan 
was not narrowly tailored. Depending upon how it interprets the narrow tailoring prong of strict 
scrutiny,64 a future court could argue that, at best, the Harvard plan discussion contributed to 
Powell’s analysis only in an informal way. Often, it is possible to identify an argument that 
contributes to the analysis in an opinion, without being able to determine definitively whether
that analysis was necessary to or sufficient for some higher-order proposition, and ultimately for 
the disposition of the case. Just as our task is not to resolve ambiguities concerning what 
propositions an opinion endorsed,65 so too is it not to resolve ambiguities concerning what role a 
particular proposition played within the internal reasoning of an opinion writer, where a judge 
has not objectively explained how that proposition supports the judge’s argument. The existence 
of the ambiguity here would provide sufficient justification for a later judge to determine that 
statement (8) is not necessary or sufficient for any other proposition, and we will consider the 
statement under that assumption momentarily.66 But for now, we will assume that statement (8) 
represents a sufficient proposition for the proposition that the Davis plan was not narrowly 
tailored.
Thus understood, statements (7) and (8) present the problem of alternative justifications. 
Justice Powell could have justified his conclusion that the Davis plan was not narrowly tailored 
(a conclusion that itself is not directly represented by any of the ten statements listed above) with 
either statement (7) or statement (8), but he chose unnecessarily to consider and endorse both
statements (7) and (8). The previously considered problem of alternative possible justifications 
presented a situation in which it might not have been necessary for an opinion author to consider 
one of two (or more) statements, but in which we cannot be sure, because we could not know 
what the analysis of the unexplored issue would have revealed. With alternative justifications, it 
is unmistakable that the opinion author did more than was necessary. Thus, there may be a 
stronger case for excluding alternative justifications from the status of holding than there would 
be for excluding statements representing alternative possible justifications.67 If we were to accept 
65 See supra text accompanying note 54.
66 See infra text accompanying note 88.
67
 When a judge advances multiple justifications, there is a danger that the judge is doing so because the judge wishes to have 
control over the resolution of multiple issues. See infra Part III.B.1, Part III.C.2. One might also make other arguments for
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the simplistic “necessary” definition of holding, alternative justifications would not be 
holdings.68 Eventually, however, we will conclude that neither problem by itself should 
transform a statement from holding into dicta.69
iv. Supportive and nonsupportive propositions
Statements (6) (diversity is a compelling interest) and (7) (focusing exclusively on race
would hinder genuine diversity), reflect the two prongs of the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis for 
the diversity defense of affirmative action. In constrast, we have seen that Justice Powell used 
statement (4) (remedying the present effects of past discrimination does not justify using race as 
a factor in admissions) to refute the past discrimination defense by considering only the 
compelling state interest prong, and used statement (5) (improving health services for 
underprivileged communities does not justify using race as a factor in admissions) to refute the 
downstream benefits defense by considering only the narrow tailoring prong. Statement (7) is 
like statements (4) and (5), however, in the sense that all three statements articulate propositions
that are sufficient to support a proposition that is necessary to the eventual result. Specifically, by 
rejecting narrow tailoring, statement (7) implies the proposition that on the facts of the case, the 
state’s proffered goal of promoting academic diversity will not save the program. Thus, 
statement (7) (a quota undermines diversity) is sufficient to a proposition (the Davis program is 
not narrowly tailored) that is necessary for the ultimate result (striking the program).
Unlike statements (4) and (5), however, statement (7) does not present the problem of 
alternative possible justifications. Justice Powell explored the apparent alternative justification 
(the compelling interest prong) in statement (6) (diversity is a compelling interest), thus rejecting 
the argument that diversity provides no compelling interest as a possible alternative justification 
for his result. Thus, statement (7) would appear to have at least as much of a claim to holding 
status as statements (4) and (5). Statement (6), in contrast, would appear to have less of a claim 
to the status of holding. At least in our stylized presentation, it appears that it would have made 
counting alternative justifications as holding, while ignoring alternative possible justifications. For example, one might argue that 
alternative justifications invite an intellectual shell game in which a judge who perceives weaknesses in argument A advances 
argument B, and perceiving weaknesses in argument B advances argument C. But because none of the arguments needs to be 
independently conclusive—instead they are each alternative justifications—the judge does not iron out the wrinkles in any of the 
arguments (or reject any or all of the arguments as deficient). This problem is less acute in the context of alternative possible 
justifications because there the court has chosen to resolve the issue on one ground, but has not foreclosed the possibility that a 
different court selecting a different ground might get to the same judgment.
68 See infra note x and accompanying text.
69 See infra Part III.C.2.
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no difference to the case outcome, or to his need to consider other legal issues, had Justice 
Powell skipped statement (6). 
More concretely, statement (6) is not a “supportive proposition,” by which we mean one 
that is necessary to or sufficient for either the disposition or any other supportive proposition. 
Identifying “nonsupportive propositions” like statement (6) is useful because such propositions
can be freely omitted without affecting either the result or the need for a court to determine other 
propositions en route to reaching the result. Returning to our earlier hypothetical, if the Court 
had concluded that the Davis plan also constituted sex discrimination against Bakke, that would 
be a supportive proposition. That determination would not have affected the result, because
absent the discussion the Court would have achieved the same judgment relying solely on race 
discrimination. The determination, however, would have meant that the propositions related to 
race discrimination could alternatively have been omitted without affecting the result, since the 
Court could have relied solely on sex discrimination. But if the Court had concluded that the 
Davis plan did not constitute sex discrimination against Bakke, that would be a nonsupportive 
proposition, because inclusion of such reasoning would have had no effect on the remainder of 
the analysis.
b. Possible Reasons for Deviating from the Presumptive Definition
We will assume for now that a supportive proposition presumptively counts as a holding. 
As a result, any proposition that is necessary to or sufficient for either the disposition or for 
another holding will itself be a presumptive holding. This assumption will allow us to separate 
the analysis thus far, which focused on the relationship between the propositions at issue and 
higher-order propositions, including but not limited to the disposition of the case, from the 
analysis that follows, which focuses on whether the relationships between or among individual 
propositions should alter this initial presumption.
i. The problem of structured analysis
One argument for crediting nonsupportive propositions as holdings immediately arises, 
and this argument also will reveal a potential reason to discount some supportive propositions as 
dicta. Even though statement (6) is a nonsupportive proposition, the question of whether an 
interest is compelling is part of a legal test. We consider legal analysis to be structured when a 
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legal test or legal doctrine, whether adopted in the case itself or in prior cases, identifies what a 
party must show to prevail on an issue. Strict scrutiny provides that to defend a certain type of 
program (in Bakke, programs that use racial classifications), the government must show both a 
compelling interest and that the program is narrowly tailored to that interest. When structured 
legal analysis identifies two or more elements, factors, or prongs as required to resolve a 
particular issue, there is an argument that a court’s consideration of any one of these should 
count as a holding even if that portion of the analysis is nonsupportive, because consideration of 
elements of a structured analysis might not seem like a mere aside.70
With unstructured analysis, in contrast, the courts may consider various issues, but there 
is no legal test or doctrine that explicitly ties those issues together or requires their collective 
resolution. One might imagine a hypothetical Bakke decided in a world in which there was no 
such thing as strict scrutiny. The Court might still have been willing to entertain arguments about 
issues such as the importance of diversity and whether the Davis program was genuinely geared 
to advancing this interest. But those two considerations would not have resulted from any test or
doctrine that identified them as the exclusive issues of interest or as related factors driving the 
result on one issue. While common law courts often apply doctrinal tests,71 they also often 
engage in case-by- case reasoning in which the import of any portion of the analysis is not 
specified in advance. Another example of unstructured analysis might be a case in which a 
litigant has made two distinct challenges to a statute, for example under the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution and under a parallel state constitutional provision. In such a case, in 
contrast to the hypothetical Bakke without a formulated strict scrutiny test, the relationship of 
each issue to the disposition of the case would be clear. As with the Bakke hypothetical, 
however, there would be no test or doctrine tying the two issues together (after all, if the case had 
arisen in a state without such a constitutional provision, the state issue would not even have 
arisen), and so we would label the relationship between the two issues to be unstructured.72
70
 We recognize that the phrase “a mere aside” is question-begging, and we will defend our conclusions about structured analysis 
more rigorously later. See infra Part III.C.4. Our immediate purpose is simply to identify a potential reason for deviating from the 
presumptive definition of holding.
71
 For a defense of the use of doctrinal tests in constitutional adjudication, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing 
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997). 
72
 As with most legal distinctions, there may be close cases between structured and unstructured analysis. Consider, for example, 
a plaintiff who challenges a statute on the basis that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, with specific 
challenges based upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. This case is 
structured in the sense that one might say that constitutional doctrine clearly indicates that to find a violation of the Fourteenth 
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There is a further important distinction within the category of structured analysis,
between ordered and unordered analysis. Even though Justice Powell’s statement of the strict 
scrutiny test in statement (3) mentions the tailoring issue before the compelling interest issue, it 
might appear that the most natural order for strict scrutiny analysis is to consider the compelling 
interest issue first. Lawyers might intuit that one should resolve pure questions of law, such as 
whether an interest is compelling, before resolving applications of law to fact, such as assessing 
whether a particular program is narrowly tailored to an interest. Moreover, the narrow tailoring 
prong requires for its application at a mimimum the assumption of an interest to which the 
program will be linked. In contrast, the compelling interest prong does require any understanding 
about the program that must be linked to that interest based upon narrow tailoring. Lawyers 
might therefore intuit, rightly or wrongly, that because the reverse of the conventional 
application of the test would require the following a three step analysis—(1) a presumed interest, 
(2) an assessment linking the program to the interest based upon narrow tailoring, and (3) a 
determination whether the assumed interest is compelling—the more logical approach is instead 
a straightforward two-step analysis in which we first assess whether the interest is compelling
and only then assess narrow tailoring.
The judgment that the strict scrutiny test has a natural order, however, may be based as 
much on aesthetics as on logic. The following wording of a strict scrutiny test seems natural 
enough and would seem to imply a different order: “The state must prove its challenged law is 
narrowly tailored to serve a proffered governmental interest, and further establish that the 
proffered interest is compelling.” A requirement that a classification be tailored to serve a 
proffered governmental interest, which is then established as compelling seems to differ only in 
emphasis from Justice Powell’s requirement that a classification be narrowly “tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.”73 If forced to choose which of the strict scrutiny prongs 
comes first, most constitutional lawyers, we suspect, would choose the compelling interest 
prong. This intuition, however, appears to be largely a function of custom, and the fact that in the 
English language, the wording Justice Powell used happens to be more elegant and compact than 
the alternative. We thus recognize that lawyers may disagree about the most natural order of 
Amendment, a court must find a violation of one of its clauses. Our tendency, however, is to see this as an example of 
unstructured analysis, because there is no doctrinal interdependence between or among the individual constitutional claims and 
because these issues are frequently, indeed most commonly, raised in isolation of one another.
73
 438 U.S. at 299 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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many legal tests, not limited to strict scrutiny, and about whether some legal tests are ordered at 
all.
Different tests and doctrines lie along a continuum with respect to how strongly or 
weakly ordered they are, although individual tests might prove difficult to classify. At one end of 
the continuum lies rigidly ordered doctrine, for which a court is absolutely required to consider 
one issue before another. The paradigmatic example is that courts must resolve certain threshold 
issues, such as standing, favorably to the claimant before considering the merits of a case.74 If 
that is the right end of the continuum, then slightly to the left would be cases in which the 
authoritative decisionmaker has definitively indicated that there is a typical, or seemingly 
natural, order, but that in an extraordinary case, a court might approach issues in a different 
order. An example of this is the general principle that issues of subject matter jurisdiction should 
be resolved before issues of in personam jurisdiction, given that a defect in personal jurisdiction, 
unlike a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, can be waived. The Supreme Court has recognized 
this principle but decided that it is not absolute.75 Loosely ordered tests like strict scrutiny are 
further to the left of the continuum. And to the far left are multifactor tests where there is no 
priority, or interdependence, among the various identified factors.76
Regardless of whether analysis is unstructured, structured but unordered, or structured 
and ordered, in the course of its written opinion, a court will necessarily consider the issues that 
it addresses in a chosen order. The ordering of issues within a judicial opinion presents an 
additional distinction potentially relevant to assessing whether nonsupportive propositions 
should be credited as holdings. Sometimes, by the time the court reaches a particular issue in its 
opinion, it will be clear, even placing aside any clues from an introductory roadmap that the case 
may provide, that because of the manner in which the court has resolved the other case issues, 
the resolution of the remaining issue cannot affect the case judgment regardless of how it is 
resolved. Although the issue may have been potentially supportive at various points in the case 
or on appeal, thus motivating counsel to advance arguments concerning its preferred resolution, 
it has become nonsupportive by virtue of the court’s prior resolution of issues that proved 
74 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (rejecting the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction), 
discussed infra text accompanying notes x-x.
75 See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (finding that questions of subject matter jurisdiction ordinarily 
should, but need not always, analytically precede questions of personal jurisdiction), discussed infra notes x-x.
76
 For a discussion of one such test, see infra Part V.C.
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controlling earlier in the opinion. Of course this is not always the case, and quite frequently, the 
court will resolve issues early on in an opinion in a manner that requires the resolution of other 
supportive issues to determine the ultimate judgment.77 The distinction that we are drawing is 
whether an issue is or is not of continuing relevance, in the sense of potentially affecting the 
outcome, by the time a court addresses that issue in its opinion based upon the manner in which 
it has already resolved the preceding issues in the same opinion. When issues have continuing 
relevance at the point at which the court addresses them in its opinion, there is an argument for 
considering the resolution of those issues to constitute holdings, even though in the final analysis 
the resolution might prove nonsupportive.
Overlaying the distinction between continuing relevance and no continuing relevance 
onto the three-way distinction among unstructured, structured but unordered, and structured and 
ordered analyses produces six possible classifications for nonsupportive propositions. In addition
to these six categories, it is possible for a proposition to be absolutely irrelevant in the sense that 
nothing would turn on its resolution regardless of the order in which the court considered it 
relative to the remaining issues discussed in the opinion. Table 1 places the seven resulting 
categories of nonsupportive propositions along a continuum representing the strength of the 
presumption favoring, or disfavoring, holding status. Absolutely irrelevant propositions present 
the strongest case for disfavoring holding status, or for presuming dicta. The case of an ordered 
test where the nonsupportive proposition remains relevant at the point of the analysis where the 
court considered it presents the strongest case for crediting nonsupportive propositions as 
holdings. If a court must find A and then B in that order to rule for a party, and the court finds A
but then concludes not B, there is a strong argument that A, even though it is ultimately a 
nonsupportive proposition, should count as a holding. Because there is a continuum representing 
the degree to which tests are or are not ordered, there is also a continuum from “structured but 
unordered, continuing relevance” to “structured and ordered, continuing relevance.” For reasons 
that we will elaborate later,78 the closer a proposition on this continuum is to being a structured 
77
 A simple example: Finding that jurisdiction or standing is met invites resolution of the supportive issues addressing the merits 
of the case.
78
 One way to think of this is to recognize that when a test is implicated in a proper case, random factors beyond the control of 
the court present the need to apply the test and, as a result, there is little risk that applying the entire test is the product of judicial 
manipulation. See infra Part III.C.4.
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and ordered proposition with continuing relevance, the stronger will be its claim to the status of 
holding.
The examples in the table are based upon three hypotheticals. The first, the paradigm of 
ordered analysis, is a case in which because standing is jurisdictional, the court must resolve 
standing in favor of the claimant before it addresses the merits. The second, an example of an 
unstructured analysis, is a case in which a plaintiff challenges a statute banning the advertising of 
handguns on both First Amendment and Second Amendment grounds; to prevail the plaintiff 
needs to succeed on either ground. The third, an example of a structured but unordered analysis, 
is a case in which a plaintiff challenges a state’s refusal to honor a gay marriage from another 
state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause; to prevail, the plaintiff must establish that the 
marriage should count as a “public act” or as a “judicial proceeding” of the other state.79 In all 
these examples, we assume that there are no other contested issues in the case.
Table 1. Types of nonsupportive propositions80
Category Example
(1) Absolutely irrelevant In any of the three hypotheticals, the court mentions that Michael 
Jordan is the greatest basketball player ever. This could not affect 
the outcome of the case regardless of how the court resolved the 
other propositions, and would thus clearly have no precedential 
value in a subsequent case in which Jordan sues on a contract in 
which, for good consideration, he is promised a large bonus if he 
establishes a reputation as the greatest basketball player ever.
(2) Structured and ordered, with no continuing 
relevance
In the threshold issue hypothetical, the court finds that the plaintiff 
does not have standing, but then rules that the plaintiff’s argument 
on the merits is correct. The resolution of the merits issue is an 
ordered nonsupportive proposition that has no continuing relevance
at the time the court considers the issue.
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(3) Unstructured, with no continuing relevance In the handgun advertising hypothetical, the court strikes down the 
statute on First Amendment grounds, but then finds that the Second 
Amendment would not provide a basis for striking down the statute. 
The latter conclusion is a nonsupportive proposition that is part of an 
unstructured analysis and that has no continuing relevance by the 
time the court considers the issue.
79 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”). See generally Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power Under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604 (1997) (discussing the applicability of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause to the question of gay marriage).
80 This table arranges nonsupportive propositions along a continuum, from weakest presumptive claims to holding status at the 
top to strongest presumptive claims to holding status at the bottom. The broken line between rows (4) and (5) signifies that while 
we believe that there is a stronger claim to holding for propositions with no continuing relevance but that form part of a 
structured and unordered analysis, we recognize that others might instead view the distinction between continuing relevance and 
no continuing relevance as more important than that between structured and unstructured, in which case a proposition that is part 
of an unstructured analysis with continuing relevance would be entitled to a relatively stronger presumption of holding status. 
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(4) Structured but unordered, with no continuing 
relevance
In the gay marriage hypothetical, the court finds that the marriage is 
a “public act,” and is thus entitled to Full Faith and Credit, and then 
concludes that the marriage would not count as a “judicial 
proceeding.” The latter conclusion is a nonsupportive proposition that 
is part of a structured, but unordered analysis and that has no 
continuing relevance by the time the court considers the issue.
(5) Unstructured, with continuing relevance In the handgun advertising hypothetical, the court rejects the First 
Amendment argument, but then strikes down the statute on Second 
Amendment grounds. The former conclusion is a nonsupportive 
proposition that is part of an unstructured analysis, but that had 
continuing relevance at the time the court considered the issue.
(6) Structured but unordered, with continuing 
relevance
In the gay marriage hypothetical, the court finds that the marriage is 
not a “public act,” but then concludes that the marriage was a 
“judicial proceeding,” and is thus entitled to Full Faith and Credit 
Clause protection. The conclusion with respect to “public act” is a 
nonsupportive proposition that is part of a structured but unordered 
analysis, but that had continuing relevance at the time the court
considered the issue.
(7) Structured and ordered, with continuing 
relevance
In the threshold issue hypothetical, the court finds that the plaintiff 
has standing but then rules against the plaintiff on the merits. The 
former conclusion is a nonsupportive proposition that is part of an 
ordered analysis that had continuing relevance at the time the court 
considered the issue.
So far, we have considered the problem of ordered analysis only with respect to 
nonsupportive propositions. The problem of ordered analysis, however, may also imply that 
some supportive propositions, which presumptively count as holding, should instead be 
discounted as dicta. The analysis is simpler for supportive propositions, however, because there 
is only one category—structured and ordered, with no continuing relevance—that presents an 
argument for converting holding to dicta.81 Where a test is ordered, and the court resolves the 
first prong of the test in a way that determines the outcome under the test as a whole, there is a 
strong argument that the court’s resolution of the second prong should be discounted as dicta 
even if it would otherwise count as an alternative justification and a holding. Suppose, for 
example, that a court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction and yet proceeded to resolve the 
merits.82 If the court resolved the merits against the petitioner,83 the resolution of the merits might 
81
 The other categories at most simply restate the problem of alternative justifications. Consider, for example, supportive 
propositions in unstructured analysis with no continuing relevance. In a variation on the handgun advertising hypothetical 
depicted in row (3) in Table 1, suppose the court strikes down the statute on First Amendment grounds, but now finds that the 
Second Amendment provides an additional basis for striking down the statute. The Second Amendment conclusion is a 
supportive proposition that is part of an unstructured analysis, but that has no continuing relevance at the time the court considers 
the issue. Whether this proposition should count as a holding or dicta depends entirely on the problem of alternative 
justifications.
82 See infra text accompanying notes x-x (discussing hypothetical jurisdiction).
83
 For an infamous illustration of a case fitting this paradigm, see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), where 
having found no diversity jurisdiction, because Dred Scott was not a citizen of a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 
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be seen as an alternative justification for the petitioner to lose. Nonetheless, the problem of 
structured and ordered analysis would provide an argument for discounting the merits resolution 
as dicta even if alternative justifications are generally holdings.
ii. The problem of hypotheticals
The analysis so far has provided an interpretation of Powell’s argument that would make 
statement (8) (a plus factor plan would not hinder the attainment of diversity) a supportive 
proposition, and thus applying our definition, presumptively a holding.84 Even so, there may be 
another argument for denying holding status to statement (8). The court’s analysis of the Harvard 
plan is counterfactual. Statement (8) can be interpreted as a conditional statement: “If a plan has 
the characteristics of the Harvard plan, then it will not hinder achievement of genuine diversity.” 
The antecedent of that statement— “a plan has the characteristics of the Harvard plan”—is false 
in Bakke, because the Davis plan did not have the characteristics of the Harvard plan. If a 
Harvard-like plan were presented in a subsequent case, a lawyer challenging the program might 
argue that even if statement (8) formed a part of Powell’s Bakke analysis in a manner that 
ordinarily would entitle it to presumptive holding status, the counterfactual nature of the 
statement should suffice to rebut that presumption.
We will label this the problem of hypotheticals. Reasoning about actual cases based upon 
hypothesized case facts implicating significantly distinguishable cases yet to be presented is not 
only not unusual, it is the standard fare of judging. Judges frequently pose hypotheticals about
undecided cases in oral arguments, and analogical reasoning is frequently reflected in published 
opinions.85 A judge in Case A might conclude that Case A is sufficiently similar to Case B, a case 
with different facts, that they should produce the same result. That poses no problem for our 
purposes if the outcome in Case B is already clear by virtue of a prior holding. It might pose a 
problem, however, if the outcome in Case B is not resolved, and the judge in Case A anticipates a 
result in Case B to facilitate its resolution in the case before it.86 Does an anticipated result of 
Article III of the United States Constitution, the Court nevertheless proceeded to reach the merits of the case, striking down the 
Missouri Compromise. For a critical analysis of the first holding, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 39 
(1997).
84 See supra notes 63- 69 and accompanying text.
85
 Assessments of the usefulness of analogical reasoning in judicial opinions include Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: 
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996); Emily Sherwin, 
A Defense of Analogical Reasoning, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999); and Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993)
86
 As an example, suppose a court faces a case involving whether flag burning should receive First Amendment protection. The 
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Case B count as a holding about how to resolve those facts, if the anticipation itself forms a 
sufficiently integral part of the reasoning that, were it not counterfactual, it would count as a 
holding of Case A? Analogical reasoning is undoubtedly important in allowing judges to sharpen 
their analyses of factual and legal issues presented on appeal, but this does not necessarily mean 
that analogical reasoning creates additional holdings.87
iii. The problem of biconditional statements
The analogical reasoning problem presents a possible reason for counting statement (8) (a 
plus factor plan would not hinder the attainment of diversity) as dicta even if it is a presumptive 
holding, and statement (8) also must count as presumptive dicta if interpreted as a nonsupportive 
proposition.88 Either way, the problem of biconditional statements provides an argument for 
counting statement (8) as holding. The argument is that even if the propositions related to the 
Harvard plan were irrelevant in the formal sense that they did not lead to the case result, they 
were relevant in the sense that they articulated a resolution of the central issue of the case. That 
issue is the extent to which it is acceptable for government educational institutions to use race as 
a consideration. In this sense, endorsement of statement (8) and other statements concerning the 
Harvard plan were indeed supportive of the court’s resolution of this issue and were not 
hypothetical.
Justice Powell himself came close to justifying the Harvard discussion on this basis. 
Countering a complaint89 from Justice Stevens that his opinion had gone further than necessary 
court might reason that flag burning should be treated like cross burning, and even though the court might never have considered 
cross burning, the court might conclude that cross burning should receive First Amendment protection and therefore that flag 
burning therefore should as well. (For consideration of the flag burning-cross burning analogy in the analogical reasoning 
literature, see Sunstein, supra note 85, at 759-61.) The question is whether this creates a holding as to cross burning, should that 
issue subsequently come before the court.
87 The analogical reasoning in statements (7) and (8) arguably differ from conventional analogical reasoning, because the 
statements are being used to address legal questions the resolutions of which arguably require a form of analogical reasoning. An 
analysis of the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny demands the identification or rejection of a more narrowly tailored 
alternative. See supra note 64. Thus, use of analogical reasoning may be necessary rather than merely sufficient to establish some 
higher-order proposition. In the end, though, this argument is a nonstarter. Even if the court must use analogical reasoning to 
assess a particular proposition, there would be no requirement that it use any particular analogy. 
88 See supra text accompanying note 66.
89
 Justice Stevens’s criticism that Justice Powell engaged in an unnecessary discussion demonstrates that the distinction between 
holding and dicta not only affects what future courts will consider authoritative in a precedent-setting opinion, but also might 
affect the precedent-setting court’s own determination of how much to say. Thus, while some jurists might willingly defend 
against accusations of claiming holding status for what is arguably dicta, as Powell appears to have done regarding statement (5), 
or happily admit to authoring dicta without making this stronger claim, others might see dicta as something that is best avoided. 
See, e.g., Hollister Convalescent Hosp.., Inc v. Rico, 542 P.2d 1349, 1356-58 (Cal. 1975) (referring to “unnecessary and 
overbroad dicta,” “ill-considered dicta,” “erroneous dicta,” “panoramic dicta,” and “persistent dicta”); see also infra Part III.B 
(arguing that opinions closely tied to the material facts of a case may be normatively preferable to opinions that stray from the 
material facts).
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to resolve the case,90 Powell noted that the lower court had rejected the Davis plan on the broad 
ground that Davis had considered race at all, rather than on the potentially narrower ground that 
Davis had improperly employed race in the form of a quota.91 The reference to the lower court 
might obscure the point. Whether a statement in a Supreme Court opinion is holding or dicta 
depends on the issue presented to the Supreme Court, not on the issues that the lower court 
happened to discuss. 92 If, for example, the lower court had also explored an argument by Bakke 
that he was the victim of sex discrimination, but the Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari on 
this basis, that issue would not be before the Court. Or, if the lower court had itself reached 
propositions that count as dicta, the lower court’s decision to do so would not make the Supreme 
Court’s decision to repeat or refute those statements holdings. The Supreme Court itself has 
stated that it “reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.”93
Conceived in its best light, Powell’s point is not so much that the issue of whether race
could be used was resolved in the lower court, but that the issue of whether race could be used 
was before the Supreme Court itself.94 Powell’s analysis of the Harvard plan constituted part of 
his resolution of this question. Let us now imagine that Powell had organized his opinion 
differently. Powell might have started with the question whether race constitutionally could be 
considered in admissions decisions, concluding that such consideration was acceptable as long as 
race was used as a plus factor rather than as a quota, and then considered how his resolution 
90
 Justice Stevens noted that, following the California Supreme Court ruling, there was no “outstanding injunction forbidding any 
consideration of racial criteria in processing applications.” 438 U.S. at 410-11 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens concluded: “It is therefore perfectly clear that the question whether race can ever be used as a 
factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case, and that discussion of that issue is inappropriate.” Id. at 411. For a 
critique of Powell’s opinion along these lines, see Arval A. Morris, The Bakke Decision: One Holding or Two, 58 OR. L. REV.
311, 326-32 (1979).
91
 438 U.S. at 271 n.** (opinion of Powell, J.) (stating that the California Supreme Court opinion “left no doubt that the reason 
for its holding was petitioner’s use of race in consideration of any candidate’s application”). Justice Powell also emphasized that 
the medical school “cross-complained in the trial court for a declaratory judgment that its special program was constitutional.” Id.
That a party sought declaratory judgment in a suit, however, ordinarily would not be thought of as allowing the courts to consider 
issues beyond the controversy between those parties. See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) 
(noting that jurisdiction in declaratory judgment suits is limited to the actual controversy between the parties). 
92 See Morris, supra note 90, at 331 (“If each reason given by a lower court in support of its judgment constituted an issue 
properly before the United States Supreme Court, the consequences would be chaos.”). A higher court can choose not to pass on 
many propositions made by a lower court. A reviewing court, reaching the same result on a narrower ground as the court below, 
has elected to hold off resolution on the broader ground unless and until a case arises that disallows resolution on the selected 
narrower ground and that instead demands resolution—in either direction—on the broader ground. Justice Powell’s implication 
that he was forced to reach the issue because the lower court mentioned it thus seems unpersuasive. Whether or not he was 
compelled to do so, however, does not answer whether Powell overreached in electing to reach the issue arising at the broader 
level, specifically whether the use was altogether impermissible.
93
 Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956).
94
 These are admittedly connected. The issue was before the Supreme Court in part because it had previously been resolved in the 
lower court, and also because the Court had granted certiorari on that issue.
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applied to the facts of the Davis plan, concluding that the Davis plan counted as an illicit quota. 
Even if the Harvard plan were used as an example to explain the plus factor concept, the 
conclusion that race can be used as a consideration and the distinction between a plus factor and 
a quota no longer would seem to be as much of a detour.
Our point is not to criticize the internal organization of Powell’s opinion, but rather to 
recognize that in that opinion, Justice Powell effectively created a test for whether use of race in 
admissions decisions is constitutional. While subsequent commentators unmistakably 
extrapolated the test from Powell’s analysis,95 surprisingly, the observation that it was a test did 
not appear to factor into anyone’s analysis of whether the discussion of the Harvard plan was 
holding or dicta.96 Tests, of course, are ubiquitous in law,97 and we have already seen that 
statement (3) (all race classifications are subject to strict scrutiny) adopted a test to be applied to 
affirmative action plans. A court’s decision to formulate a test may present two distinct 
problems, which we will refer to as the issue of biconditional statements and the issue of 
breadth. 
We will first consider biconditional statements. If we accept the proposition that equal 
protection condones some benign use of race, we might imagine a boundary that divides 
permissible from prohibited methods of using race. According to the Bakke Court, the Davis 
quota plan was on the wrong side of that line. Powell could have made clear that the Davis 
program was on the wrong side of the line without making clear exactly where the line was. 98
For example, he might have written, “A quota will never be narrowly tailored to the goal of 
improving diversity. Whether a race classification other than a quota, such as Harvard’s plus 
factor plan, can be narrowly tailored is a question for another day.”
95 See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative 
Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 924 (1983) (noting that Justice Powell distinguished between programs that used race as a plus 
factor and those that used race to justify quotas).
96 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the prior literature assessing the holding-dicta distinction in Bakke).
97 See Fallon, supra note 71, at 67 -73 (offering a typology of eight different kinds of tests in constitutional law).
98
 Those who joined the Stevens opinion in Bakke would have held that any use of race violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, and thus indicated that the Davis plan was far from the boundary line for the permissive use of race. See supra note 31. 
Justice Powell, in contrast, elected to inform courts and relevant state actors that in his view, the Davis plan was sufficiently close 
to the boundary line that with some modifications, Davis could salvage its affirmative action program. Had Powell been unable to 
make that proffer, it is at least conceivable that he might have preferred to endorse the Davis plan in full, rather than risk 
signaling that any use of race—including the Harvard plan which he endorsed—was illicit. See infra note x and accompanying 
text. 
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Such an opinion would have endorsed the proposition “if quota, then not narrowly 
tailored,” but it would have said nothing about the inverse99 proposition “if not quota, then 
narrowly tailored” (or, what amounts to the same thing, “if instead a plus factor approach, then 
narrowly tailored”). Justice Powell’s opinion, however, endorsed both the proposition, in 
statement (7) (focusing exclusively on race would hinder genuine diversity), and its inverse, in 
statement (8) (a plus factor plan would not hinder attainment of diversity). The test that Powell 
created is thus the biconditional statement “if and only if a quota, then not narrowly tailored.”
The biconditional statement issue is whether this statement counts as a holding, assuming that 
statement (7) would count as a holding, in which case statement (8) should count as a holding as 
well.
iv. The problem of breadth
Powell’s endorsement of the quota test also presents the related but analytically separate 
problem of breadth. Powell might have described the facts of the Davis plan, and concluded, 
based upon the aggregation of those facts, that the program failed narrow tailoring. This 
presumably would have produced a holding—“if a program is just like the Davis program, then it 
is not narrowly tailored”—but the holding would be extremely limited. That might be the 
narrowest possible proposition that would support the judgment, but Powell also might have 
made some other generalizations in between this level of generality and the level of generality 
that he ultimately chose. For example, Justice Powell might have singled out schools that have
racial quotas but that do not also ensure a minimum number of places for applicants with other 
qualities.100 Alternatively, Powell might have endorsed only the proposition that “if a race-based 
quota is used in a graduate admissions program, then it is unconstitutional,” leaving aside the 
question of race-based quotas at other educational institutions. In sum, Powell could have chosen 
narrower reasoning than he apparently selected without affecting the ultimate case judgment. 
The question is whether a judge’s decision to endorse a broader proposition than necessary in 
99
 The implication “if not p, then not q” is the inverse of the statement “if p, then q.” The inverse is thus the contrapositive of and 
logically equivalent to the converse (if q, then p). See, e.g., http://www.jimloy.com/logic/converse.htm (last visited September 2, 
2004) (discussing the definition of converse, inverse, and contrapositive).
100
 Powell disliked the Davis program because racial minorities were singled out for special treatment, unlike those with 
“exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a 
history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important.” 438 U.S. at 
317 (opinion of Powell, J.). Powell’s opinion suggests that it might have been sufficient to sustain the program had Davis singled 
out additional groups for reserved places that are not open to the general applicant pool. Whether or not this is a satisfactory 
reading of Bakke, the analysis reveals that an author of an opinion must select from a continuum of breadth.
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resolving a case makes the broader selected proposition dicta. We will eventually conclude that it 
does not.101
The breadth issue affects whether a later court may distinguish a precedent from an 
earlier court. A later court cannot distinguish a prior case in a way that is contrary to any of that 
case’s holdings. If Justice Powell had issued only the narrowest possible ruling, focusing only on 
the facts, then a later court could have distinguished Bakke easily. For example, a court might 
have concluded that a program just like the Davis plan, but with a smaller percentage of spaces 
reserved for minority students, was acceptable. Given Bakke as written, a later court 
distinguishing Bakke on the same ground would need to conclude, explicitly or implicitly, either
that Powell’s reasoning did not endorse the proposition that racial quotas are unconstitutional or 
that the proposition was dicta. Otherwise, the distinguishing court would seem disingenuous. Our 
analysis cannot do all the work of clarifying when it is permissible for a later court to distinguish 
a prior case, of course. That will also depend on resolution of ambiguities about what 
propositions the precedent-setting court indeed endorsed.102
If unnecessary breadth makes a statement dicta, then both statements (7) (focusing 
exclusively on race would hinder genuine diversity) and (8) (a plus factor plan would not hinder 
the attainment of diversity) would be dicta because the biconditional statement analysis above 
suggested that statement (8) might be a holding only on the assumption that statement (7) counts 
as a holding. Let us, however, assume (as we will later conclude103) that broad statements do not 
make statements dicta. The final statement other than the disposition, statement (9) (the Harvard 
plan would be constitutional), is easily analyzed. Statement (9) followed logically only because 
Powell had already endorsed statement (6) (diversity is a compelling interest).104 Against the 
backdrop of the remaining statements, given either statements (6) or (9), the other statement 
101
 As we will later demonstrate, see infra notes x-x and accompanying text, an understanding of holding that would relegate to 
the status of dicta any rationale that is broader than necessary in resolving a particular case operates in tension with the Supreme 
Court’s narrowest grounds rule articulated in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1973). Such an understanding would 
suggest that the Court’s holding is limited to the narrowest possible grounds even when a majority, or indeed a unanimous Court, 
stands united behind a broader rationale in support of the ultimate case disposition.
103 See infra Part III.C.7.
104
 It might appear that statement (9) also presents the problem of breadth, because the court concludes that a plus factor 
approach would be constitutional, rather than merely drawing the narrower conclusion that a plus factor approach is narrowly 
tailored. But this issue is analytically distinct from the problem of breadth. Consider statement (9) in conditional form: “if a 
program uses a plus factor approach, then constitutional.” The problem of breadth concerns the antecedent to this conditional (a 
program uses a plus factor approach), not the consequent. Whether the breadth of the consequent should count as a holding 
depends on whether statement (6) counts as a holding.
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follows as a corollary. Where a statement’s truth depends on that of other statements, it logically 
can count as a holding only if the other statements count as holdings.
3. Summary and Comparison with Previous Analyses
We have now completed the necessary analytical apparatus with which to analyze Justice 
Powell’s Bakke opinion. Table 2 includes in the first column each of the propositions discussed 
above. The second column states whether the identified proposition is necessary or sufficient to 
some higher-order proposition in the case, and the third column states whether this classification 
makes it a supportive proposition, thus warranting presumptive holding status, or a 
nonsupportive proposition, thus warranting presumptive dicta status. Finally, the fourth column 
identifies the reasons that the presumptive status accorded each proposition in the third column 
might be rebutted, thus discounting some presumptive holdings as dicta and crediting some 
presumptive dicta to holding. Because statement (8) is ambiguous,105 we have offered two 
constructions, each with its own analysis.
Table 2. The Bakke Propositions and their Presumptive and Ultimate Holding-Dicta Classifications
Proposition Classification of 
proposition
Presumptive 
status
Possible rationales for rebutting 
presumptive holding or dicta 
status
(1) Davis program is 
race-based.
Necessary to statement (10) Holding None
(2) Equal protection 
protects nonminorities.
Necessary to statement (10) Holding None
(3) All race classifications 
are subject to strict 
scrutiny.
Test; selection of some test was 
necessary to statement (10)
Holding Problem of alternative possible 
justifications; the Court might have 
instead concluded that the Davis 
program failed a laxer test.
(4) Remedying the 
present effects of past 
discrimination is not a 
compelling interest.
Sufficient for proposition that goal 
of remedying the present effects 
of past discrimination does not 
pass strict scrutiny
Holding Problem of alternative possible 
justifications; the same result could be 
achieved under strict scrutiny by refuting 
narrow tailoring.
(5) Improving health 
services for 
underprivileged 
communities was not 
shown to be a goal to 
which program was 
narrowly tailored.
Sufficient for proposition that goal 
of improving health services for 
underprivileged communities 
does not pass strict scrutiny
Holding Problem of alternative possible 
justifications; the same result could be 
achieved under strict scrutiny by finding 
no compelling state interest.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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Proposition Classification of 
proposition
Presumptive 
status
Possible rationales for rebutting 
presumptive holding or dicta 
status
(6) Diversity is a 
compelling interest.
Nonsupportive proposition Dicta Problem of structured analysis; the 
compelling interest prong is a part of the 
structured strict scrutiny analysis and 
arguably is ordered first in that analysis.
(7) Focusing exclusively 
on race by means of a 
quota would hinder 
genuine diversity.
Sufficient for proposition that 
Davis program is not narrowly 
tailored to goal of achieving 
diversity 
Holding (1) Problem of alternative justifications; 
the second interpretation of statement (8) 
is also sufficient for the proposition that 
the Davis program is not narrowly 
tailored to goal of achieving diversity.
(2) Problem of breadth; Powell could 
have issued a narrower holding.
Arguably nonsupportive 
proposition
Dicta Problem of biconditional statements,
assuming that (7) is a holding; Powell 
established the quota vs. plus factor 
dichotomy as the means of determining 
narrow tailoring.
(8) A plus factor plan 
would not hinder
attainment of diversity.
Arguably sufficient for proposition 
that Davis program is not 
narrowly tailored to goal of 
achieving diversity
Holding (1) Problem of alternative justifications; 
statement (7) is also sufficient for the 
proposition that the Davis plan is not 
narrowly tailored to goal of achieving 
diversity.
(2) Problem of breadth; Powell did not 
have to resolve the constitutional status 
of all plus factor plans.
(3) Problem of hypotheticals; the plan at 
issue was not a plus factor plan.
(Note: If any of these three is adequate to 
convert the presumptive status, then the 
problem of biconditional statements 
might convert the status to dicta.) 
(9) The Harvard plan 
would be constitutional.
Nonsupportive proposition Dicta As corollary of (6) and (8)
(10) The Davis plan is 
unconstitutional.
The disposition Holding None
Determining the status of Justice Powell’s discussion concerning the Harvard plan, and 
specifically whether any conclusions reached were dicta or holding, had significant implications 
for lower court litigation about affirmative action. And yet, those courts never adequately 
confronted the governing definitional issues. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, concluded, “We 
do not believe that Justice Powell's opinion is binding, and his discussion of the Harvard Plan 
was entirely dicta.”106 While that court rested the first conclusion on its analysis that the Marks
narrowest grounds doctrine cannot be applied to Bakke,107 the more important point for present 
106
 Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001).
107 Id. at 1246-47. But see supra note 37 (arguing that the Powell opinion necessarily is controlling under Marks).
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purposes is that it offered no justification at all for the second conclusion.108 The Sixth Circuit 
noted the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion but declined to address whether the Eleventh Circuit was 
correct. “Even if this portion of Justice Powell’s opinion could be labeled dicta, it is nevertheless 
dicta from the determinative opinion in the only Supreme Court case to address the consideration 
of race and ethnicity in academic admissions,” the court observed, concluding that it therefore 
carries “considerable persuasive authority.”109
Legal scholars have considered the question whether the discussion of the Harvard plan 
should be treated as dicta in greater detail, but even those discussions have not identified the 
critical issues that we have shown here. In an informative discussion, Alan Meese argues, “The 
language approving the use of a plus system . . . was plainly gratuitous, dealing, as it did, with an 
issue—and an admissions program—that was not before the Court. This language was dicta 
under the conventional definition.”110 Meese is correct that the Harvard plan was not directly 
before the Court, and perhaps that alone might be viewed by some as sufficient to remove 
Powell’s conclusions concerning plus-factor plans from the category of holding. But as 
demonstrated above, one can argue that Powell’s discussion of the Harvard plan was not 
gratuitous at all. Rather, the discussion was arguably essential to the narrow tailoring analysis of 
the Davis plan and within the confines of that discussion, merely constituting the “and only if” 
portion of his proffered biconditional holding on narrow tailoring. We will assess later whether 
that should count as enough, and while Meese has accurately described a “conventional 
definition” of dicta insofar as one exists, his lack of attention to this point of logical structure 
reflects the broader lack of attention in the scholarly literature.
The status of Justice Powell’s discussion was particularly critical to lower court litigation, 
because once lower courts identify a Supreme Court holding, they must follow it under the rule 
of vertical stare decisis.111 The definitions of holding and dicta, however, also matter to the 
108
 The district court offered only a slightly more detailed justification of this position. “Powell’s view as to the validity of a 
‘Harvard-style’ admissions system was mere dicta and not a holding in any event, since Bakke concerned a dual-track program 
rather than a ‘plus factor’ program like Harvard’s or UGA’s.” Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 
1362, 1369 (S.D. Ga. 2000), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
109
 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 746 n.9 (2002) (en banc), aff’d, 2003 WL 21433492 (U.S. June 23, 2003) (No. 02-241). 
110
 Alan J. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 GREEN BAG 381, 383 & n.12 (1998) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of 
dicta). Meese’s application of the conventional definition seems reasonable, subject to the caveat that at least to Powell, the 
evaluation of the Harvard program may in fact have been necessary. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. We will argue, 
however, that the conventional definition is flawed and inconsistent with conventional practice. See infra Part IV.A.3.
111
 Under State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 484 (1989), lower federal courts and state courts are prohibited from anticipatorily overruling Supreme Court precedents 
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application of horizontal stare decisis, both at the circuit court level (where previous decisions 
are binding except in the unusual case of a prior panel decision that is vacated pursuant to en 
banc reconsideration or an intervening Supreme Court case that demonstrates that the prior panel 
case rests upon discredited precedent),112 and in the Supreme Court. In the recent Supreme Court 
affirmative action litigation,113 most of the briefs ignored the issue.114 Perhaps the absence of 
discussion is attributable to a strong intuitive sense that Justice Powell’s discussion of the Davis 
plan was dicta. The failure of affirmative action’s opponents even to make any rigorous attack on 
the characterization of the Harvard plan as holding, however, reflects problems with existing 
definitions of dicta and the failure of commentators more broadly to consider the definitional 
question with precision.
Admittedly, the distinction should have mattered less than it would have had the relevant 
portion of Justice Powell’s opinion been set out in a majority opinion. Had the Court wished to 
deviate from Powell’s conclusions, it could have simply observed that whether or not the Powell 
opinion resolved Bakke on the narrowest grounds, the Supreme Court, unlike lower federal 
courts and state courts, need adhere only to precedents established in its own majority 
decisions.115 And while Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter, adopted more or 
less in full Justice Powell’s Bakke analysis, she did so while claiming no need to resolve whether 
Powell’s Bakke opinion was a binding precedent under the narrowest grounds rule.116 After all, 
whether a statement is holding or dicta does not matter much if the subsequent court concurs 
with the merits of the stated proposition. Yet, at various points in her opinion, O’Connor justified 
based upon subsequent case law developments. Instead, lower federal courts and state court must wait until an express overruling 
by the Supreme Court itself. If one accepts the premise that both halves of Powell’s Bakke opinion—striking Davis’s use of race, 
while allowing some use of race in the form of a plus factor—expressed the holding under the narrowest grounds rule, then 
Hopwood v. Texas, 732 F.2d 932, 968 (5th Cir. 1996), which struck down the University of Texas Law School affirmative action 
program based largely upon post-Bakke developments in the Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence, violated the principle 
expressed in Khan and de Ouijas. For further discussion of Hopwood, see infra notes 309-315.
112 See supra note x and accompanying text.
113 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
114
 For a notable exception, see Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Neither Party at 13-
15, 2003 WL 164165, Grutter (No. 02 -241). This brief concludes that Powell’s discussion of the Harvard plan is dicta, based on a 
definition offered by Arthur Goodhart. Id. We will critique that definition later. See infra Part IV.A.2.
115 See supra note 38. This approach would have served the dual purposes of enabling the Supreme Court both to extricate itself 
from Powell’s idiosyncratic approach to affirmative action and to remind lower federal courts and state courts of their continuing 
obligation to abide all Supreme Court precedents, including narrowest grounds decisions, unless and until the Supreme Court 
expressly overturns them, see supra note 111.
116
 Justice O’Connor stated that it was unnecessary to perform the Marks inquiry, because “we endorse Justice Powell’s view that 
student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
325. O’Connor gave no indication that she even recognized the existence of an issue of whether Justice Powell’s comments on 
the Harvard plan were dicta. 
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her conclusions as much by citing Powell as by developing her own argument.117 Such citations 
might have seemed somewhat more persuasive if Powell’s statements were clearly holdings 
(even if holdings not entitled to stare decisis weight), and conversely, somewhat less persuasive 
if Powell’s statements were clearly dicta.
B. Summary of Identified Problems
We have now created a presumptive definition of holding embracing each statement that 
is a supportive proposition, in the sense that it is necessary or sufficient either for the disposition 
or for another holding. We now will summarize the problem categories that, assuming that this is 
the appropriate presumptive definition,118 might reverse the presumptive classification. Table 3, 
which follows, identifies the problems that might turn presumptive holdings into dicta, or that
might turn presumptive dicta into holdings, along with explanations and illustrations from the 
preceding discussion. Because the problem of structured analysis may have both effects, it is 
listed twice.
117 See, e.g., id. at 337 (“The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions 
program is paramount.”) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52 (opinion of Powell, J.), without offering any additional defense).
118 See infra Part III.D.1-3 (arguing in support of this presumptive definition). If we determined that the problem of alternative 
possible justifications and the problem of alternative justifications were both sufficient to turn a holding into dicta, then we would 
need to abandon the presumptive definition.
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Table 3. Potentially presumption-altering categories, with explanations and illustrations
Potentially 
Presumption-Altering 
Category
Explanation Example from Bakke
Alternative possible 
justifications
A and B are propositions that, if accepted, 
would each be sufficient for a holding. The 
court resolves and accepts A but does not 
consider B. The question is whether the 
failure to consider B denies A the status of 
holding.
Justice Powell found that the goal of 
remedying past discrimination was not a 
compelling interest, but he did not consider 
whether the Davis program was narrowly 
tailored to this goal. A negative answer to this 
question also would have been sufficient for 
the proposition that the goal of remedying 
past discrimination could not justify the Davis 
plan. The question is whether the finding that 
remedying past discrimination was not a 
compelling interest is a holding.
Alternative justifications A and B are propositions that, if accepted, 
would each be sufficient for a holding. The 
court resolves and accepts both A and B. The 
question is whether A and B must both count 
as dicta because neither was necessary for 
resolution of the case. 
Justice Powell arguably offered two 
justifications for the proposition that the Davis 
program failed narrowed tailoring: first, that 
the Davis program itself hindered genuine 
diversity; and second, that a more narrowly 
tailored program, the Harvard plan, would 
meet the constitutional requirement. The 
question is whether each finding negates the 
status of the other as holding.
Hypotheticals A is a conditional proposition with an 
antecedent that is false on the facts of the 
case. The question is whether A should count 
as dicta as a result.
Justice Powell determined that if an 
affirmative action plan were structured like the 
Harvard plan, it would be narrowly tailored to 
the goal of improving diversity. (Note that 
even if the problem of hypotheticals would 
make this statement dicta, the problem of 
biconditional statements might restore this 
particular example to holding status.)
Breadth A is a proposition that is a presumptive 
holding, but A is broader than necessary for 
the court to reach the disposition. The 
question is whether the broader than 
necessary portion of the statement is dicta.
Justice Powell concluded that if a program 
uses quotas, it is not narrowly tailored to the 
goal of improving diversity. The Court could 
have offered a narrower proposition, such as 
if a graduate educational program uses 
quotas or if it uses quotas based upon a 
particular percentage, it is not narrowly 
tailored to the goal of improving diversity. 
Structured analysis (for 
presumptive alternative 
holdings)
A and B are propositions that are tied 
together by a doctrinal test. That test may be 
ordered or unordered. For example, suppose 
a legal test that the court is applying 
considers A before B. The court resolves A in 
a way that resolves the test as a whole (either 
finding A true if the test is “A or B” or finding A
false if the test is “A and B”), and it then 
proceeds to resolve B in the same way. The 
question is whether the resolution of B should 
count as dicta, assuming that the problem of 
alternative justifications does not ordinarily 
turn presumptive holdings into dicta.
In a hypothetical alternative to Bakke, the 
Court concludes that Bakke did not have 
standing and that he would have lost anyway 
because affirmative action is constitutionally 
permissible. Even if the conclusion that 
affirmative action is constitutionally 
permissible ordinarily would count as a 
holding because alternative justifications in 
fact do count as holdings, the question is 
whether the proposition should count as dicta 
since the first prong of the analysis (standing) 
made it unnecessary for the Court to consider 
the second prong (merits). 
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Biconditional statements A is a holding, and B, which is not a 
presumptive holding, is the inverse of A. The 
question is whether B’s status as the inverse 
of A elevates B to the status of holding.
Justice Powell identified as the test for 
meeting narrow tailoring to the goal of 
diversity whether the program took the form 
of a plus-factor plan (permissible) or a quota
(impermissible). Assume that the following 
counts as holding: If a program uses quotas, 
it is not narrowly tailored to the goal of 
improving diversity. Now assume that 
biconditional statements count as holdings.
Then, the following would also count as a 
holding: A program taking the form of a plus 
factor plan is narrowly tailored to further the 
goal of academic diversity.
Structured analysis (for 
presumptive dicta)
A legal test that the court is applying 
considers A before B. The court resolves A in 
a way that does not resolve the test as a 
whole (either finding A false if the test is “A or 
B” or finding A true if the test is “A and B”),
and it then resolves B in opposite fashion. 
Because the stated resolution of A does not 
affect the resolution of the test, A is a 
nonsupportive proposition and thus 
presumptively dicta. Whether A should 
nonetheless count as a holding may depend 
on the degree to which the test is ordered.
Justice Powell applied the strict scrutiny test, 
which may be understood to require first a 
compelling interest prong, and second means 
that are narrowly tailored in furtherance of 
that interest. The Court applied the test in that 
order, concluding that diversity was a 
compelling interest, but that the Davis plan 
was not narrowly tailored to it. The question is 
whether the compelling interest conclusion 
should be considered a holding because it is 
the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.
III. POSITIVE MODELS AND NORMATIVE FACTORS
We have now identified several categories of judicial assertions that courts can, and 
sometimes do, present as holdings in their judicial opinions. Before reviewing the various 
definitions of holding and dicta that have been offered in the literature and presenting our own, 
the subject of Part IV, we must lay a proper theoretical foundation to use in evaluating the 
various definitions. This task has both a positive and a normative component. 
Understanding the conceptual origins and characteristics of stare decisis, and defining 
holding and dicta, are distinct but overlapping projects. Each set of inquiries focuses in 
significant part on evaluating two aspects of judicial overreaching, first the risk that judges will
present overly broad written opinions as precedent, and second, the risk that judges will
disingenuously construe past precedents to avoid results with which they disagree. As a result, it 
is important to our project to understand the role of both sets of legal constraints—stare decisis 
and the definitions of holding and dicta—in shaping appropriate judicial behavior. This task
requires that we explore the conceptual foundations and characteristics of stare decisis, and that 
we evaluate the extent to which stare decisis itself inhibits the two identified forms of judicial 
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overreaching. Once we understand the constraining role of stare decisis, we can better appreciate 
any remaining opportunities for these forms of overreaching even with stare decisis in place.
Proper definitions of holding and dicta should be targeted toward reducing (even if they cannot 
altogether eliminate) the remaining opportunities for inappropriate judicial behavior.
As we will demonstrate, stare decisis doctrine provides meaningful limits on 
opportunities on judicial overreaching. It leaves substantial room, however, for differences 
among judges, even when those judges are acting in good faith, respecting the permissible extent 
to which a court can properly claim holding status in a given opinion for particular propositions. 
It also leaves substantial room for differences as to which a later court can credibly claim a basis 
for distinguishing a seemingly problematic precedent.119 While stare decisis provides a core set 
of principles for limiting judicial overreaching, it does not answer several of the specific 
questions identified in Part II concerning those holding categories that prove the most difficult.
To understand the nature of the limits that stare decisis imposes, it is important to 
appreciate the doctrine’s theoretical origins. As we will elaborate,120 prior commentators have 
offered models grounded in rational choice theory to demonstrate that even without formally 
imposed rules demanding adherence to precedent, judicial systems would develop a legal regime 
that employs precedent in some form.121 In addition, commentators have used rational choice to 
demonstrate that within a legal system based upon precedent, judges behaving rationally are 
motivated to limit, to a considerable extent, the scope of their written opinions. Rational choice 
analysis is appealing in this context because it suggests that even if society did not impose formal 
obligations on judges to adhere to precedent, or to limit the scope of their opinions in some way, 
a system resembling the one that we observe, which possesses these characteristic features,
would likely emerge as a product of the rational expectations of interactive jurists.
While these conclusions are largely compatible with our own analysis, we are less 
persuaded that the models developed thus far accurately reflect the dynamics that give rise to the 
119 See supra text accompanying note 102 (discussing the relationship between the holding-dicta distinction and the task of 
distinguishing precedents).
120 See infra Part III.A.
121
 One datum strongly supportive of this intuition is that civilian regimes go further than declining to impose an obligation of 
precedent, and instead formally eschew precedent. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 144 (1969). While civilian regimes formally reject precedent, 
legal scholars have observed that over time, such systems nonetheless begin to resemble common law systems in their effective, 
if not formal, reliance upon precedent. See id. (observing that “although there is no formal rule of stare decisis, the practice is for 
judges to be influenced by prior decisions”); infra note 263.
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stare decisis doctrine or to the incentives in shaping the judicial writing and construction of 
opinions. Exploring the contributions and limits of existing models, and suggesting some modest 
refinements, will allow us to appreciate several critical features of stare decisis that are of 
particular relevance to our larger project, namely devising theoretically sound and functional
definitions of holding and dicta that complemen t stare decisis in encouraging appropriate judicial 
behavior. Refining the existing models allows us to improve upon the explanatory force of 
rational choice in providing a theoretical foundation for several important aspects of judicial 
practice that we commonly observe. Once we have accurately described the nature and limits of 
stare decisis based upon our rational choice model, and have further considered the limits of that 
doctrine in properly constraining the two feared manifestations of judicial overreaching that we 
have identified,122 we can then evaluate the role of proper understandings of holding and dicta in 
furthering appropriate judicial incentives. After we set out our positive model, we will thus 
undertake a careful analysis of the various categories of judicial assertions set out in Part II based 
upon four normative considerations that are particularly relevant to our larger project.
Before proceeding, we would like to offer a few brief methodological comments. Our 
analysis is not intended to suggest (and does not suggest) that judges uniformly exhibit a set of 
common behaviors that one can label “rational.” We do not, for example, suggest a single 
maximand or utility function that can be superimposed on judges as a class.123 Judges, like 
members of any other profession, have a wide range of personal attributes and expectations, 
including expectations about their profession. Our goal is not to use rational choice to describe 
the psychology of the individual jurist or even of jurists generally. Instead, by developing some 
basic suppositions about judges and recognizing that there are exceptions to any characterization 
that we make, we can evaluate how the judiciary as an institution is likely to respond to some of 
the problematic phenomena that our analysis reveals. We can then further consider how judges
behaving rationally are likely affected by those judicial practices that our analysis predicts will 
emerge. The essential intuition that underlies our analysis is merely that institutions are formed
122 See infra Part III.A.
123
 To that extent, we agree with the subtitle of Judge Posner’s essay, responding to the question “What do judges maximize?” 
with the reply “the same thing as everyone else.” See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing as 
Everybody Else Does), 3 S. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993). The point of course is that individual preferences—and in this case judicial 
preferences—are widely varied. A sound rational choice analysis can account for such differences and still provide insights into 
how the judiciary shapes, and is shaped by, the expectations of a group of diverse judges acting rationally in pursuit of their 
objectives.
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or modified in response to particular difficulties that confront individuals when they are unable 
to solve certain bargaining or coordination problems on their own, and further, that individuals 
shape their behavior, and their expectations, in consequence of the structures of the institutions in 
which they are operating.
Our analysis will demonstrate that solutions to the problems that we identify sometimes 
affect the structure of the judiciary as a whole; sometimes take the form of rules (or rebuttable 
presumptions); and sometimes, when changes in institutions or rules prove impracticable, take 
the form or customs or norms.124 While the solutions to the problems that we identify vary, in 
each instance, rational choice analysis is helpful in identifying the nature of the problem, the 
likely judicial responses, and the probable solution. To be clear, we do not contend that any of 
the solutions that we identify are perfect in the sense of absolutely ensuring appropriate judicial 
incentives and behaviors. Indeed, our project is motivated by the limits of existing institutional
structures, rules, and norms in encouraging proper judicial behavior in the writing and 
construction of opinions, and specifically by the need for improved definitions of holding and 
dicta.
Before proceeding to our analysis of the models, we wish to acknowledge that rational 
choice has been criticized for relying upon thinly constructed models to justify bold public policy 
prescriptions.125 Indeed, we are sympathetic to such concerns.126 Thankfully, our purpose in 
assessing and developing rational choice models of stare decisis  here is quite modest. We are 
using rational choice to help answer some of the fundamental questions about our system of 
precedent as it actually exists. To the extent that our model helps to answer such questions, and 
to the extent that our answers help to provide an important context for constructing proper 
definitions of holding and dicta, this part of our project has served its purpose. We are not using 
rational choice to suggest an optimal stare decisis rule, which is beyond the scope of our project, 
124
 For an interesting recent article describing the role of stare decisis as a norm constraining decision making on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see Emery G. Lee III, Horizontal Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, 92 KY. L.J. 767 (2004). While we agree that stare decisis can sometimes be understood as a norm, our rational 
choice analysis is designed to study stare decisis within the context of several features that limit judicial overreaching, some 
affecting institutional structure, some taking the form of rules, and some taking the form of norms. See infra Part III.A. 
125 See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE 11 (1994) (arguing that “too often prescriptive conclusions . . . are floated upon empirically dubious rational 
choice hypotheses”).
126 See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Rational Choice and the Rational Actor, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY (David S. 
Clark ed., forthcoming 2004) (urging rational choice theorists to develop “narrower claims increasingly subject to meaningful 
falsification”). 
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or to suggest how holding and dicta should be defined. For that, one must undertake a careful 
normative analysis, which although edified by our positive analysis, is the subject of the next
subpart.
Instead, the rational choice analysis we offer is targeted to providing answers to the 
following inquiries: Why would judges willingly limit their ability to effectuate legal policy by 
abiding the precedents of other judges with whom they disagree?127 If judges on the same level 
court have an incentive to disregard precedents of other judges, how does the judiciary develop a 
system of precedent? Why are multi-member appellate court panels better equipped than single-
judge trial courts at encouraging (or presumptively requiring) adherence to the precedents 
established by earlier decision makers on the same level court? Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, if we assume that judges are rationally motivated to construct a system that adheres 
to some form of precedent, what then prevents an opinion writer from using any given case to 
announce the judge’s preferred resolution of any number of legal policy issues and from 
claiming holding status for the resulting discussion? While our rational choice model will 
provide answers to these, and other related,128 questions, we do not suggest that ours is the only 
correct or edifying approach, or that we have constructed the only plausible account of stare 
decisis.129 Rather, we contend that our model offers important insights into the nature and 
problem of precedent that provide an essential backdrop in devising a meaningful definition of 
holding and dicta.
127
 Addressing this question does not require that we assume judges are bent on imposing their normative views into law. A 
judge’s view of legal policy can consist of a desire to produce results that are driven by a dispassionate application of external 
principals of law, even those with which the judge disagrees. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: 
READINGS AND COMMENTARY 540 (1997) (explaining that the rational choice assumption that judges seek to impose their own 
normative views into law can include judges whose normative views “require principled, rather than preference-based, 
decisionmaking”). But a system of precedent can, nonetheless, prevent a judge from achieving even that objective if the decisions 
of judges who prefer to impose their normative views onto the law are binding precedent.
128
 For example, if an earlier court has issued a judicial decision that is not overreaching, what is to prevent a later court 
nonetheless from disregarding it to the extent that the later court finds the constraint it imposes problematic? See infra Part 
III.A.3.
129
 For two interesting alternative economic perspectives on stare decisis, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on 
Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989), which uses game theoretic analysis to evaluate costs and benefits of stare decisis 
when changes in technology outpace doctrinal preferences for less valuable activities; and Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and 
External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93 (1989), which explains the adaptability of stare decisis to 
societal change and discussing the role of legislation as an external check on precedent that entrenches outmoded technologies. 
While these two articles provide valuable assessments of the societal costs and benefits of stare decisis, they do not focus on the 
capacity of stare decisis to emerge as an endogenous feature of judicial decision making. 
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A. Modeling Stare Decisis and the Holding-Dicta Distinction
The rational choice model stems from a puzzle concerning judicial incentives in crafting 
opinions. Academic commentators within law and political science routinely assume that judges 
are motivated by the desire to implement their preferred resolutions of issues of legal policy.130
Such a claim can be advanced in a broad form, insisting that judges seek to convert desired 
policy objectives into law without regard to the legal issues presented, or (more plausibly in our 
view) in a narrow form, maintaining that when legal doctrines admit of some flexibility in their 
construction, judicial policy preferences will inform which of the plausible constructions a judge 
is likely to prefer. Either way, within our post-realist jurisprudential world, it is commonly 
appreciated that judges not only make law,131 but also that they seek to advance their views of 
legal policy in doing so.132 Indeed, the prevalence of this view is so striking that those who 
embrace a contrary vision of judicial law making—one that anticipates that judges will be 
motivated by a neutral desire to resolve cases within the framework of existing rules and without 
regard to any policy preferences that they might hold—are depicted as naïve.133 Even so, our 
understanding of rationality and the model we build upon that assumption is sufficiently 
accommodating to include judges for whom this is a sound description.134
If judges truly are motivated by the desire to advance their views of legal policy in the 
cases that they decide, they have a potentially strong incentive to use those cases that appear 
before them as vehicles with which to make substantially broader pronouncements of legal 
policy than is required to resolve the immediate case. The puzzle is that while judges sometimes 
might be seen as overreaching, many, perhaps most, judges are cautious about creating new law, 
130
 The classic work is JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). We, 
however, are not claiming that judges necessarily seek to impose their normative views into law. See supra note 127 (explaining 
that judges can hold the view that the judicial role should be limited to the dispassionate and neutral resolution of legal disputes).
131
 As one commentator has aptly noted, “Post-realist jurisprudence must depart from the truism that judges make law and begin 
instead with the question of how they make law.” See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American 
Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601 636 (1993).
132
 We do not intend to suggest that judges create policy in the same manner as do political actors operating within elected 
branches of government. Indeed, our project is intended to underscore an essential difference between adjudicatory and political 
decision making, namely the greater constraint—imposed by the fortuitous circumstances that give rise to a case—on judges in 
their efforts to create desired policy relative to legislators that a proper understanding of dicta and holding imposes. See infra Part 
III.B (describing normative considerations that emerge as a function of judicial lawmaking).
133 Cf. Nancy Weston, The Fate, Violence, and Rhetoric of Contemporary Legal Thought: Reflections on The Amherst Series, the 
Loss of Truth, and the Law, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 733 (1997) (asserting that “[l]egal formalism . . . appears ripe for discard as 
naïve and illusory—or, worse, as mendacious, the later version of this judgment, as indeed it must in a world in which realism 
reigns”).
134 See supra note 127.
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and very few seem to use cases to resolve altogether unrelated issues. The immediate challenge 
is to identify those mechanisms within the judicial process that help to counteract the tendency to 
overreach, even if they do not succeed in eliminating it entirely. This puzzle is not new. Indeed, 
it has motivated legal scholars in their efforts to explore the conceptual origins of both horizontal 
and vertical stare decisis, as well as in their efforts to explain judicial incentives to craft narrow 
rather than broad holdings. 
1. Modeling Horizontal Stare Decisis
As is generally the case with rational choice analysis, we will begin with a set of stark 
assumptions, and then relax the assumptions to bring the model closer to the actual institutions 
that our analysis is offered to study. In this case, we will begin by imaging that our judiciary 
consists solely of a single level trial court in which individual judges hear and resolve disputes.
We can imagine the judges on such a court realizing that while they would prefer that their 
colleagues on the bench respect their resolutions of issues they resolve as a necessary part of the 
cases they decide as precedent, their colleagues do not have a strong incentive to do so. If other 
judges agree in principle to the resolution of such issues, they will, of course, reach similar 
results in future cases. But this signifies no constraint in the form of precedent. After all, even 
absent a prior case that turned on the same issue of law presented in a new case, the later 
deciding judge would achieve the same result.135
This insight can be cast in simple game theoretical terms using the framework of the 
standard prisoners’ dilemma. While each judge would prefer to see his or her views reflected into
law, each would also prefer not to be bound by the views of other judges who happened upon the 
need to resolve the same issue in an earlier case. As a result, without regard to whether the other
judge abides one’s own opinions as precedent, one has an incentive to decline to honor the other 
135
 This point has long been understood:
If a court follows a previous decision, because a revered master has uttered it, because it is the right decision, because it 
is logical, because it is just, because it accords with the weight of authority, because it has been generally accepted and 
acted on, because it secures a beneficial result to the community, that is not an application of stare decisis. To make the 
act such an application, the previous decision must be followed because it is a previous decision and for no other 
reason.
Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 200 (1933). It is 
possible, for example, that a prior decision explored the legal issue in a sufficiently persuasive manner that a later judge, who 
initially would have resolved the issue differently, changes positions. Should this occur, the second judge is not basing the 
resolution on the fact of the precedent, however, but rather on the persuasiveness of the earlier reasoning. A judge is invariably 
free to do this, just as a judge may find a treatise, law review article, an op ed, or a speech by a law professor persuasive on a 
relevant point of law.
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judge’s opinions as precedent. These incentives are mutual and thus the dominant outcome is 
mutual defection even though the payoffs to each judge would be greater if each was able to 
achieve a regime of mutual cooperation, meaning that each respects the opinions of the other 
judge as precedent. This is so even though mutual cooperation itself limits the ability to achieve 
results that each judge might otherwise prefer in individual cases.
We see traces of such a regime in which decision makers resolve cases but do not create 
precedents in doing so within some real world institutions for the resolution of legal disputes.
These include civilian courts, which formally eschew precedent,136 and both nonbinding 
mediation and arbitration, which do not develop binding bodies of internal precedent in the same 
manner as do courts.137 While there are certainly differences between the hypothetical regime 
that we imagine and any of these real world regimes, for simplicity, we will refer to our decision 
makers for now as arbitrators. In our hypothetical regime, the individual arbitrators resolve 
disputes without developing precedent that binds other arbitrators. Their immediate concern is to 
identifying mechanisms that will enable them to elevate themselves from merely resolving 
disputes to judging, and in doing so, to creating, and not merely applying, law. 
Professor Erin O’Hara has developed a game theoretic model, which although designed 
to explain stare decisis, ultimately demonstrates the conceptual difficulty that individual judges 
on the same level court confront in their effort to construct a system of precedent that elevates
themselves from de facto mediators, who resolve disputes without making law, to judges, who 
perform both functions.138 O’Hara begins with the observation that different judges sometimes 
hold different normative views.139 As a result of this divergence of viewpoint, individual judges 
136 See MERRYMAN, supra note 121, at 144.
137
 Arbitrators are not entirely bound by externally-imposed rules of law, whether the product of statues, administrative 
regulations, or the decisions of common law courts, but are generally expected to conduct arbitration in the shadow of the law. 
See Daniel Q. Posin, Mediating International Business Disputes, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 449, 464 (2004) (positing that 
“external standards [and] bargaining in the shadow of the law . . . can eliminate extreme ‘outlier’ possibilities and narrow the 
scope of negotiation/mediation”). A principal objective of mediation is to achieve predictable, and thus defensible, outcomes at 
lower cost than would be achieved though more costly litigation. See Alison E. Gerenscer, Family Mediation: Screening for 
Domestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 43, 47 (1995) (asserting that “[t]he goals of mediation include: reducing the court’s 
docket, reducing the demand on judicial resources, accelerating the rate of case resolution, reducing the cost of resolving 
conflicts, increasing the litigants’ satisfaction with the court system, and improving relationships between disputing parties”).
138
 Erin O’Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion? Toward a Game Theoretical Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL
L. REV. 736 (1993). While O’Hara imagines single panel appellate judges, we adapt her analysis to imagine single-panel 
arbitrators.
139 See id. at 743 (“[I]f Ann and Bert shared perfectly identical normative views, then the legal system would function 
consistently with a rule of stare decisis. . . Where their normative views differ . . ., however, the judges will engage in 
nonproductive competition.”).
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would prefer their colleagues to abide the decisions they issue as precedent, while, at the same 
time, avoiding any reciprocal obligation to abide the opinions of their colleagues as precedent. 
Thus cast, O’Hara’s model represents the classic prisoner’s dilemma that we have 
identified. For each judge in the game, the ideal situation is to impose an obligation on other 
judges, but not to have an obligation imposed on one’s self. If other judges honor precedent, it is
rational for a judge to receive the benefit of their adherence to the judges’ opinions, while 
declining to honor their opinions. And if other judges decline to honor the judge’s precedents, it 
remains rational to decline to honor their precedents. Either way, it is rational to “defect” from a 
regime of precedent enforcement. Because these payoffs are reciprocal, meaning that other 
judges have the same incentives, mutual defection—meaning the absence of a system of 
precedent—emerges as the dominant strategy. While O’Hara describes the resulting regime, one 
that threatens to undermine the optimistic claim of endogenously created stare decisis, as one of 
“nonproductive competition,”140 we can also think of the resulting regime as that of arbitrators 
failing in their attempt to change their status to judges.
O’Hara considers whether this regime of mutual defection could be avoided if the game 
were treated as iterated, rather than single period. O’Hara observes that if the iterations are 
infinite, then the judges might well achieve a cooperative solution: “As long as the judges expect 
to work together indefinitely, then each can use potential future benefits from stare decisis to 
encourage present cooperation from the other.”141 A judge who fails to cooperate in one period 
invites retaliation in the next period, as the judge whose decision was ignored in turn refuses to 
enforce the other judge’s precedent.142 “As long as the gain from defecting today is less than or 
equal to the present value of future losses from perpetual noncooperation, then both judges are 
willing to follow each other’s precedents.”143
140 Id. at 748-49.
141 Id. at 751.
142 Id. at 752 (“[A]t least in this grossly oversimplified model, the judges can maintain an equilibrium of cooperation with the 
threat of perpetual defection.”). The analysis is not intended to suggest that stare decisis is the product of endless bilateral 
negotiations or of endless tit-for tat-games. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) 
(modeling tit-for-tat strategy). Instead, the analysis is intended to suggest the conditions under which stare decisis does, or does 
not, emerge as a dominant strategy. Once the regime is established, because stare decisis takes the form of a rule, even the 
opinions of a noncooperative judge will be respected as precedent. Rather than punishing through disregarding a noncooperative 
judge’s precedent, the defecting judge will suffer as few other judges will join that judge’s opinions. And since stare decisis, as 
shown below, see infra notes x-x and accompanying text, emerges in the first instance within multimember appellate panels, this 
is a potentially effective sanction against defectors, barring conditions in which two judges agree to disregard precedent. Even 
then, en banc review remains an additional check.
143 Id. Rather than “solving” a prisoners’ dilemma, this “solution” avoids one by altering the payoffs for cooperative and 
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Professor O’Hara recognizes, however, that the cooperative solution induced by the 
iterated games threatens to unravel when the participants confront a certain, or anticipated, end
period. To illustrate, O’Hara posits three known periods, and considers what happens in the third 
period when the players anticipate no further iterations.144 In this situation, the players no longer 
confront a threat in any future period for defection, and, as a consequence, mutual defection 
reemerges the dominant strategy as in a single period game. In period 2, anticipating mutual 
defection in period 3, the players again defect, realizing that they will receive no benefit from 
cooperation. With any definite end period, the same “unraveling” begins in the final period and 
continues to the very first period, suggesting that unless iterations are infinite, or sufficiently 
long that future defection is heavily discounted, unraveling threatens to restore mutual defection 
as the dominant outcome.145
We do not intend to suggest that the choice is quite as stark as selecting between 
unraveling with anything short of endless iterations versus cooperation in an infinitely iterated 
game. Some literature suggests that even without endless iterations, under certain assumptions it 
is possible to generate cooperative solutions.146 It is beyond our scope here to review the 
literature on the iterated prisoners’ dilemma and assess the possibility of cooperation where there 
is only some probability of the game ending in any period. Rather, it is sufficient to note that a 
cooperative solution that generates a regime of stare decisis among single judge panels on the 
same level court is likely to be at least substantially unstable. And in fact, this intuition, which is 
consistent with O’Hara’s analysis, reflects practices that we observe in trial courts.147
noncooperative behavior such that the regime no longer represents a prisoners’ dilemma. See STEARNS, supra note 127, at 541-
42. Eric Rasmusen, in a separate article written at about the same time as O’Hara’s, see Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a 
Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63 (1994), reaches a similar conclusion concerning the possibility of a cooperative 
solution under specified conditions. 
144
 O’Hara, supra note x, at 774-75 n.72.
145
 For helpful discussions of the prisoners’ dilemma and the associated difficulty of unraveling in repeated games, see ROBERT
COOTER & TOM ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 216-17 (3d ed. 2000); and ERIC RASMUSEN: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
88-89 (1989).
146 See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in 
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 520 (1994) (positing that depending upon the payoff function, cooperative behavior can arise 
in a multi-round prisoners’ dilemma when players anticipate a high possibility of a subsequent round in which cooperation is 
rewarded and defection is punished.); David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,
27 J. ECON. THEORY 245, 245-47 (1982) (explaining conditions under which cooperation may arise even in finite-period repeated 
games).
147
 Thus, Professor O’Hara notes that “[i]t is unclear whether district courts actually follow a rule of horizontal stare decisis.” Id.
at 773 n.66. Similarly, in Charles H. Nalls & Paul R. Bardos, Stare Decisis and the U.S. Court of International Trade: Two Case 
Studies of a Perennial Issue, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 139 (1990-91), the authors observe: “Although most treaties consider a 
district court judge bound by the decisions of his colleagues on the court, case law shows that some judges do not believe this to 
be the case. Instead, they view the precedential effect of other judges’ decisions as persuasive, but not binding authority.” Id. at 
146.
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Within the United States, as a general matter, precedent does not take as strong form a 
constraint—if it is a constraint at all—among trial judges operating in the same level court. 
While judges might find the opinions of their colleagues persuasive, they do not generally 
consider themselves bound to adhere to those opinions as precedents. This suggests that the 
practice thus far tracks the observations of the model, which would not predict a strong form 
cooperative equilibrium in this context. And yet, the practical problem remains, namely that 
individual trial judges seek to extricate themselves from the function of arbitrating (or merely 
resolving disputes) to that of judging (thus making law as needed in the course of resolving 
disputes). The solution to this problem lies not in the iterated prisoners’ dilemma, but rather in 
the nature of a pyramidically structured court. 
2. Modeling Vertical Stare Decisis
In an earlier article,148 Professor William Landes and then-Professor Richard Posner also 
addressed the conceptual difficulty in employing a prisoners’ dilemma analysis to devise an 
explanation for horizontal stare decisis. Landes and Posner offered an alternative explanation for 
the emergence of stare decisis doctrine that relies upon the emergence of pyramidically 
structured judicial system.149 By devising another level in an emerging judicial pyramid, judges 
create a means of developing and promoting adherence to precedent. Most importantly, in doing 
so, they avoid the need for cooperation among the judges at the trial court level.150 An appeals 
court’s “power to reverse the decisions of lower courts,” Landes and Posner explain, “checks any 
tendencies on the part of lower-court judges to disregard precedent (reversal foils a judge’s 
attempt to create his own precedent), and its own position in the judicial hierarchy checks its 
members’ tendencies in that direction.”151 An appellate court, even one that is drawn from the 
ranks of the trial court judges, most logically in odd-numbered random groupings to prevent ties, 
is able to induce cooperation and limit defection among individual trial judges who would 
148 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 
(1976). 
149
 Civilian regimes, which formally eschew precedent, also follow a pyramidic structure. This does not undermine the Landes 
and Posner theory, but might be attributable to the need to correct rulings within the immediate case, rather than to impose the 
obligation of precedent, or it might be due to the de facto practice of following precedent—without doing so formally—within 
civilian courts. See supra note 121; infra note 263.
150
 As explained below, their proffered solution does not actually induce mutual cooperation because it does not result in 
adherence to precedents issued at the trial court level. Instead, it solves the problem by imposing a vertical restraint.
151
 Landes & Posner, supra note 148, at 273.
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otherwise fail to make law as they routinely disregard each others’ precedents. The analysis 
reveals that a statutory mandate or other external source of law is not required to induce 
cooperation in the form of precedent because the emerging judicial hierarchy, which creates the 
same result, emerges as a function of the rational incentives of participating jurists.
While this analysis helps to resolve the difficulty posed by mutual defection among 
judges at the trial court level, the explanation remains only partial. The same incentive to ignore
precedent that confronts individual trial judges also confronts the various members of separate 
appeals court panels. The question then arises why such panels do not experience the same 
mutual defection—or nonproductive competition—that trial judges would experience in a 
judiciary that lacked a heirarchical structure. To some extent this motivation is tempered when—
as occurs within the United States Courts of Appeals—appellate panels include three judges who 
are randomly drawn. For an appellate judge to disregard precedent, the appellate judge will have 
to find at least one other judge who is willing to sign on. In addition, anticipating serving on the 
same panel with a judge whose opinion one chose to disregard might motivate more collegial 
behavior. But a considerable incentive to disregard precedent, perhaps by engaging in 
disingenuous distinctions from prior rulings, remains, especially where judges on a panel have 
similar ideological preferences.152 The incentive might even be exacerbated at the appellate level 
as a result of the greater impact of precedent over a broader number of future trial and appellate 
judges.
A final step in the judicial pyramid, namely the creation of a supreme court, to the extent 
that it serves a similar function with respect to appeals courts that appeals courts serve with 
respect to district courts, might further limit incentives to disregard precedent. But at best such a 
solution once again is only partial.153 Within the federal judiciary, as is widely recognized, 
Supreme Court review is sufficiently rare—far rarer than appeals court review of district court 
152
 This incentive has led some commentators to argue that appellate courts should self-consciously seek to include broad 
political representation in panels. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220-24 (1999) (proposing that panel assignments ensure split-party representation to reduce probability 
of partisan influence in federal appellate decision making); see also Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 
57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 291 (2000) (refining the Tiller-Cross proposal by proposing a mechanism in which litigants 
provide preference-orderings of appellate judges).
153
 We might imagine some concerns for defection within a single appeals court remaining, and the use of an en banc practice—
calling on all active members from which randomly drawn panels are selected—to check against such defection. The Supreme 
Court presumably cares less about intra-appeals court defection than about adherence among appellate court panels to its 
precedents, so en banc review and Supreme Court review serve complementary functions. Cf. Michael Abramowicz, En Banc 
Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (2000) (arguing that en banc review could be restructured to ensure greater conformity 
among the circuit courts to Supreme Court precedent).
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decisions154—that substantial opportunities remain to disregard prior appeals courts decisions as 
precedents. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, while en banc review (the practice 
whereby the full circuit court has the power to vacate and review three judge panel decisions) 
might be used to correct defection taking the form of failures to abide internal circuit court 
precedent, it too is also rarely used.155 We know of no cases in which the Supreme Court has 
reviewed a case to ensure consistency of case law within a particular circuit. In addition, once the 
Supreme Court is established, it is potentially subject to a similar form of defection, here an
incentive among individual justices to disregard the Court’s own precedents, assuming they can 
persuade the requisite majority to join.
If each level in the judicial hierarchy substantially reduces the risk of defection in the 
court below, but cannot prevent defection at the newly created court level, the question thus 
arises how the various appeals courts—including the circuit courts and the Supreme Court—
overcome the incentives of their own members to defect from a cooperative stare decisis regime. 
The answer does not rest in the prisoners’ dilemma analysis, but rather lies in the need to 
stabilize doctrine in multimember appellate courts. While the need to stabilize doctrine is a 
general problem on multimember courts, even those that hear case en banc, the problem is 
particularly acute in courts in which subgroups, for example panels of three, hear cases for the 
entire court, but might not reflect the views of the court as a whole. An analysis based upon 
social choice demonstrates the nature of the problem of doctrinal instability on multimember 
appellate courts, whether or not the courts hear cases in panels, and the function of stare decisis 
in horizontal form in substantially reducing it.
Under specified conditions, judges on a multimember courts sometimes hold preferences 
over the resolution of cases,156 that when subject to a series of direct pairwise contests would 
result in the phenomenon of cycling. For a simple illustration, consider three persons—P1, P2, 
P3—holding the following rank ordinally ranked orderings over options ABC: P1: ABC; P2: 
154
 For relevant statistics, see JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, APPELLATE COURTS INSIDE AND OUT: THE IMPACT OF COURT
ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (Mich. 2002), at 7 tbl.1 (“Appeals 
Commenced, Terminated, and Pending in the U.S. Courts of Appeals”), 43 tbl.2 (“Appeals Terminated in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals and Petitions for Certiorari Filed, Granted, and Decided in the U.S. Supreme Court”).
155 See Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1029, 1049 (1999) 
(“En banc review is a rare occurrence.”).
156
 For a similar analysis of preferences over issues within cases, see STEARNS, supra note x, at 97-156 (illustrating with Miller v. 
Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), and collecting additional cases).
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BCA; P3: CAB. If the three people were presented with the three possible binary comparisons 
and voted sincerely based upon their expressed ordinal rankings, the result would be a cycle, 
such that B is preferred to C (P1 and P2 winning); and A is preferred to B (P1 and P3 winning), 
implying that A is preferred to C, when in fact, C is preferred to A (P2 and P3 winning). Thus, 
even though each member holds preferences that are transitive, the group as a whole prefers A to 
B to C to A. Social choice theory demonstrates that a general assumption of individual 
rationality, namely that preferences satisfy the minimal condition of transitivity, cannot be 
assumed for groups of three or more.157 With a set number of options represented by n (here 
three), a regime that allows only n minus 1 (here two) votes provides a stable outcome, albeit one
that turns on the order in which the votes are taken. The following example will demonstrate that 
stare decisis in horizontal form effectively removes an option for multimember appellate courts, 
thus stabilizing doctrine, with the effect of rendering doctrine dependent on the order in which 
cases are presented. 
Imagine a three judge panel deciding two cases on the same day,158 first, Adams v. School 
Board, raising a constitutional challenge to busing ordered by a school board, and the second, 
Barnes v. State Court, raising a constitutional challenge to busing ordered by a state court. 
Imagine that in each case, the lower court rejected the constitutional challenge and that the same 
three judge panel—consisting of judges J1, J2, and J3—decided the two cases on the same day. 
In Adams, J1 and J2 conclude that the challenge is not meritorious, and thus affirm the decision 
below sustaining the statute, while J3 dissents. In Barnes, J2 and J3 conclude that the challenge 
to the state court busing order is meritorious, and thus reverse the lower court decision sustaining 
that order, while J1 dissents. Imagine that in their respective dissenting opinions, J3 and J1 both 
state that in their views, the two cases are indistinguishable, a position that is consistent with 
their individual votes to either reject (as did J1) or sustain (as did J3) both challenges. The 
analysis reveals three majorities, one of which must be suppressed: (1) J1 and J3 to sustain the 
statute in Adams; (2) J2 and J3 to strike the court order in Barnes; and (3) J1 and J3 to treat 
Adams and Barnes as indistinguishable.
158
 This discussion is based upon a stylized rendition of two actual Supreme Court cases. For a more detailed discussion and 
analysis, see id. at 170-77, which illustrates intransitive Supreme Court preferences using Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 
U.S. 527 (1982), and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982), both of which were issued on the same 
day.
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Now imagine that instead of the two cases arising concurrently, Adams arises first, 
followed, one year later, by Barnes. Because the Adams court affirms (J1 and J2 controlling), 
and because J1 and J3 believe that the cases are indistinguishable, the result in Barnes would 
also be to affirm. Alternatively, if Barnes arises first, resulting in a reversal (J2 and J3 
controlling), then because J1 and J3 view the cases as indistinguishable, the result in Adams will 
also be to reverse. The analysis reveals that depending upon the order of presentation, any of the 
three identified outcomes might arise: both upheld, both struck down, or Adams upheld and 
Barnes struck down.159 In each sequence above, the court has not permitted resolution of all three 
issues (Adams as a matter of first impression; Barnes as a matter of first impression; and Adams 
or Barnes with the other case as a precedent) that would be required to determine that the 
combined outcomes over the three possible binary comparisons are an arbitrary function of the 
order in which the cases have been presented for consideration. Adams then Barnes generates 
opposite outcomes from Barnes then Adams, and both sequences generate a different outcome 
from the two cases arising together and thus without one or the other as precedent.
If the court were permitted to run through all possible iterations endlessly, the 
arbitrariness would become clear.160 Social choice theory, of course, does not posit that 
institutions are plagued by endless cycling and indeterminacy. In most instances, institutional 
structures induce equilibria even when the participants possess intransitive preferences.161 Courts 
are no different in this regard, and our example serves to illustrate this point. At whatever point 
the relevant structure induced equilibrating rule breaks the theoretical cycle, the chosen outcome 
inevitably suppresses a set of majority preferences for a contrary result.
This admittedly stylized presentation provides a core insight into the function that stare 
decisis serves in multimember appellate courts. Social choice analysis reveals that when a group 
possesses cyclical preferences over multiple options and must achieve determinate outcomes, 
159
 The fourth possible outcome—Adams upheld, Barnes struck down—is not necessary to the analysis.
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 If the Court first decided Adams, it would affirm, and then, based upon the Adams precedent, it would also affirm in Barnes. 
But a majority favoring a reversal in Barnes in the absence of a governing precedent has been suppressed. The Barnes affirmance 
resulted from applying Adams as precedent in Barnes even though absent that precedent, some of the arguments that had been 
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and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503 (1981).
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one means of ensuring actual results is to limit the number of binary comparisons relative to the 
number of options.162 In parliamentary procedure, for example, rules proscribing reconsideration 
of defeated alternatives163 serve the function of breaking cyclical indeterminacy by ensuring that 
for n options, there will be no more than n – 1 binary comparisons.164 The outcome under such a 
regime is arbitrary; had the voting started elsewhere, the outcome would have been different. 
Because any outcome is arbitrary, however, the regime of horizontal stare decisis has the decided 
benefit of giving at least the appearance of majority support, as the final outcome and all those 
preceding it will be decided with majority opinions, within the context of a legitimating process. 
Thus, stare decisis is the judicial equivalent of a rule limiting the number of binary 
comparisons relative to options in appellate courts.165 The doctrine achieves this by holding off 
limits those options that have been defeated in earlier cases, which now form the basis of
precedent. The analysis demonstrates that while vertical stare decisis—the product of 
pyramidical courts—emerges as a solution to the problem trial judges face in trying to extricate 
themselves from a arbitration type regime in which they resolve disputes but do not make law, 
the horizontal form of stare decisis within appellate courts emerges as a solution to a different 
problem, namely the need ensure stable doctrine and prevent cycling. Stare decisis may not have 
arisen historically to solve a potential cycling problem. Regardless of its initial motivation, 
horizontal stare decisis has survived at least in part because the doctrine solves a practical 
difficulty that might otherwise threaten the objective of doctrinal stability on multimember 
appellate courts. 
The analysis also helps to explain a difference in the nature of stare decisis as it operates 
at the level of the Supreme Court and in the United States Court of Appeals (and by extension 
between state supreme courts and intermediate state courts of appeals). In the Court of Appeals, 
panels are the product of random draws of three among a larger set of members of the court. The 
randomness exacerbates the problem of doctrinal instability by increasing the probability that 
panels that do not represent accurately the membership of the court as a whole will decide 
162 See STEARNS, supra note 37, at 158.
163 See id. at 70. For an important article that reviews the Rules of Parliamentary from a social choice perspective, see Saul 
Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 74 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989).
164 See STEARNS, supra note 37, at 170.
165 See id. at 158. For a discussion of congressional practices that limit the number of votes relative to options, see William H. 
Riker, The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 349, 354 (1958).
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cases.166 In contrast, with narrow exceptions, the Supreme Court always meets as an en banc 
court. As a result, although that Court is occasionally prone to preference aggregation problems 
that conceal doctrinal cycles,167 the problem is minimized relative to circuit courts because 
subgroups generally lack the power to resolve cases on behalf of the Court as a whole.168
The Courts of Appeals have two additional mechanisms for reducing doctrinal instability. 
The first is the possibility of Supreme Court review, which as we have already explained is not 
likely motivated to check against intra-circuit doctrinal instability. The second is en banc review 
by the full membership of the relevant court of appeals.169 While this is a statistical rarity as 
compared with review by the Courts of Appeals of district court cases, for purposes of stare 
decisis enforcement, en banc review nonetheless serves a similar function with respect to the 
circuit court as a whole to that which circuit court review serves for district courts. A possible 
justification for en banc review is therefore to check against panels that stray sufficiently from 
predictable outcomes for the circuit as a whole that they invite a considerable risk that over time, 
the result will be to codify unstable—and perhaps eventually cyclical—preferences.
Within our judicial system, we observe several features that the model outlined here 
would predict: (1) a relatively weak stare decisis rule among trial judges operating at the same 
level court; (2) a substantially stronger vertical stare decisis norm operating from a supreme 
court to an appellate court and from an appellate court to a trial court; and (3) a strong 
presumptive stare decisis rule, one that requires overruling in either a higher court or an en banc 
court operating horizontally at the supreme court and appeals court levels. The solutions to the 
difficulties of extricating jurists from the task of arbitrating to that of judging, however, creates a 
166
 This problem may be particularly acute in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which uses a mini-en banc 
procedure that allows 11 of the active 26 judge membership to review three-judge panel decisions. For a probabilistic analysis 
that explores the likely differences in outcomes as between full en banc review and mini-en banc review in the Ninth Circuit, see
Maxwell L. Stearns, Appellate Courts Inside and Out, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1764, 1780-85 (2003) (reviewing COHEN, supra note 
154).
167 See generally STEARNS, supra note 37, at 138 -56 (illustrating cycles within individual cases); id. at 179-90 (illustrating 
cycling with groups of cases over time).
168
 Exceptions include single justices acting as circuit justices. See generally S. CT. R. 22 (allowing for applications to individual 
Justices in specified circumstances). Actions by single Justices are generally not considered to have precedential value, which 
may explain why a comprehensive collection of such opinions were compiled and published only recently. See 1-3 IN CHAMBERS 
OPINIONS (Cynthia Rapp ed., 2004).
169 But see supra note 166 (discussing the alternative regime employed by the Ninth Circuit). Even the Ninth Circuit allows full 
en banc review, but since the implementation of mini en banc review, the Ninth Circuit has never employed this further review 
option. See id. COHEN, supra note 154, at 182 n.22 (observing that as of the time of publication, “the judges on the Ninth Circuit 
have voted on three calls for a full-court en banc, but a majority of the judges has not yet voted to rehear a case decided by an 
eleven-judge panel.”).
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new difficulty of its own. Once the system of stare decisis is in place, what is to prevent its 
abuse? Specifically, if judges on appellate courts have the power not merely to resolve cases, but 
also to establish precedents, what then prevents them from abusing that power by resolving 
substantially more than is required in the immediate case in an effort to engraft their strongly 
held policy views into the fabric of legal doctrine?
3. Modeling the Breadth of Holdings
If we accept the premise that judges are motivated to advance their views of legal policy, 
whatever their views happen to be,170 a substantial risk arises that ambitious judges operating 
within a stare decisis system will use the cases that they decide to announce their preferred views 
of law and public policy as “holdings.” This difficulty is exacerbated once we realize that stare 
decisis takes its strongest form in vertical form and at the appellate level. Because courts of 
appeals decisions have a substantially broader impact—they apply to more courts and over a 
broader geographic domain—than do decisions of district court judges, the incentive to present 
expansive opinions as holdings is all the more powerful. So the question arises what, if anything, 
mitigates judicial incentives to overreach, and specifically, what motivates judges to limit the 
reach of their holdings.
Legal scholars who have used rational choice to study the emergence of stare decisis in 
its various forms have also employed rational choice theory to identify mechanisms that induce 
cooperative strategies that are conducive to a properly limited judicial decision making function, 
one that generally inhibits judges in their efforts to use particular cases to advance broad policy 
prescription under the guise of holdings. As with those models designed to construct a system of 
stare decisis, these related models suggest that even without an externally imposed rule 
demanding appropriate judicial restraint, it is rational for interactive judges to develop a system 
of appropriate restraint, one that we might think of as a custom or norm,171 that encourages 
170
 Strongly held policy views can include furthering the objective of a very limited judicial role. See supra note 127 and 
accompanying text. 
171
 We use the term “norm” to suggest solutions to games involving cooperative and noncooprative strategies for which the 
solution does not rest in a formalized rule. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 5 (2000) (modeling social norms 
as “a signaling game in which people engage in behavioral regularities in order to show that they are desirable partners in 
cooperative endeavors”); see also id. at 11-46. Here, jurists can signal cooperative behavior through the nature of the opinions 
that they write as a potential solution to the defection strategies that would predominate if instead they systematically used cases 
as vehicles for effectuating desired policy objectives unlinked to the cases before them. But because there is no operational rule 
that can insist that judicial opinions be crafted carefully, be limited to particular discussions, or omit extraneous details, any 
general practices that emerge concerning the scope of opinions take the form of a norm or custom, rather than of a rule.
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restricting holdings to the resolution of issues bearing a meaningful connection to the operative 
facts of the cases that they are called upon to decide, and thus inhibiting judicial efforts to use 
cases as vehicles for effectuating unrelated, or tangentially related, views of law and public 
policy. 
In contrast with the structural aspects of stare decisis described in the last subpart, which 
produce enforceable rules that all participating judges are at least presumptively required to 
follow, here we are concerned with norms concerning the form that opinions take once the stare 
decisis regime is established. While those declining to adhere to stare decisis are subject to a set 
of formal processes, most notably the possibility of further appellate review, and difficulties in 
finding judges to join their opinions, there are no such formal or informal processes through 
which to counteract clumsily written or overbroad judicial opinions. There is no meaningful 
prospect for devising formal rules that appropriately tailor judicial incentives, but over time, 
customary practices taking the form of norms are likely to develop, and these in turn become 
meaningful benchmarks against which other judges on the same court can evaluate the quality of 
opinions and make appropriate suggestions for revision. Our analysis here and in Part III.A. 
reveals that rational choice explains a range of mechanisms that encourage proper judicial 
restraint respecting the impact and content of opinions, including institutional modifications 
(developing a judicial hierarchy with an imposed rule of vertical stare decisis), formal rules 
(creating a regime of horizontal stare decisis to induce doctrinal stability among multimember 
appellate panels), and norms (encouraging appropriately limited statements of holdings within 
opinions).
While Professor O’Hara’s argument focuses on providing a game theoretical analysis of 
interactive judges, she also considers whether limits of judicial prescience in anticipating the 
consequences of overly broad holdings might provide an endogenous incentive to limit ambitious 
judicial opinions.172 Thus, for example, O’Hara imagines a judge confronted with a case 
requiring her to determine if adult pornography is protected speech. This judge is generally 
protective of free speech, including pornography, but fears that an overly broad statement of the 
holding might unwittingly also protect child pornography, which she does not seek to protect. 
172
 See O’Hara, supra note x, at 741 n.19. While this argument is not central to Professor O’Hara’s larger thesis, evaluating the 
argument is important to our analysis because it suggests the possibility of an additional independent endogenous incentive 
limiting judicial overreaching.
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The result is that the judge articulates a relatively narrow holding, perhaps one limited to the 
material facts, which do not involve child pornography, as a means of avoiding the pitfall of 
potentially codifying into law a result that does not accurately reflect her ultimate views of legal 
policy. O’Hara summarizes her intuition as follows: “Although the judge can later abandon that 
part of [the] opinion which creates undesirable incentives, [the judge] prefers to avoid 
encouraging such behavior in the interim.”173
One difficulty this hypothetical highlights is that while some judges might be reticent to 
anticipate future legal issues, either based upon concerns for failing to anticipate the 
consequences of their holdings or simply due to their understanding of a limited judicial 
function, other judges might not share the same reticence. If so, then those judges who are more 
disposed to expand present cases into future doctrinal areas would then have an advantage in 
setting out the law at the expense of the law making power of more reticent judges. The result 
would then be a regime in which ambitious judges dominate the judicial lawmaking game. So 
viewed, self restraint motivated by failing to anticipate the consequences of one’s own rulings 
seems unlikely to promote a stable regime that limits  judicial overreaching. While this might 
explain a tendency that we actually see, namely varying degrees of ambition in judicial opinions, 
it does not explain any generalized custom or norm that limits judges in general as it relates to 
the scope of judicial opinions.
Professor Eric Rasmusen has provided an alternative account of how judges, behaving 
rationally, might achieve an equilibrium in which they limit the scope of their written opinions.
In his model, each judge seeks to limit the power of other judges to state overly broad holdings 
in exchange for other judges respecting her precedents in their own opinions. Rasmusen 
describes the problem, and his suggested solution, as follows:
The distinction between ratio decedendi and dictum limits the rate at which new 
law can be created, which is useful with regard to maintaining a precedent-
obeying equilibrium. Judges must wait to create new law until appropriate cases 
arrive at their benches, and only the ratio decidendi or holding—the case’s 
essential and decisive point of law—is binding precedent. Dicta, rulings irrelevant 
to the case outcome, are, by convention, not binding on future judges, although 
like anyone else’s writings, they may be considered as arguments. If dicta were 
binding, a judge could create an unlimited amount of new law. His 600-page 
decision on a bankruptcy case could also control the law on abortion, copyright, 
173 Id.
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and criminal evidence. Such an equilibrium could not be maintained . . . because 
even if the dicta carefully avoided violating existing precedent, very little new 
law would be left to future judges to create.174
In Rasmusen’s analysis, the stability of a stare decisis equilibrium requires that judges not 
overstate their holdings. Otherwise, judges will not afford themselves or their colleagues the 
opportunity to develop law unencumbered by any prior judge’s overreaching in future periods.
Overreaching in this analysis occurs when judges claim holding status for assertions that should
be dicta, which Rasmusen asserts are not binding “by convention.”
Rasmusen’s argument suggests both an equilibrium in which rational judges limit their 
holdings to ensure sufficient room for future law making by other judges and that judges must 
self consciously restrain themselves so as not to disturb this equilibrium.175 Thus, using an 
extreme example, Rasmusen suggests that an ambitious judge might thwart the equilibrium if he 
were to use a bankruptcy case as a vehicle for a book length treatment on such wide ranging 
issues as abortion, copyright, and criminal procedure, while presumably claiming holding status 
for the resulting discussion. The difficulty is that if it is rational for ambitious judges to engage in 
a strategy of defection, thus producing such excessive opinions, then the game is closer to a 
prisoners’ dilemma in which the dominant strategy would be mutual defection rather than 
cooperation. While some judges might voluntarily restrain themselves, nothing prevents other 
judges from assuming a more ambitious law making role, which would cause the claimed 
equilibrium to unravel.
While the explanations that O’Hara and Rasmusen offer would appear to invite mutual 
defection as the dominant strategy, refining the models will allow us to identify the basis for a 
more benign equilibrium outcome. The rational choice analysis will help to explain the 
emergence of a norm concerning the scope of judicial opinions. This norm encourages judges to 
limit their holdings based upon the material case facts. Judges are motivated to do so as a means 
of ensuring their own ability to police against defections by other judges on the same court who 
would prefer to set out their own policy preferences unconstrained by precedent. A precedent 
setting judge will rightly fear that as the precedent setting opinion appears to overreach, that 
174
 Rasmusen, supra note 143, at 75.
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 Professor Rasmusen further suggests that the need to avoid inconsistency with external law provides an additional 
endogenous incentive against overreaching since conflicts in law are likely to rise with ambitious opinions. See id. While this is 
certainly possible, we also think that judges are generally qualified to avoid obvious conflicts with existing law and that, as a 
result, this concern is unlikely to strongly motivate limiting the scope of judicial opinions. 
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opinion will be increasingly vulnerable to future judges who not only will distinguish the factual 
predicates that give rise to tangential aspects of the opinion, but also will disingenuously 
distinguish those parts of the opinion that represent core holdings. In this analysis, the motivation 
to limit the scope of opinions stems entirely from rational motivation of judges to enhance their 
own power to make law rather than to arbitrate disputes, and since all judges on the same level 
court share this incentive, it provides the basis for a stable equilibrium outcome, one that in this 
instance takes the form of a norm, rather than that of a rule or a modification to institutional 
structure.
Consider a very simple example involving two judges, each operating as single judge 
appeals court panels, who resolve three cases in sequence. Assume that Judge Potter holds strong 
views on whether the optimal tort regime is one of contributory or comparative negligence.
Further assume that Judge Potter is presented with Case I, a contract dispute that turns solely on 
whether the claimed contract was supported by consideration. Assume that Judge Potter resolves 
the contract dispute in favor of the plaintiff, finding consideration, and goes on to state: “I further 
hold that in a tort suit, the rule of contributory negligence applies such that when plaintiff is more 
than 50% at fault, defendant is afforded complete relief based upon plaintiff’s comparative fault, 
but when plaintiff’s fault is 50% or less, defendant is entitled to no offset based upon plaintiff’s 
comparative fault.”
One year later, Judge Weasley is called upon to resolve Case II, a negligence suit in 
which the jury, in a special verdict, determined that the plaintiff is 40% at fault. The trial judge, 
relying upon Case I as a precedent, determined that because the plaintiff was not more than 50% 
percent at fault, under the Judge Potter’s selected regime of contributory negligence, the 
defendant was not entitled to any liability offset resulting from plaintiff’s comparative fault. On 
appeal to Judge Weasley, the defendant claims that Case I was not controlling and that the 
preferred regime—one Judge Weasley would be free to adopt if Case I is not controlling—is 
comparative negligence, under which defendant’s liability would be offset by plaintiff’s 40% 
comparative fault.
In his opinion in Case II, we might anticipate Judge Weasley saying something like the 
following:
Case I presented a contract dispute and turned on the whether or not consideration 
was present. This case presents the question whether the governing tort regime is 
62
contributory or comparative negligence. While Judge Potter expressed views on 
the issue presented in this case, and further characterized those views as stating a 
holding, nothing in Case I turned on his determination on that issue. As a result, 
regardless of the label that he attached to that discussion, anything expressed on 
this question in Case I falls squarely into the category of dicta. 
In this analysis, Judge Weasley avoids the claimed obligation of precedent by relying upon the 
material facts in two cases: first, the case in which the claimed holding was articulated, and 
second, the case presently before him.
Anticipating this type of response by Judge Weasley creates a problem for judges, 
including Judge Potter, in future cases that they decide. Judge Potter realizes that he cannot 
affect doctrine outside the context of the material facts of the cases before him. But that is not all.
He also is concerned that if he is not careful in articulating a defense of his genuine holdings, in 
the first case involving an issue of consideration in a contract dispute, then future judges might 
further characterize those holdings as dicta. Unless Judge Potter carefully defends a holding 
based upon a justification for making law that is grounded in those issues implicated by the
material case facts, he runs the risk that Judge Weasley, or other judges, not only will distinguish 
that which is obviously outside the case, but also disingenuously distinguish core holdings.
The analysis reveals two critical features of the stare decisis norm as it relates to the 
scope of written opinions. First, it shows that judges can credibly affect only the direction of law 
in the cases that they are called upon to decide based upon the material facts that are presented in 
those cases. Second, it reveals that when writing opinions, judges will be rationally motivated to 
seek to protect their core holdings by grounding those holdings in the material facts of the case. 
Otherwise, they will rightly fear that future jurists might attempt not merely to distinguish the 
parts of their opinions that go beyond the core facts, and which thus constitute legitimate 
distinctions, but also that overly broad holdings will invite disingenuous distinctions that cut into 
core holdings. Thus, in a case in which Judge Potter actually must resolve a series of legal issues 
to resolve the dispute before him, he will be concerned that any failure to justify the need to 
reach each issue, by demonstrating a logical progression that links the resolutions of the issues he 
claims to resolve to the material facts of the case, will invite future jurists to limit the reach of the 
holdings that are credibly grounded in the fortuitous circumstances of the case.
Conversely, future jurists will read published opinions for material fact-based 
justifications of any newly made law as a precondition to applying holdings within those 
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opinions as precedent in the cases before them to which no material distinctions apply. Over 
time, the resulting practice of defending opinions based upon material facts and seeking material 
fact-based justifications for written opinions provides a stable solution to the potential defection 
strategy that would otherwise dominate and encourage judges to overreach, if not by writing the 
proverbial 600 page opinion, at least by extending beyond the material case facts in the 
resolution of immediate cases. And notice that this equilibrium is not the product of any desire to 
leave room for future jurists to make law, or of any reticence among judges to make law 
themselves. Unencumbered by the threatened non-enforcement of core holdings, judges would 
happily write opinions that go well beyond immediate case facts, or at least those judges who are 
confident of their own jurisprudential views would. But this model provides a rational incentive 
to limit defection, namely the desire to ensure that although the law making role is thereby 
limited to chance presentation of issues linked to material facts, at least any law that jurists make 
in resolving those facts will be respected as precedent.
Thus far, the analysis reveals that stare decisis forms an endogenous constraint that 
limits, to some extent, the tendency of appellate judges to overreach in claiming holding status 
for propositions of law that are not necessary to the resolution of the cases before them. Limiting 
holdings to those issues the resolution of which can be credibly defended as necessary to resolve 
a case based upon the material facts articulated in a judicial opinion allows appellate judges to 
increase the impact of their decisions. More broadly, voluntary self-imposed limits on the scope 
of holdings allow the appeals courts to move from institutions that resolve disputes to institutions 
that make law in the course of performing that task. But the very transformation from arbitrators
to jurists invites a tendency to overreach precisely because judges, unlike arbitrators, have 
substantial power to make law.
Other factors, including concerns for reputation and collegiality, also influence decisions 
to cast holdings broadly or narrowly, and certainly we do not suggest that our simple rational 
choice model captures all relevant concerns. For example, once we recognize that appeals courts 
do not operate in single judge panels, and that majorities on panels of three for most appeals and 
of full appellate courts for en banc reconsiderations are necessary to create precedent, we can 
further appreciate that strategy might sometimes overtake candor as the basis for decisions to 
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join with others as a means of creating desired precedent.176 While rational choice helps to 
answer some important questions concerning why judges to do not systematically overreach, the 
analysis thus far is at best a rough cut, one that provides a useful starting point in undertaking a 
careful normative analysis of dicta and holding. This is especially so once we realize that most 
cases involve facts or law that are neither obviously within nor beyond the scope of what is 
needed to resolve a case. Having identified some core limits exposed by the rational choice 
model, we now turn to four overlapping sets of normative concerns, which prove critical in 
defining dicta and holding.
B. The Judicial Four C’s
In this section, we identify four normative considerations, which we will call the 
“Judicial Four C’s.” Jewelers evaluate carat, cut, color, and clarity in assessing diamonds; we 
evaluate constraint, consideration, clarity, and candor in forming understandings of what to treat 
as holding and dicta within judicial opinions. While our considerations only overlap directly in 
one category, clarity, this area of overlap proves particularly significant. As with diamonds, the 
principal difficulty in overly broad holdings is that of inclusions, and specifically of clouding 
what should be clear statements of the holding with other assertions that should instead have 
been treated as dicta. While we do not employ cut as a criterion, just as a diamond’s cut can be 
too shallow or too deep, the factors that we employ do not push inexorably in a single 
direction.177 In the case of judicial consideration, for example, this means that judges resolve 
those issues targeted to the immediate case, without avoiding difficult questions necessary to 
resolving cases presented, but not inquiries that cases might implicate if conceived at a broader 
level. The criteria are useful, of course, not only because they might allow us to grade judicial 
opinions, but because they allow us to assess possible definitions of dicta, and more specifically 
the analytical categories and problems that we identified in Part II.
We recognize that the normative considerations we consider not only push in more than a 
single direction, but also that they are incommensurate. Weighing these factors against one 
another requires us to make normative judgments that some might dispute. In addition, although 
176
 For discussions of strategic versus candid behavior on multi-member appellate courts, see STEARNS, supra note x, at 97-156 
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we doubt that many readers would claim that any of these four factors are unimportant, we 
recognize that some might place different weights on these factors, and might include other 
normative factors as well. We believe that each of the considerations we have chosen is 
relatively uncontroversial in its own right.
1. Constraint
Constraint is perhaps the most significant normative consideration in justifying limits on
the scope of holdings. At first blush, this concern might appear to push solely in a single
direction. Limiting holdings to the resolution of issues that are implicated by the material case 
facts substantially constrains the power of judges to make law on extraneous issues. Assuming 
agreement on what constitutes extraneous discussion, such discussion should be understood as 
dicta. But even this is not so simple. The doctrines of ripeness, standing, and mootness, though 
frequently deployed in the name of judicial constraint, are often criticized as devices that allow 
an unrestrained judiciary to avoid deciding, or to choose when to decide, some of the most 
difficult questions of law and public policy that are implicated in properly presented cases.178
Constraint therefore is relevant in assessing not only when a court has strayed too far, but also 
when it has decided to avoid going down a necessary, but difficult or unpleasant, path.
Along with the remaining considerations, constraint is best understood at a micro level, 
one that focuses not on the role of the case against some broad set of doctrines, justiciability or 
otherwise, but rather on the scope of judicial autonomy in deciding the particular case. Even if 
the rules of the judging game impose considerable restraint, within individual cases, judges 
retain substantial flexibility. And indeed, as we will argue in the next part, we believe that the 
definitions of dicta and holding must be sufficiently capacious to allow the deciding jurists such
flexibility in setting out the reasoning within particular cases. Consistent with our earlier positive 
analysis,179 however, we also believe that the legal system should restrain judges from 
178 For a neofederalist critique of standing that is consistent with this analysis, see Robert J. Pushaw, Justiciability and 
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393 (1996). For a social choice analysis responding to 
various criticism of standing, including the claim that it is primarily an avoidance device, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back 
from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995), which develops a theoretical model, and 
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995), which presents historical 
evidence in support of the model.
179 See supra Part III.A.
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conclusively resolving issues not meaningfully presented by the material facts of the particular 
case. 
Some might argue that courts have no less a role in setting out legal policy than 
legislatures, and therefore that there are no inherent limits linked to the obligation to resolve 
particular cases on judicial law making powers.180 We respectfully disagree. Courts inevitably 
make positive law, but that does not mean that individual judges are normatively justified in 
making positive law at will. A central feature of the judicial system is the random selection of 
judges to hear cases and thus to resolve the issues presented by those cases.181 Cases arise from 
circumstances beyond the control of the individual judges, thus limiting any given judge’s ability 
to determine which issues to resolve.182 Proper definitions of holding and dicta can preserve this 
feature while still allowing judges control over case reasoning on issues fairly presented. To the 
extent that judges may resolve issues independent of the random generation of cases in need of 
resolution and of the factual bases of the cases that arise, a central aspect of judicial legitimacy—
and thus of judicial restraint—is undermined.
Although legal scholars might disagree as to how much constraint is desirable, even those 
who believe that judges should have a substantially stronger policymaking role recognize the 
need for some restraint on judicial lawmaking.183 Imagine a judicial system in which there were
no constraint, whether taking the form of formal rules or informal norms, encouraging judges to 
limit their case dispositions to resolving issues implicated by material case facts. Any judge then 
would be free to resolve—and indeed might feel justified in resolving—any issue at any time the 
he or she chose. This judicial system then would be akin to a legislature in which any single 
legislator could pass a bill.184 Other rules or norms still might constrain judges relative to 
180
 For an argument from the left that would relax modern conceptions of justiciability as a precondition to judicial lawmaking, 
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legislators—for example, stare decisis, the custom of honoring legislative intent, and the 
expectation that judges explain their reasoning in written opinions—but such a system would 
certainly not further, and might undermine, these practices. The judges who would elect to 
resolve particular issues would likely be those who care most deeply about the issues they elect 
to consider. In electing to resolve issues not obviously implicated in the cases before them, they 
might willingly sacrifice constraint to ensure preferred outcomes.
We recognize that there are some potential virtues in affording judges broad flexibility in 
identifying on their own those issues that they elect to resolve. Granting broad flexibility might
promote valuable specialization. The judge who cares most about admiralty law is likely to be 
the judge who knows the most about admiralty law, and such a judge might be particularly eager 
to draft a broad rather than a narrow holding in an admiralty case, one that anticipates a problem 
important to that body of precedent. With the specialist, rather than a dabbler, deciding such an
issue, there might be a lower risk that the failure to appreciate the peculiarities of admiralty law
will generate problematic doctrine. Similarly, more capable judges might be better able to 
identify remaining legal ambiguities in doctrine than less capable judges, and a system that 
effectively allows judges to resolve cases or issues within cases more broadly depending upon 
their abilities might generate sounder legal doctrine.
Again, however, we must consider important countervailing concerns. By allowing the 
specialist—whether in admirality, bankruptcy, corporate law, tax law, or something else 
entirely—to drive precedent in a chosen area, the judicial system would create discrete doctrinal 
enclaves that might not reflect broader doctrinal or institutional concerns. We might then 
confront a choice between a system with numerous bodies of specialty judges and specialty 
jurisprudence, versus a system of generalists who encourage various specialized bodies of law to 
conform more comfortably with an overriding set of agreed upon jurisprudential principles.185
Moreover, a legal system that allowed judges unfettered discretion to determine what issues to 
resolve might invite ideology as a determinant of which issues particular judges elected to 
address. Legal doctrine might become less coherent with ideologically polarized judges 
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1288-89 (1994).
185
 For an essay defending the generalist appellate judge, see Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Couts of Appeals Surivive Until 
1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. C AL. L. REV. 761 (1983).
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simultaneously resolving issues in a particular substantive area.186 We do not suggest that 
specialization should be altogether avoided, but rather that there are substantial tradeoffs in a 
system that invites systematic specialization among judges who might care more deeply about 
particular outcomes or bodies of case law than with reconciling that case law within the larger 
context of the legal system.
The challenge is for the legal system to discourage judges from reaching out to resolve 
issues, while allowing them to resolve, and perhaps even demanding that they resolve, those
issues that do arise. The legal system might grant a sufficient amount of flexibility in identifying
issues so as to allow more specialized and more intelligent judges a greater role than other 
judges, without allowing undue influence of ideology on who decides any given issue. In 
economic terms, the legal system should allow flexibility up to the point at which the marginal 
costs of flexibility exceed the marginal benefits. We will argue that the proper distinction 
between holding and dicta affords judges considerable latitude to select among various paths that 
lead from facts to judgment, and among levels of breadth, in forging a particular path of case 
reasoning.187 Our definitions, however, will also prevent judges from reaching out to resolve 
issues on paths that do not lead from facts to judgment. A judge can retain considerable 
flexibility even while restrained by the rules and norms of the judicial game.
2. Consideration
In a legal system in which a judge could use any case as the vehicle through which to 
resolve issues of her choosing, some judges might race to resolve particular issues for which they 
hold particularly strong normative concern. Not only would such judges be less likely to be 
neutral, but also the race itself might reduce the care with which they address issues. The 
American legal system includes various mechanisms that encourage proper consideration before
judges resolve those issues implicated in the cases they are deciding. These include finding 
issues not previously litigated to be waived on appeal,188 discouraging (although not prohibiting) 
186 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 185, at 783 (giving bankruptcy and criminal law as areas in which judges tend to be ideologically 
polarized). 
187 See infra Part IV.B (defining dicta and holding).
188 See, e.g., Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983 (“[W]here counsel has made no attempt to address the issue, 
we will not remedy the defect, especially where, as here, important questions of far-reaching significance are involved.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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ex parte adjudication,189 and the various justiciability rules—ripeness, standing, and mootness—
that limit access to the judicial process absent the requisite circumstances to ensure that 
consideration takes place within a concrete judicial setting.190 At the same time, the expectation 
that judges explain how they reached their decisions encourages judges to pay considerable 
attention to those issues that are properly before them. The holding-dicta distinction similarly 
should serve both functions, delaying resolution of issues until judges can properly consider 
them and encouraging judges to focus on the issues before them.
The propositions that judges should be hesitant to create new law absent adequate 
presentation, normally through the adversarial process, and that judges are required to exercise 
proper care in resolving the cases they decide, are, of course, not new. To the contrary, they are
emblematic features of judicial law making.191 Cass Sunstein, for example, has recognized the 
value of judicial minimalism and what he calls “incompletely theorized agreements.”192 Judges 
should seek agreement on how to resolve a case, even if that agreement masks chasms on larger 
jurisprudential or philosophical issues that the case may present.193 The holding-dicta distinction, 
properly conceived, helps to enforce an appropriate level of consideration, one that delves into 
reconciling the case with the larger body of precedent, but that does not necessarily look for, or 
189
 Of course ex parte cases can and do produce important precedents. For perhaps the most famous example, see Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
190
 Indeed, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court identified the goal of ensuring the crisp presentation of 
issues as a central justification for standing, stating:
Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of 
difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.
Id. at 204.
191
 The virtue of ensuring adequate consideration, however, has received renewed attention in recent years, particularly in CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Sunstein defines the practice of 
“decisional minimalism” as “the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as 
possible undecided.” Id. at 3.
192 Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). 
193
 Thus, Sunstein states:
[W]ell-functioning legal systems often tend to adopt a special strategy for producing agreement amidst 
pluralism. Participants in legal controversies try to produce incompletely theorized agreements on particular 
outcomes. They agree on the result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it. They need not 
agree on fundamental principle. They do not offer larger or more abstract explanations than are necessary to 
decide the case. When they disagree on an abstraction, they move to a level of greater particularity. The 
distinctive feature of this account is that it emphasizes agreement on (relative) particulars rather than on 
(relative) abstractions. This is an important source of social stability and an important way for diverse people 
to demonstrate mutual respect, in law especially but also in liberal democracy as a whole.
Id. at 1735-36.
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attempt to resolve, fissures within larger bodies of case law, at least at one time. Judicial 
minimalism leaves important issues open for resolution after further democratic deliberation.194
3. Clarity
Once a judge has fully considered a particular issue, the judge must still decide whether 
to offer a broad or narrow resolution of the issue. Judicial minimalism often calls for narrow
resolutions. In some cases, however, “a wide rule, even if overinclusive and underinclusive, 
would be better than a narrow judgment,” Sunstein acknowledges, because in the absence of a 
wide rule “lower courts and subsequent cases would generate an even higher rate of error.”195 A 
legal regime that insisted that issues always be resolved as narrowly as possible might invite 
paralysis. There is value in achieving legal clarity, and although clarity sometimes pushes in the 
same direction as do the factors of constraint and consideration, other times clarity pushes in the 
opposite direction.
Broad rulings can promote clarity by cutting off a subsequent line of cases as, for 
example, would have occurred had the Supreme Court ruled for the state in Roe v. Wade,196 and 
found no constitutional right to abort.197 Courts sometimes promote doctrinal clarity, however, by 
engaging in the opposite strategy, thus providing very specific and detailed holdings. Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke, for example, gave educational institutions a relatively clear 
framework for developing affirmative action policies, or at least appeared to have done so from 
the time of the initial decision in 1978 until at least 1995,198 by signaling his approval of the 
Harvard plus-factor plan, even though that plan was not immediately before the Court.199
194See SUNSTEIN, supra note 191, at 24-25. For an argument countering that minimalism can produce avoidance, see Pushaw, 
supra note x.
195
 SUNSTEIN, supra note 191, at 49-50.
196
 410 U.S. 113 (1973); infra Part V.B.
197 For a list of 46 post-Roe cases involving abortion, counting only up to 1993, see Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 77 n.283 (1993).
198 See infra notes 309-315 (discussing Hopwood v. Texas, 732 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)).
199
 Perhaps ironically, Lino Graglia, an outspoken opponents of affirmative action residing at the University of Texas Law 
School, recently supported this point:
A task this difficult [namely reconciling affirmative action in higher education with the principal of nondiscrimination] 
requires superior intellect, such as one could expect to find at Harvard, and Harvard, Powell thought, had in fact 
already pulled it off. All that remained to be done was raise Harvard’s achievement to the status of constitutional law, 
which is exactly what Powell's decisive opinion in Bakke did. . . . We are being indirectly ruled by the Harvard faculty, 
however, Bakke illustrates with unusual clarity through the ruse of the Supreme Court—mirror and mouthpiece of 
liberal elite academia—purporting to interpret the Constitution.
Lino Graglia, Grutter and Gratz: Race Preference to Increase Racial Representation Held “Patently Unconstitutional” Unless
Done Subtly Enough in the Name of Pursuing “Diversity,” 98 TUL. L. REV. 2037, 2040 (2004). 
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4. Candor
The clearer the holding-dicta distinction itself, the more difficult it will be for judges to 
offer disingenuous rationales for avoiding the central determinations of previous cases. As the 
distinction between holding and dicta becomes increasingly vague, past precedents can be 
increasingly manipulated. Judges will face greater temptation to cheat from the regime of mutual 
cooperation,200 or perhaps even convince themselves that they are not cheating, when they can 
offer some facially plausible argument for disregarding a statement in a prior case. If the 
holding-dicta distinction were perfectly clear (a goal that we recognize as impossible), then 
disingenuous manipulation of precedents would be immediately recognizable. That would reduce 
the incidence of manipulation and improve the legitimacy of the judicial process. Our goal is to 
move the judicial system closer to this ideal, thus improving judicial candor.
By candor, we do not mean a naïve sense of disclosing the jurist’s subjective sensibilities 
about legal doctrine or case facts. Rather, we mean that the legal system seeks to ensure that 
judges disclose their genuine views concerning how the case they are deciding should be 
resolved within the context of existing legal doctrines. It is entirely possible that if the deciding 
jurists had the power to define the governing legal doctrines without regard to precedent, they 
would do so differently. Perhaps the most significant benefit of candor in the sense that we use 
that term is in furthering reliance upon the rule of law. Absent meaningful expositions on the 
manner in which the court applies the governing rules to the case facts in the course of reaching a 
disposition, it would be difficult for judges, or other affected actors, to discern with a reasonable 
degree of certainty the rule of law as it applies in the next related dispute.201
Judicial incentives for candor, of course, depend not only on the clarity of the holding-
dicta distinction, but also on how broadly holding is defined. Again, however, there are cross-
cutting concerns. On one hand, a narrower definition of holding, by granting future judges more 
flexibility, may also encourage judges to be more candid. The power to create precedents, we 
have seen, may encourage judges to interpret precedent other than in a purely neutral manner. It 
is, after all, a common pastime for legal academics to point out exercises in creative judicial 
200 See supra Part III.A.
201
 For a related analysis demonstrating that vote trading within appellate courts would undermine reliance on the rule of law, see 
STEARNS, supra note x, at 88-92.
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draftsmanship,202 sometimes with admiration (depending on the importance of the doctrinal 
objective), but often with a smirk. A definition of the holding-dicta distinction that allows great 
flexibility for judges to craft broad holdings may also increase the incentives that later judges 
have to offer disingenuous reasons for avoiding holdings. Even if it is theoretically desirable to 
have a regime allowing broad holdings, such a regime might bring about its own collapse. 
On the other hand, a narrow definition of holding may make judges less willing to 
express nuanced legal conclusions. If only part of a judge’s reasoning will constitute the holding, 
a judge might try to articulate a holding in a broader and less nuanced fashion than the judge 
would ideally prefer. More worrisome still, to the extent that the judge believes the nuances 
critical to the analysis, the judge might adopt a position opposite the judge’s preferred case 
resolution.203 By switching positions and sacrificing the judge’s preferred resolution in the case at 
hand, the judge may be able to ensure that caveats that otherwise would be considered dicta will 
count as holding, although at the expense of too broad a holding in the opposite direction.204 We 
believe that a regime that encourages a judge to disguise true beliefs about cases ultimately
undermines the rule of law, first by reducing predictability and legal clarity, and second by 
inhibiting the emergence of nuanced doctrine.
C. Assessing Propositions and Problem Categories
We will now apply the Four C’s to the various categories of potential holdings that we 
defined in Part II.
202
 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note x, at 2021-24 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s recasting of earlier executive removal precedents in 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
203
 Some doctrines, such as the Supreme Court’s outcome voting regime, discourage judges from endorsing case resolutions with 
which they disagree as a means of achieving some other goal. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting 
Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1932 (2001) (demonstrating that social choice “reveals 
one important constraining effect [the outcome voting] rule places on judicial behavior by encouraging not only principled—
meaning nonstrategic—articulation of issues, but also principled resolution of issues”).
204
 For a related analysis using social choice to demonstrate that the narrowest grounds rule limits strategy in Bakke by 
preventing Justice Powell from being forced to select an opinion that strikes down the Davis plan but that employs an overly 
stringent understanding of the permissible use of race in admissions (per Justice Stevens), or an opinion that upholds the Davis 
plan, thus permitting the use of race in admissions, but in a manner that Powell found constitutionally defective (per Justice 
Brennan), see STEARNS, supra note 37, at 137-38.
73
1. Necessary Propositions
The most straightforward category to analyze is necessary propositions, such as the 
proposition in Bakke that the Equal Protection Clause protects nonminorities.205 Unless a system 
of adjudication rejects altogether the notion that legal principles can constitute holdings,206 a 
proposition that is necessary to the disposition (or, by extension, to another holding) itself must 
count as a holding. Absent an overruling, a subsequent court must distinguish a precedent if it is 
to arrive at an opposite result. And unless the judicial system is willing to invite upon itself 
claims of complete disingenuousness, a subsequent court will need to reconcile its ruling with 
the earlier case.207 Denying relief to the next white applicant on otherwise indistinguishable facts 
because Cotter begins with the letter “C” while Bakke begins with the letter “B” will not do. If 
we set aside such obvious absurdities, it is apparent that no credible court could reconcile a 
holding resting upon the determination that a racial set aside is not a race-based classification or 
that Equal Protection Clause does not protect whites with the ultimate holding in Bakke. Under 
any fair reading of the case, Bakke could not have prevailed without succeeding on these two 
arguments.208 Where a Court explicitly endorses a proposition and could not have reached the 
result without at least implicitly endorsing the proposition, then the proposition must be a 
holding.
Although we recognize that this will be the least controversial of our conclusions, it is 
worth establishing that the four normative factors that we have identified strongly support the 
categorization of necessary propositions as holdings, at least absent other concerns. Where a 
205
 It is, of course, our ambition to assess whether propositions are holdings without regard to whether the propositions are 
correct or persuasive. We recognize that some might conclude that the Equal Protection Clause properly understood does not 
protect whites. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (construing the Equal Protection Clause as 
primarily motivated by the need to protect blacks against state action). But if precedent has any constraining influence at all, a 
court determining whether to apply precedent must consider more than simply whether it would have resolved the initial case 
differently. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (listing factors to consider in applying stare decisis and 
applying those factors to avoid overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
206
 For discussion of legal systems without precedent, see supra note 121; and infra note 263.
207
 In Bakke, Statement (7) (the Davis program, which focuses solely on race, hinders rather than furthers diversity) is the 
narrowest possible expression of the holding, applying itself only to the immediate case. An interesting question is what the 
effect of (7) would be if the Court had simply announced the facts and then skipped immediately to (7) without explaining its 
justification. We would argue that in such a case, other courts would still have to justify any opposite results from the result 
announced by (7), by identifying a relevant distinctions in the facts. See infra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that the even in the absence of 
any articulated reasoning, the combination of facts and the announced judgment create a very narrow holding).
208
 As this analysis suggests, the necessity of considering and resolving an issue as a court resolved it is sufficient for the court’s 
resolution of the issue to count as a holding. But necessity is not required for a statement to be a holding. See infra Part IV.A.3. In 
addition, the logical necessity of deciding an issue that the court has not actually decided might not transform a potential holding 
into a holding. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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court must resolve an issue to resolve a case, and in fact does resolve that issue, the court cannot 
be thought of as having reached out to resolve the issue, so concerns about constraint do not 
arise. The failure to resolve the issue, although potentially ensuring continued consideration of 
the issue over time, would entail a failure to dispose of the immediate case based upon a proper 
consideration of a critical issue. Perhaps most important, counting such propositions as holdings 
is essential to maintaining legal clarity, for the set of holdings would be very small if necessary 
propositions did not count. Finally, concerns about candor seem irrelevant. The resolution of a 
necessary proposition does not alter the need for a judge to resolve any other propositions, and so 
judges can be expected to resolve these questions based on their candid views rather than based 
on strategic considerations.
2. Sufficient Propositions and Related Problems
We also conclude that sufficient propositions for the disposition (or, by extension, for 
other holdings) should at least presumptively be holdings, and that the existence of alternative 
possible justifications or alternative justifications should not be a bar to crediting sufficient 
propositions as holdings. Let us consider alternative possible justifications first. The principal 
concern is that when alternative possible justifications exist, we know that the jurist has made 
some choice. It is possible that a judge might use such flexibility as a vehicle through which to 
make law, and judges with strong preexisting normative views on particular issues may be more 
likely to resolve those issues than other judges. To that extent, alternative possible justifications 
might trigger concerns about constraint.
While we believe that the normative merit of creating law within cases is a function of 
the judge’s need to resolve cases, we do not believe that judges should be constrained in 
choosing among decisional paths when the legal doctrines implicated in the cases they decide 
require the exercise of judicial discretion. One might criticize particular legal doctrines for 
affording judges too much leeway, but some leeway is inherent in the judicial process. If a test 
requires that two prongs be met to achieve a result, a judge cannot be said to overreach in finding 
that because one of the two elements is not met, the test is not met. The judge must pick some 
decisional path to resolve the actual case presented. As long as a judge does pick an appropriate
path from material facts to judgment, the judge remains considerably constrained.
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Two other factors, meanwhile, are decisive in suggesting that alternative possible 
justifications should not bar sufficient propositions from counting as holdings. First, if alternative 
possible justifications exempted actual justifications from holding status, it would be difficult to 
develop clarity in the law. There almost always exist alternative possible justifications for the 
result that the court reached with respect to a dispositive issue or to the case as a whole.209
Second, a holding rule excluding alternative possible justifications would lead judges determined 
to establish a holding to consider the full range of alternative possible justifications. Because 
there may be a large number of alternative possible justifications, this pursuit would call the 
judge to consider a large number of issues, distracting the judge from focused consideration of 
any one of those issues.
The analysis of cases in which a judge in fact offers alternative justifications for the same 
result is equally straightforward, indeed easy given the conclusion that alternative possible 
justifications should not deprive sufficient propositions that the court did reach of presumptive 
holding status. There exists some risk that a judge will offer two justifications rather than one 
because the judge is particularly concerned about making law with respect to both issues, thus 
once again exposing concerns about constraint. The concern, however, can only be with respect 
to the issue about which the judge cares less. Give our resolution of the alternative possible 
justification problem, a judge would have the flexibility to resolve at least one of two alternative 
justifications regardless of the rule governing alternative justifications. Granting the judge the 
power to resolve a second (or third or fourth) alternative justification does not seem particularly 
likely to channel resolution of issues to the judges who feel particularly strongly about those 
issues. 
Denying holding status to alternative justifications would delay the resolution of legal 
issues for reasons having nothing to do with the need for more consideration, thus rendering the 
law less clear without a compelling justification. This would thus undermine both the goal of 
encouraging judges to consider issues genuinely presented in cases, and the goal of promoting 
209
 As we noted in Bakke, for example, the Court conceivably might have struck down the program on the basis of sex 
discrimination rather than race discrimination. See supra notes x-x and accompanying text. That this seems exceedingly unlikely 
under the facts of Bakke may suggest that the real question is whether there were alternative plausible justifications. That 
formulation, however, emphasizes the difficulty of assessing the reasonableness of justifications that have not been explored. The 
holding-dicta distinction would not be clear if it demanded an analysis of legal issues that the court did not even consider. 
Alternative possible justifications might be found only where litigants in fact advanced those justifications, but with such a rule, 
there might be considerable debate about whether litigants did sufficiently raise justifications, an issue that would require looking 
beyond the judicial opinions themselves.
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clarity in the law. The concern for candor, meanwhile, furnishes an additional reason for 
counting alternative justifications as holdings. In a regime that denied the status of holding to 
alternative justifications, a judge might have an incentive to resolve more than one potential 
justification as a means of denying holding status to the proposition establishing the most critical 
justification in the case. Suppose that Powell had wanted to strike down the Davis program, but 
did not want to create any precedent on the strict scrutiny analysis of social remediation.210
Powell might explain that each prong was sufficient because he wanted neither to be a holding. 
Because judges establish precedent in resolving cases, the risk that judges will decide cases 
based primarily on their idiosyncratic predilections toward particular litigants is reduced. 
Candor concerns would be particularly severe if both alternative possible justifications 
and alternative justifications were excluded from status as holding. Imagine a holding rule 
demanding that whenever an alternative possible justification can be identified, the chosen 
justification counts as a holding only if the alternative possible justification is expressly 
considered and rejected. A judge then might have an incentive to reject rather than accept the 
alternative possible justification simply as a means of ensuring that the actual justification would 
have the status as holding. We posit that this might cause only slight damage to precedent, 
because the rejection of the alternative possible justification itself would be dicta under the 
analysis that follows. A judicial system that invited such manipulation, however, not only would 
undermine the legitimacy of the judicial process, but also would aggravate the concerns about 
lack of constraint, as the judges most eager to set a precedent would be most willing to jump 
through the necessary hoops to do so.211
210
 It may seem implausible that Powell would want to strike down the Davis program for reasons other than those actually 
considered in the case. But there are at least some cases in which judges might want a particular litigant to win, perhaps because 
of the underlying case equities, but not want to create the precedent that would be necessary for that litigant to win. The 
controlling opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), suggested that it might have viewed that case in this manner, stating: 
“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally 
presents many complexities.” Id. at 109.
211 The recognition that a regime that fails to credit actual justifications because of alternative possible justifications would 
produce incentives for noncandid resolution of issues also shows that such a regime would encourage judges to consider issues 
unnecessarily. Again, using Bakke, consider the implications of not crediting the alternative explored justification on societal 
remediation. Such a regime would insist that Powell specifically rule on both prongs to have even the chance of holding, even 
though only one of the two prongs is needed for him to reject this justification for the use of race. Justice Powell then would be 
reaching at least one issue that it inessential to his ultimate disposition. Requiring a judge to resolve an issue the resolution of 
which is beside the point certainly promotes consideration of that issue, but it does so in the precisely the manner that excursions 
into dicta promote consideration of matters extraneous to the resolution of the case at hand.
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3. Nonsupportive Propositions
In contrast, nonsupportive propositions generally should count as presumptive dicta. 
Where a judge resolves an issue in a manner that does not contribute to the disposition of the 
case, there is a strong possibility that the judge is reaching out to resolve that issue because the 
judge holds relatively strong views about it. It is one thing to allow a judge to choose among 
alternative paths of decision leading to the case judgment and to credit issues that are necessary 
or sufficient to supportive propositions along that path. It is another to allow a judge to choose 
decisional paths that do not lead to the disposition and to credit as holdings the resolution of 
issues that lead to a place that the court is not compelled to go.
Not all nonsupportive propositions are equally irrelevant. We have distinguished, for 
example, between absolutely irrelevant propositions (those that could have no conceivable 
connection to the case) and six categories of nonsupportive propositions that might have been 
relevant if they had been resolved differently or if other propositions had been resolved 
differently.212 For example, the issue in Bakke concerning whether diversity is a compelling 
interest was at least potentially relevant in the sense that a negative conclusion would have been 
sufficient for the disposition, and an affirmative conclusion could have been supportive along a 
path to an opposite case disposition. Thus, although the issue was not on the decisional path to 
the actual disposition of the case, it was on a decisional path to a potential resolution.
Nonetheless, we believe that the constraint factor is ordinarily sufficient to render 
resolution of such an issue dicta. While it is certainly not uncommon for a judge to indicate that 
certain issues point in the direction opposite the disposition of a case, a judge can just as easily 
skip such issues altogether, and often judges do skip such issues. A judge might use the process 
of writing an opinion to determine how to resolve a case, but more often a judge considers all of 
the issues in the case before deciding at least tentatively how to structure the opinion.213 As 
recent cognitive psychology research has revealed, judges are like other decision makers in this 
respect; human reasoning tends not to be linear, with premises leading to conclusions, but 
212 See supra Part II.A.2.b.i.
213
 Judges sometimes speak of situations in which an opinion “won’t write,” meaning that the process of writing causes the 
judges to change their minds. See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 115 
(1998) (asserting that “[s]ome judges report that on occasion, they find a decision that has wandered too far, or the decision 
simply “won’t write”). That may happen when the judge realizes that the opinion “does not follow accepted rules and is therefore 
arbitrary in result or superficial in reasoning.” Id. 
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bidirectional, with anticipated or preferred conclusions also affecting premises.214 Thus, a judge 
who reaches a nonsupportive proposition typically recognizes that the proposition is 
nonsupportive before the judge writes the relevant section of the opinion. When a judge decides 
to resolve that proposition nonetheless, there is a strong possibility that the judge cares especially 
about the resolution of that issue, and the constraint factor presents a strong argument for 
counting the resolution of such a proposition as dicta.
The issue remains close, however, because the remaining normative concerns move 
largely in the other direction. The parties in a case have had incentives to brief potentially 
relevant issues. Karl Llewellyn recognized long ago that the consideration factor does not 
necessarily militate in favor of delaying resolution of potentially relevant issues.215 On the other 
hand, a holding-dicta distinction that encourages judges to travel down only decisional paths that 
actually lead to the disposition will likely encourage greater consideration of issues along that 
path, rather than diverting judicial attention to issues that arise along several possible alternative 
paths, some of which might not lead to the judgment. Clarity in the law sometimes might be 
advanced by resolving issues that have been briefed, but allowing potentially relevant
propositions to count as holdings might require difficult distinctions about which propositions in 
fact were potentially relevant rather than irrelevant to the outcome of a case. At a more global 
level, therefore, clarity is promoted by limiting holding status to an identifiable class of 
propositions.
Finally, providing holding status to potentially relevant propositions might advance the 
goal of candor, because it would reduce the risk that a judge would resolve other issues 
differently to ensure that resolution of the particular issue is credited as a holding. Suppose, for 
example, that Justice Powell cared a great deal about his conclusion that diversity was a 
214 See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 
529-83 (2004) (reviewing the cognitive psychology literature and offering legal implications).
215
 Karl Llewellyn poses the following hypothetical: “Again, take a case where the court rules on four points in favor of a man 
who won below, but reverses, for all that, on the fifth point.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS 
STUDY 46 (1929). Llewellyn recognizes that the issue is close:
One of the reasons, of the sound ones, often given for weighing dicta lightly, is that the background and consequences 
of the statement have not been illumined by the argument of counsel, have not received, as being matters to be weighed 
with brows-a-wrinkle, the full consideration of the court. In the case put the first reason does not fit; the second, if it is 
to be put on at all, hangs loose and flaps.
Id. Llewellyn’s subsequent analysis, however, focuses not on the fact that the four are nonsupportive propositions, but on the fact 
that there are five propositions in all. See id. at 46-47. Llewellyn thus failed in this portion of his argument to distinguish the 
problem resulting from nonsupportive propositions and the problem of alternative justifications. Shortly before, however, 
Llewellyn identifies the category of nonsupportive propositions, excluding them from holding status, noting “no rule can be the 
ratio decidendi from which the actual judgment . . . does not follow.” Id. at 45.
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compelling interest, but not so much about his narrow tailoring analysis. If it were clear that his 
compelling interest conclusion would count as dicta, he might have had an incentive to switch 
sides in the case and find that the Davis plan was narrowly tailored to the goal of improving 
diversity. 
Evaluating potentially relevant propositions thus demands a difficult balance between 
constraint and the other factors. As a general matter, we believe that the constraint factor 
predominates in this context because allowing judges to create holdings on every issue that 
possibly could be relevant to resolution of a case would create many chances for opportunistic 
resolution of legal issues, and because the class of cases in which judges are likely to care 
sufficiently deeply about issues pointing in the opposite direction of their preferred case 
resolution as to encourage them to switch sides is quite small.216 We do recognize, however, that 
the Supreme Court, given its unique role relative to the federal and state judiciaries on issues of 
federal law and its limited docket capacity, might afford itself more leeway in defining its own 
holdings more broadly than would ordinarily be the case in other courts.217
4. Structured Analysis
The classification of potentially relevant propositions is a sufficiently close call that other 
considerations might rebut our presumptive conclusions. One such factor is the problem of 
structured analysis, which, we will argue, should be sufficient to move some nonsupportive 
propositions from the status of presumptive dicta to holding. We have already argued, however, 
that Justice Powell’s conclusion that diversity is a compelling interest should count as dicta, even 
though the compelling interest analysis is part of the structured strict scrutiny test. Using the 
taxonomy of nonsupportive propositions that we offered in Table 1,218 we would draw the line 
between “structured but unordered, with continuing relevance” and “structured and ordered, with 
continuing relevance,” while recognizing that this line may at times be difficult to draw.
Where a test has a strong natural order, and the resolution of the first part of the test turns 
out to be a nonsupportive proposition, the constraint concern is diminished. In such cases, the 
judge might have been able to violate the natural order and thus avoid resolving issues that point 
216
 See Stearns, supra note 176, at 129-42 (demonstrating narrow class of such cases).
217 See supra text accompanying note 347.
218 See supra text accompanying note 80.
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away from the court’s eventual disposition, but when a judge does follow the natural order of a 
test, the concern that the judge is reaching out to resolve an issue about which the judge has 
particularly strong concerns is substantially diminished. Similarly, when an analysis does not 
involve a particular test but presents a logically ordered analysis, this too diminishes the concern 
regarding constraint. Certainly, where a court finds standing before ruling against a plaintiff or 
petitioner on the merits, the standing conclusion should count as a holding even though it is 
opposite the ultimate judgment.219
Unordered or weakly ordered tests do not seem to us to furnish a sufficiently strong 
argument to convert propositions from presumptive dicta to holding. Once again, we recognize 
that there seems no ready metric for assessing how strongly tests are ordered or where to draw 
the dividing line between ordered and unordered tests, but given that virtually all tests are at least 
articulated in an order by the courts originating them,220 we would be wary of claims that tests 
are generally strongly ordered so as to convert nonsupportive propositions into holding. Because 
narrow tailoring analysis could build upon an assumed rather than established compelling 
interest, however, it is not obvious that what may be the more intuitive ordering—compelling 
interest then narrow tailoring—is a sufficiently strong natural ordering in the sense in which we 
use that term.221
We recognize, however, that dominant lawyerly and judicial intuition might sometimes 
diverge from formal analysis on how to treat a particular test. If most lawyers and judges would 
find a particular test to be strongly ordered that a more formal analysis reveals to be weakly 
ordered, perhaps the dominant understanding should control. For example, while we have argued
that strict scrutiny is a weakly ordered test, and that Justice Powell's nonsupportive assertion that 
racial diversity is a compelling state interest is therefore dicta, one might instead conclude that 
the proposition is a holding if lawyers and judges in general consider strict scrutiny to be a
219
 Declining to elevate such standing determinations to holding would threaten to undermine the development of standing 
doctrine. If announcements of standing determinations counted as holdings only when they supported the judgment, this might 
bias standing doctrine in a more liberal direction, at least if one assume that judges will sometimes liberalize standing to reach 
favorable outcomes on the merits, but that judges who grant standing and then deny relief on the merits are more likely to take a 
somewhat grudging view of the standing issue. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment in Milller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 
(1999), provides an illustration of grudging conferral of standing to then deny relief on the merits. See id. at 454 n.1 (stating that 
while “[a]s an original matter, I would agree with Justice O’Connor that [the asserted] ground [for third party standing] is 
inadequate, . . . I do not read our cases as demanding so significant an impairment of the rightholder’s ability to sue as she does,” 
and then proceeding to deny relief).
220
 The mere articulation of a test taking the form, to achieve result X, the court must find A, B, and C, should not be presumed 
to imply that A must precede B, which must precede C. 
221 See supra notes 75- 76 and accompanying text.
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strongly ordered test. The dominant perception of lawyers and judges on the question of ordering 
provides an independent check against articulating holdings that are motivated primarily by the 
desire to resolve questions of legal policy rather than dictated by the need to resolve the 
immediate case. A nonsupportive proposition may therefore be classified as holding based upon 
a determination that it derives from the application of a test that either is strongly ordered or that 
is generally understood to be strongly ordered.
The problem of structured analysis also may provide a basis for converting to dicta some 
alternative justifications that presumptively count are holdings.222 The paradigmatic case, once 
again, involves standing, except this time the court finds that a litigant who lacks standing would 
have lost in any event. Even though the court’s assessment of the merits provides an alternative 
justification for the judgment, it was improper for the court to reach the merits given that the 
standing denial is jurisdictional. When a court does consider the merits in such a case (as in a 
case in which jurisdiction is absent), that may suggest that the judge has a strong normative 
interest in the resolution of the merits. The constraint factor thus counsels against treating the 
court’s conclusion on the merits as holding. Similarly, discounting the merits resolution as dicta 
promotes proper consideration. One of the commonly expressed justifications for standing is to 
ensure adversity concerning those issues to be resolved.223 Allowing a court to set a precedent on 
the merits of a nonjusticiable case would undermine that justification.
We recognize that the factors do not point unambiguously in one direction, however. 
Allowing courts to resolve issues that the litigants have briefed might contribute to resolving 
ambiguities in law and thus promote clarity. Meanwhile, by denying precedential status to the 
merits resolution of a nonjusticiable case, a judge who is particularly interested in resolving the 
merits may have an incentive to find the case justiciable in order to achieve a holding on the 
merits, thus threatening both candor and constraint. The observation that judges might 
manipulate justiciability doctrine is, of course, not new,224 and the judges most inclined to engage 
222 See supra Part II.A.2.b.i.
223
 Richard Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 97 CAL. 
L. REV. 1, 33 (2003) (observing that “standing rules require concrete adversity between the parties”).
224
 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 70 (1984) (asserting that “the Court has so severely 
manipulated the injury standard that the foundation of standing law is essentially incomprehensible”). For an article that takes a 
more sanguine view of the standing doctrine, and of the injury requirement in particular, see Stearns, Standing Back from the 
Forest,  supra note 178.
82
in such manipulation are likely those with particularly strong normative views on the merits 
resolution for which a more dispassionate standing determination might pose a barrier.
Where analysis is as strongly ordered as the questions of standing and the merits, 
however, that is presumably because the courts have concluded that there is a strong reason to 
resolve the second inquiry only after the courts achieves a certain resolution on the first. In such 
circumstances, where the resolution of the first inquiry makes the second inquiry irrelevant, we 
believe that resolution of the second inquiry should count as dicta. We would reach the opposite 
conclusion, however, with tests that are only weakly ordered, such as the strict scrutiny test. 
Evaluation of the second prong of a weakly ordered test despite the resolution of the test as a 
whole through the first prong is not so unusual as to raise red flags about a judge’s motivation in 
doing so.
A variation on the problem occurs where a court skips the first prong of an ordered test to 
resolve the second prong, most commonly because the second prong is the easier to resolve. For
example, a court might avoid an analytically difficult standing issue and conclude that the merits 
of the claim is frivolous. The Supreme Court has confronted cases in which lower federal courts 
have engaged in such “hypothetical jurisdication.” In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment,225 Justice Scalia, writing for a majority on this issue, rejected the practice, claiming 
that it “offends fundamental principles of separation of powers.”226 The Court, however, has not 
always insisted that courts follow the order of even relatively strongly ordered tests. Thus, in 
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,227 Justice Ginsburg, while claiming to adhere to Steel Co.,
permitted a lower federal court to resolve a less difficult question of personal jurisdiction, which 
represents a waivable barrier to jurisdiction, without first resolving the more difficult and 
nonwaivable question of subject matter jurisdiction, where the particular resolution of the easier 
jurisdictional question rendered moot the resolution of the more difficult one. The Court 
concluded that despite the difference in the power to waive these forms of jurisdiction, “there is 
no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy.”228
225
 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
226 Id. at 94.
227
 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
228 Id. at 577.
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Our point is not to resolve the difficult questions of hypothetical jurisdiction or inter-
jurisdictional priorities. These doctrines do not concern whether the courts should consider the 
resolution of logically subsequent issues as precedent, but rather whether courts are permitted to 
skip steps in reaching them. Nonetheless, the factors that underlie our analysis suggest that these 
issues are closely related, and thus it is not surprising that the courts have made fine distinctions 
in this area. There are policy issues that counsel in favor of permitting courts to resolve cases
based upon easy (even if subsequent) rather than difficult (even if prior) issues. Doing so allows 
for continued consideration of the difficult issue while providing adequate consideration of those 
issues that prove sufficient to resolve the case. Clarity might be furthered as the legal system 
benefits from incremental development of doctrine, which is promoted by limiting the obligation 
of courts to reach issues in resolving cases. And when the second issue is genuinely easier, a 
judge’s decision to resolve the case on that issue does not suggest that the judge had a 
particularly strong normative interest in that issue. 
On the other hand, once judges are allowed to skip a preliminary issue, judges who 
particularly wish to resolve the second issue might present the subsequent issue as easier than it 
actually is, and might set out a simplistic analysis of that issue to reinforce the judge’s claim that 
skipping the logically prior issue is justified. In addition, there remains a concern that skipping 
the first issue will promote underdevelopment of doctrine in that area, especially if the area is 
viewed as an arcane body of jurisdictional case law. In the narrow class of cases in which it is 
permissible to skip jurisdictional predicate issues to get to the merits, the courts have presumably 
found that concerns about manipulation are not sufficient to force compliance with the general 
rule.
5. Hypotheticals
The problem of hypotheticals proves one of the easiest to resolve. Hypotheticals and 
analogical reasoning sometimes help to sharpen case issues. The power of reasoning by analogy 
might suffice to make the resolution of hypothetical issues a sufficient, or even necessary, 
proposition in a case from the perspective of the deciding court. Nonetheless, the power to create 
holdings through hypotheticals presents significant problems of constraint. If a court, by 
resolving a hypothetical case, can determine the result of that case should it arise, there will be a 
strong incentive for judges to pose hypotheticals that they are particularly interested in resolving. 
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This might result in courts devoting excessive attention to, and sometimes purporting to resolve, 
potentially relevant hypotheticals even absent adequate briefing, thus undermining the goal of 
proper consideration. Assigning holding status to hypotheticals would diminish doctrinal clarity 
in the law, at least to the extent that abstract or tangential hypotheticals obscure what a judge was 
actually required to resolve in the immediate case. Providing holding status to hypotheticals 
would thus threaten to undermine candor, as judges would increasingly claim to identify 
hypotheticals as relevant to the immediate case when their real interest is just resolving the 
hypotheticals themselves. Thus, propositions that are hypothetical should count as dicta.
6. Biconditional Statements
Even a hypothetical, however, conceivably could count as a holding if it is the inverse of 
a holding and part of a biconditional statement. The case for counting both halves of a 
biconditional statement as a holding is strong. When the case reasoning directly results in an “if, 
then” holding on a particular issue, there is little reason to believe that the judge has reached out 
in resolving the inverse issue. A judge who concludes that the inverse proposition is true may 
reach that issue because the judge feels particularly strongly about the issue, but there is at least a 
strong possibility that the judge is simply trying to offer a comprehensive resolution to the 
relevant question presented. For example, in Bakke, Justice Powell resolved the question of how 
a university could use race as a factor in an admissions program in a way that would be narrowly 
tailored to advance the interest of diversity.
The concerns about constraint that ordinarily would arise with respect to nonsupportive 
propositions thus seem greatly reduced when the nonsupportive proposition is the inverse of a 
holding and thus part of what the court intended as a biconditional test. The consideration factor 
and the clarity factor point in opposite directions, but we believe that the pull of the clarity factor 
is stronger. Delaying final resolution may always promote consideration, but there is no special 
reason to delay resolution of inverse propositions. Bakke, for example, unquestionably presented 
the question that Powell resolved, and waiting until additional cases raised the same issue would 
not have greatly improved the Court’s ability to address the issue. The clarity factor, meanwhile, 
strongly suggests that inverse propositions generally should be holdings. If a court cannot issue 
biconditional holdings, it may take considerably longer to provide definitive guidance on where 
the line is. Of course, sometimes there will be reasons for judges to conclude that given the 
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complexity and fact-dependent nature of an issue, the consideration factor will outweigh the 
clarity factor, but we do not believe that the holding-dicta distinction should demand that 
consideration trump clarity in every such case.
Finally, the concern for judicial candor is significant here, as the Bakke example shows.
If Justice Powell had been clearly prohibited from treating his analysis of whether the Harvard 
plan was narrowly tailored as holding, and if he had feared that a holding limited to striking 
down the Davis program might signal that no race-based admissions programs could be narrowly 
tailored or at least have left open that possibility, then he might instead have elected to go further 
in deciding which programs to allow. A regime that flatly prohibits the issuance of biconditional 
holdings might have placed Powell in the difficult position of either striking the Davis plan on 
narrow tailoring grounds, and leaving open the possibility that a later Court would extend Bakke
to cover the Harvard plan, or endorsing the Davis program, even though Justice Powell truly 
believes that it was not narrowly tailored.229 By instead issuing a biconditional holding, Powell 
was able to issue an opinion that promoted judicial candor in the sense of informing the relevant 
institutions as to the precise, and nuanced, basis for his narrow tailoring holding. The holding-
dicta distinction ideally should not induce judges to take disingenuous positions on issues, 
contrary to how they actually believe the issues should be resolved. This problem might also 
distinguish the Supreme Court given the relative rarity with which it reviews any particular 
substantive issue. The hiatus in equal protection analysis of affirmative action programs in higher 
education admissions from 1978 when the Supreme Court decided Bakke until 2004 when the 
Court decided Grutter and Gratz provides a credible normative justification for affording that
Court more flexibility to determine the scope of its own holdings as compared with courts that 
lack discretionary power to control their dockets.
As a general matter, we believe that the inverse statements of holdings generally should 
count as holdings as well, but there is a significant caveat. It often may not be obvious that an 
inverse of a holding in fact is an inverse of a holding, when the holding and the inverse statement 
are not conceptually connected in the form of a biconditional. Allowing all inverse statements to 
229
 Of course a similar analysis can be applied to the issue of whether diversity is a compelling interest. If Justice Powell believed
that he had identified a means of narrowly tailoring a race based admissions program but to an end that would be rejected as not 
compelling, he might instead have elected to sustain the Davis program based upon one of the advanced grounds that he did not 
believe satisfied strict scrutiny. But since the compelling interest prong does not form part of a biconditional holding, see supra x, 
we nonetheless conclude that this part of the Powell opinion is dicta.
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count as holdings thus makes the holding-dicta distinction itself difficult to apply, undermining 
the goal of clarity. We would thus limit our conclusion to situations in which a court clearly is 
creating a test that is equivalent to a biconditional statement. An important virtue of this 
approach is that we believe that it comes closer to judicial practice and lawyerly intuition than an 
approach that counts all inverse statements of holdings as holdings. Our anecdotal evidence 
suggests that lawyers generally believe that when a court creates a test, even a biconditional test, 
that is a holding, but lawyers do not generally have an intuition that all inverse propositions of 
holdings should be holdings. Later, we will consider a case presenting inverse propositions that 
should not count as holdings.230
We recognize that this approach introduces a concern with respect to the clarity factor, 
albeit one that we view as less significant: determining whether the court is crafting a test. 
Although we think the answer in Bakke is affirmative, that case nonetheless illustrates the 
difficulty. Powell could have stated more explicitly that he was announcing a distinction between 
quotas and plus factors as the test for meeting narrow tailoring. Even so, the true test of a theory 
may be whether it can identify which cases are difficult, and our analysis can show precisely 
why the discussion of the Harvard plan presents a difficult issue for the holding-dicta
distinction.231 Some readers of Bakke may see the discussion as creating a test, and those readers 
will tend to think the discussion created a holding. Others may see the discussion as unconnected 
to Justice Powell’s conclusion that the Davis plan was not narrowly connected, and those readers 
will tend to think the discussion was dicta. We side with the former readers because Powell did 
explain that the reason that he was discussing the Harvard plan was because it bore on the issue 
of the extent to which a university can use race.232 But readers need not accept our conclusion to 
agree with our more general position that biconditional statements that announce tests create 
holdings, while other biconditional statements do not.
230 See infra note 408 and accompanying text.
231
 An additional reason for the difficulty is that Powell expressed the discussion of the Harvard plan in the form of a 
hypothetical. But that should not obscure that the Harvard discussion was an example used to advance a proposition—“if plus 
factor, then narrowly tailored”—that, though counterfactual, was the inverse of a holding. That is the reason that we believe that 
this proposition should count as a holding despite its status as a hypothetical.
232 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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7. Breadth
The holding-dicta distinction should not force judges to resolve cases in the narrowest 
possible manner that is consistent with the case judgment. When an issue is genuinely before a 
judge, and thus concerns about constraint are at their minimum, the holding-dicta distinction 
should leave the choice to the deciding jurist to weigh the benefits and costs of resolving the 
issue in a complete and comprehensive manner. We recognize that there may be times when it is 
appropriate for a judge to craft holdings that have very narrow application, leaving it to future 
courts to identify which features of the case were dispositive, but there may be other cases in 
which it is appropriate for a court to clarify the law by offering a broader holding.233
As before, there is some risk that allowing judges to determine the breadth of their 
holdings will lead to an issue’s being resolved in a comprehensive way by the first judge who 
has strong feelings about an issue. But any judge will be constrained by the obligation to 
harmonize a case with the holdings of earlier cases. The norm that judges should not 
disingenuously distinguish prior cases itself provides a significant constraint, complementing the 
constraint that a judge can issue holdings only along the decisional path to the case result. What 
is decisive here, however, is not a conclusion that constraint is irrelevant. Rather, it is the 
observation that a regime prohibiting unnecessarily broad antecedents would, except in cases 
involving patently absurd distinctions, effectively be a regime in which cases are generally
distinguishable on their facts, and in which generalizations by a court would rarely provide the 
basis for holdings. We will turn to the task of critiquing such a regime soon.234 For now it is 
sufficient to observe that this type of regime is in tension with the premise of this Article that 
statements in opinions sometimes constitute holdings. It is always possible to make statements 
narrower and more dependent on the particular facts of a case, but our system of precedent 
sometimes counts generalizations beyond the facts of a case as holdings.
That does not mean, however, that all broad statements should be considered to be 
holdings. Imagine the following hypothetical statement in Bakke: “If a graduate admissions 
program uses a quota, or an undergraduate admissions program uses a quota or a plus factor, then 
the program fails narrow tailoring.” Allowing that proposition to be a holding would effectively 
233
 For an analysis demonstrating that the Supreme Court’s narrowest grounds rule implies a choice of breadth when a 
unanimous court or a majority agrees to the chosen level of breadth, see infra notes 313-315 and accompanying text.
234 See infra Part IV.A.1.
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provide an end run around our conclusion governing hypotheticals. No undergraduate admissions 
program was before the Court. It would be fine for a court to sweep graduate admissions and 
undergraduate admissions together—“if any university admissions program uses a quota, then it 
is fails narrow tailoring”—even though such a conclusion would resolve no greater a number of 
cases. But a court cannot invoke a narrow antecedent for the case at hand, and then resolve 
additional cases not fitting within that antecedent. Stated conceptually, a court can fit the facts of 
a case within a broad circle and resolve all the fact patterns within that circle, but it cannot then 
annex an additional circle and resolve the fact patterns within that circle too.
8. Summary
Before analyzing the definitions of holding offered by other scholars and setting out our 
own, we will summarize the preceding discussion. The following table presents each of the 
problems identified in Part II and evaluates them according to the four normative criteria 
developed in this part. This table repeats each of the problem categories from Table 3, indicating 
whether the category has potential relevance for presumptive holdings or presumptive dicta. The 
second column identifies factors that provide an argument for altering the presumptive status of 
propositions based on this category, and the third column identifies factors that provide contrary 
arguments. The fourth column offers a conclusion based on the analysis in the preceding 
subsections, indicating whether the problem category should convert presumptive holdings to 
dicta or presumptive dicta to holding.
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Table 4. The problem categories and their resolutions
Problem category (and 
presumptive status of 
potentially affected 
statements)
Factors that argue for
altering presumptive 
status
Factors that argue 
against altering 
presumptive status
Conclusions
Alternative possible 
justifications (applied to 
presumptive holdings)
The ability to choose a 
decisional path implies some 
freedom from constraint, as a 
judge may pick the path 
containing issues that the 
judge most wants to resolve.
(1) There are alternative 
possible justifications for a 
large number of propositions, 
so an exception here would 
limit clarity by preventing the 
development of law.
(2) Disallowing reliance upon 
a single prong of a multi-
prong test would undermine 
concerns for candor and 
consideration by encouraging 
resolution of issues 
unnecessary to resolving the 
immediate case. 
Should not turn holdings into 
dicta.
Alternative justifications
(applied to presumptive 
holdings)
Allowing judges to choose 
multiple decisional paths 
undermines constraint, as 
the judges who choose 
multiple paths may be 
particularly eager to resolve 
the relevant issues. The 
effect on constraint is 
minimal, however, assuming 
that judges already have the 
power to choose a path.
If alternative justifications 
were not holdings and 
alternative possible 
justifications also were not 
holdings, judges might have 
an incentive to reach a result 
on one issue opposite from 
that on the other to ensure 
that they create a holding, 
undermining the goal of 
candor.
Should not turn holdings into 
dicta.
Structured analysis (applied 
to presumptive holdings)
When a court reaches a 
second issue despite 
resolving a test on the first 
issue, it is reaching out to 
resolve the second issue, 
thus undermining constraint.
(1) Allowing courts to resolve 
briefed issues may advance 
clarity in the law, without 
reducing consideration.
(2) Considering a second 
alternative justification to be 
dicta in some circumstances 
might lead a court to change 
its position on the first 
alternative justification.
Where a test is ordered, only 
the first of multiple alternative 
justifications should count as 
a holding. For example, 
resolution of the merits of the 
case after a finding of no 
standing is dicta.
Structured analysis (applied 
to presumptive dicta)
When the first prong of an 
ordered multi-part test 
produces a nonsupportive 
proposition, concerns about 
constraint are less than with 
most other nonsupportive 
propositions.
Allowing courts to resolve 
briefed issues may advance 
clarity in the law, without 
reducing consideration.
Where a test is ordered, the 
resolution of one prong 
should not be considered to 
be dicta merely as a result of 
resolution of a later prong.
Hypotheticals (applied to 
presumptive holdings)
If hypotheticals count as 
holdings, courts may have 
wide discretion to resolve 
issues not before them, 
undermining constraint.
Even if a hypothetical 
proposition is presumptively 
a holding because of its role 
in the argument, it should 
count as dicta.
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Problem category (and 
presumptive status of 
potentially affected 
statements)
Factors that argue for
altering presumptive 
status
Factors that argue 
against altering 
presumptive status
Conclusions
Biconditional statements
(applied to presumptive 
dicta)
By allowing judges to hold on 
inessential issues, 
biconditionals threaten to 
undermine constraint. The 
effect on constraint is small, 
however, because a judge is 
still limited to issues along a 
chosen decisional path.
Allowing biconditionals can 
promote clarity and candor
by avoiding a choice 
between extreme doctrinal 
positions.
The inverse proposition of a 
holding should count as a 
holding where the court 
effectively endorses both 
halves of a biconditional in a 
test.
Breadth (applied to 
presumptive holdings)
The judges who resolve 
cases broadly may tend to be 
those with strong normative 
views on the issues in those 
cases.
If broad statements are not 
allowed, all cases are subject 
to being distinguished on 
their facts, undermining 
clarity in the law.
A court is free to endorse 
broad propositions, as long 
as the propositions do not 
forge together distinct sets of 
factual issues in an effort to 
evade the characterization of 
hypotheticals as dicta.
IV. DEFINING HOLDING AND DICTA
Not surprisingly, given the central importance of delineating dicta and holding, there is a 
longstanding, and often insightful, literature that has focused on this question. In this part, we 
will begin by providing a critical overview of that literature. While our analysis will show 
agreement with many discrete insights, it will also underscore our larger point, namely that the 
failure of prior scholars to undertake a more comprehensive approach in setting out the problem 
of defining dicta, and specifically the failure to articulate categories of judicial assertions that 
give rise to disputes in characterization, has limited the efficacy of prior scholarly efforts in this 
important area.
While the analytical framework set out in the prior parts of this Article can improve 
conceptual clarity even if courts ultimately reject our definition, we believe that our definition 
has much to commend it both at a theoretical level and at the level of practical implementation.
As with virtually any definition that one might offer, ours is prone to some difficult applications
and to potential disputes in concrete case settings. But a definition that hubristically claimed to 
resolve all cases would undoubtedly mask serious difficulties and disagreements. Instead, our 
definition is sufficiently capacious to allow reasonable jurists in difficult cases to argue for 
different conclusions edified by the common theoretical foundation. Properly applied, our 
definition resolves many issues and reduces the set of substantial disagreements that will arise.
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A. The Inadequacy of Existing Definitions 
1. Reconciliability
We begin with Professor Michael Dorf’s important article,235 first by evaluating his 
critique of a commonly held definition of holding (and by implication of dicta), and second by 
critiquing Dorf’s alternative suggested definition.236 Professor Dorf’s principal project is to attack 
the definition of holding as limited to a meaningful or plausible reconciliation of the facts and 
outcomes of prior cases. Under the facts-plus-outcome, or reconciliation, approach, a court’s task 
is to identify a theory that can explain the results of previous cases, regardless of whether the 
precedent-setting courts themselves adopted the superimposed theory. We agree with Dorf’s 
conclusion, though we disagree with some of his reasons and will offer some additional and, we 
believe, more persuasive reasons. His analysis focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court and its powers 
as an Article III court; in contrast, while we use several cases arising in Article III courts as 
illustrations, our analysis is not grounded in the requirements of Article III.237
Dorf uses case examples to illustrate in depth how the Supreme Court infamously 
reinvented the important line of cases concerning the President’s authority to remove 
administrative agency officials.238 Perhaps the strongest indication of recasting arose in Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s decision in Morrison v. Olson,239 in which a majority upheld the independent 
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, even though the Act prevented the 
President from exercising complete removal authority over the independent counsel. The 
independent counsel performs purely executive functions,240 and a previous case had clearly 
provided that Congress cannot restrict the President’s authority to remove officials performing 
purely executive functions.241 Morrison effectively supplanted what had been a clear line with a 
balancing test.242
235
 Dorf, supra note x.
236 See infra Part IV.A.4.
237
 This is an important point because the distinction between holding and dicta is general and emerged within non-Article III 
common law courts in addition to Article III courts. The theoretical foundation we have developed, see supra Part III, is 
comparably broad and does not depend on the particular limitations of Article III.
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 Dorf, supra note x, at 2009-24.
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 478 U.S. 654 (1988).
240 Id. at 689-91 (acknowledging that the independent counsel performed purely executive functions, but finding that distinction 
no longer relevant).
241
 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). As Dorf persuasively argues, see Dorf, supra note x, at 2008-20, 
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Using the euphemism of “present considered view” to describe the Court’s new position, 
Rehnquist rewrote longstanding doctrine by effectively ignoring broad positions in the prior 
cases to arrive at an otherwise unattainable result.243 Relying on this line of cases and others,
Dorf argues that the Court has repeatedly invented new rationales and used “a too-narrow view 
of holdings . . . as a means by which judges evade precedents that cannot fairly be 
distinguished.”244 Dorf expresses the concern that constraining “holding” to facts-plus-outcome 
invites such manipulation given the ability to recast prior results in a new light.245 The removal 
cases certainly support this insight. Dorf then proceeds to offer a broader theoretical justification 
for rejecting the facts-plus-outcome approach.
Dorf persuasively argues that the reconciliation approach simply fails to provide a 
positive explanation of judicial practice: “[T]he courts do not accept the facts-plus-outcome view 
of holdings; when they are not busy circumventing precedent by abusing the holding/dictum
distinction, judges typically pay a great deal of attention to the words as well as the results of 
judicial decisions.”246 Ironically, the fact that courts sometimes construct seemingly disingenuous 
distinctions, or ambitiously recast old doctrines in a new light, underscores Dorf’s argument that
courts ordinarily evince an obligation to attend to and somehow reconcile previously articulated 
holdings. And yet, as Dorf acknowledges, the occasional practice (one that might be more 
frequent in the Supreme Court than elsewhere) of disingenuously distinguishing extant case law 
complicates the task of constructing normatively satisfying and functional definitions of holding 
and dicta.
Not all observers of the courts believe that precedents, or even the facts of cases, 
constrain courts. Some judicial politics scholars have used empirical methods to argue that 
that case itself involved a disingenuously narrow reading of Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
242 Morrison, 478 U.S. at 691 (“[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the 
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that 
light.”). Morrison itself was narrowly read in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), decided at around the same time 
Dorf’s article was published. See Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments 
Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998) (discussing Edmond). If the trend continues, Edmond will be read 
narrowly as well.
243
 In dissent, Justice Scalia pointed up the revisionist nature of the majority analysis. See Morrison, 478 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Surprising to say, the Court appears to concede an affirmative answer to both questions [implicated by present 
doctrine], but seeks to avoid the inevitable conclusion that since the statute vests some purely executive power in a person who is 
not the President of the United States it is void.”).
244 Dorf, supra note x, at 1999.
245 Id. at 2039-40 (“To discard the rationale of an earlier decision without the kind of compelling reasons that justify any 
departure from precedent does more than merely reinterpret a past case.”).
246 Id. at 2037 (footnotes omitted). 
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precedent fails to explain appellate court decision making.247 One difficulty in proving or refuting 
such claims involves selection bias.248 Cases that fail to settle tend to present close issues,249 and 
the Supreme Court’s procedure for choosing most of its own docket weeds out many cases in 
which the relevant precedents provide relatively clear guidance, even if the lower courts have 
applied them incorrectly.250 In addition, the claim to “stare indecisis,”251 meaning that precedent 
imposes no meaningful constraint on judicial decision making, rests upon heavy citation in 
support of, and in opposition to, both sides of a given issue in a case. The difficulty with relying 
upon such data to refute the constraining effect of precedent is that litigants are apt to cite cases 
concerning the most contentious issues, while issues well settled by precedent, and thus beyond 
credible dispute, fail to warrant heavy citation. In any event, the widespread practice of citing the 
reasoning of prior cases strongly suggests that precedent, and expressed reasoning within 
decided cases, matters. If it did not, then litigants and courts presumably would simply present 
persuasive arguments without bothering to structure their arguments in the context of precedent. 
This insight suggests that as a positive matter, both the facts and at least some of the 
generalizations of prior cases do affect the results in subsequent cases.
Of course, even if we are correct that courts do not limit the reach of precedents to facts 
plus outcomes, it remains possible that earlier generations of jurists afforded less deference than 
courts today to the express reasoning articulated in prior opinions. Consider, for example, the 
ancient distinction between the holding and the ratio decidendi (or more simply ratio) of a case. 
As Karl Llewellyn explained: The “actual holding must be stated quite narrowly,” encompassing 
the “precise point at issue . . . that the case decided.”252 The ratio provides the “generally 
247 See, e.g., SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 
1946-1992 (1995).
248 See Frank Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. 
U. L. REV. 251, 289 (1997) (noting that attitudinal effects would likely to be most significant at the Supreme Court, because the 
Court is especially likely to hear cases that do not have a clear answer under the legal model).
249 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (presenting a 
model in which the plaintiff wins half of cases that go to trial, regardless of the relative strength of plaintiffs’ claims in the overall 
pool of cases).
250
 Thus, the Supreme Court criteria for granting certiorari indicate that error correction is not a sufficient basis for a grant. See 
SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings 
or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”).
251 BRENNER & SPAETH, supra note 247.
252 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989). Llewellyn 
wrote the work in German in 1928 to 1929. 
94
applicable rule of law on which the opinion says the holding rested.”253 The ratio must also be 
distinguished from the “‘the rule of the case,’ meaning the ‘principle’ for which a case stands,” 
as that principle may develop in subsequent case law.254 Llewellyn observed a similar contrast 
between dictum and obiter dictum.255 A dictum is a statement that is nonessential but may have 
“second-order precedential value.”256 Obiter dictum is “merely a remark in passing” and is thus 
entitled to no more weight than the expression “of a legal scholar.”257 Our point is not to resurrect 
seemingly dated terminology, but rather to show that even assuming that it was once clear, the 
distinction between holding and ratio decidendi has blurred,258 as has that between dictum and 
obiter dictum. While it is interesting to speculate as to why commentators in the early twentieth 
century offered more gradations of precedent than is common today,259 our task is to provide a 
practical set of tools for distinguishing holding and dicta that can be employed to edify current 
practice.
Dorf offers two normative arguments against the facts-outcome approach. With respect, 
we find these arguments less persuasive than his observation that the courts treat holdings as 
253 Id.
254
 Llewellyn appears to see a case’s ratio decidendi as not controlling on later courts, or at least as more subject to revision than 
the holding. Llewellyn’s view may have been dated even in his own time, as at least some contemporaries of his saw things 
differently. See id. at 15. Consider, for example, the following explanation of a case’s ratio:
A precedent, therefore, is a judicial decision which contains in itself a principle. The underlying principle which thus 
forms its authoritative element is often termed the ratio decidendi. The concrete decision is binding between the parties 
to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as regards the world at large.
JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 201 (7th ed. 1924).
255
 A scholar active before Llewellyn recognized this distinction but questioned its utility:
Some authorities attempt to distinguish between dicta and obiter dicta, saying that if the court naturally, though 
unnecessarily, uses words by way of illustrating or limiting the doctrine necessary to the decision, those unnecessary 
words are dicta, but that if the court goes still farther out of its way, leaves the question that is actually under 
discussion, and for the sake of illustration or for some other reason discusses subjects wholly foreign to the case, the 
words thus dropped outside the natural pathway are to be called not simply dicta but obiter dicta. . . . For practical 
purposes the expressions are interchangeable.
WAMBAUGH, supra note x, § 13, at 18-19.
256 LLEWELLYN, supra note x, at 14.
257 Id.
258 See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 28 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Despite the Court's valiant 
attempt to limit the logic of its holding, the ratio decidendi of today’s decision knows no bounds.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 46, 56 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part) (using the words “holding” and “ratio decidendi” separately, but making 
no apparent distinction between them); Harkless v. Sweeny Ind. Sch. Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1970) (using “ratio 
decidendi” and “holding” apparently interchangeably); Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 28 Cal. App. 4th 185, 199 
(1994) (finding “ratio decidendi” synonymous with “holding”). Indeed, even his contemporaries noted the increased attention 
that Llewellyn gave over time to what he labeled the ratio. See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 
(1928).
259
 Maybe the reason is that in an era of formalism, any seeming departure from a pure holding had to somehow be justified. The 
labels provided a doctrinal mechanism of placing such extensions in boxes that appeared to preserve the holding-dicta line. In our 
post-realist world, we have no need to do that since it is a routine observation that courts manipulate these matters. The question 
is what are the limits on manipulation, and a viable framework for distinguishing holding and dicta will help to explain that.
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significant, at least when not evading them. First, while acknowledging Justice Holmes’s 
assertion that “the common law evolves through a process of rationalization,”260 Dorf insists that 
“reconceptualization has its limits” and that the facts-outcome view is “ultimately incoherent.”261
The problem, Dorf argues, is that “‘no mechanical rules can be devised to determine the level of 
generality intended by the precedent court.’”262 We agree that there can be no mechanical rules 
for determining precedents in a facts-outcome regime, but we disagree that this makes the 
reconciliation view “incoherent.” Indeed, presumably the strongest argument for the facts-
outcome approach is that its flexibility frees courts from strict adherence to the reasoning of their 
predecessors, thus allowing them to refine doctrine within a context of overall judicial constraint. 
A jurisprudential system providing no precedential weight to written opinions might be criticized 
for producing too little clarity,263 but incoherence arises only from mutually inconsistent 
constraints, not from indeterminacy.
Second, Dorf argues that “reconceptualizations rarely pay sufficient attention to the real 
issues at stake in the earlier case.”264 A court distinguishing an earlier case may do so on the 
basis of a fact to which the litigants in that case paid little attention.265 “When a court attempts to 
re-explain a prior decision,” Dorf argues, “the court necessarily focuses greater attention on the 
case before it at the moment than on the prior case.”266 Dorf does not explain, however, why this 
admitted tendency to read old cases in a new light is undesirable or, more generally, why the 
legal system should systematically prefer the original court’s articulated rationale to an arguably 
consistent alternative rationale—one that facilitates a desired judicial outcome—provided that it 
can be meaningfully constructed from the prior case. The original court, after all, might have 
selected its rationale without fully anticipating the implications of its immediate holding for a 
260
 Dorf, supra note x, at 2035 & n.138 (citing OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881)).
261 Id. at 2036.
262 Id. (quoting MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 53 (1988)).
263
 The civil law system has no doctrine of stare decisis, but precedents may have some persuasive weight, and this weight may 
become stronger when multiple courts arrive at the same conclusion. See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in 
Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis (2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=534504) 
(providing an economic analysis comparing the civil law’s approach to precedent to that of the common law).
264
 Dorf, supra note x, at 2038.
265
 Dorf offers Humphrey’s Executor as an example: “How did the Humphrey’s Executor Court know with such certainty that a 
postmaster carries out inherently executive functions? Might not the setting of postage rates be considered quasi-legislative? 
Could not the application of those rates to particular parcels be termed quasi-adjudicatory?” Id. These arguments attack 
Humphrey’s Executor for positing facts that may not have existed in Myers. Yet one can imagine a definition of holding that 
permits distinctions, but only where the distinctions are clearly supported by facts deemed material by the original court.
266 Id.
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significant future case. The second judge is in a better position to consider the operative 
precedent in light of at least two sets of facts: those motivating the initial precedent, and those in 
the immediate case. Thus, Dorf’s argument might even cut in favor of the reconciliation 
approach.
Larry Alexander has also offered an argument against the reconciliation approach,267
which he labels “the result model of precedent.”268 After distinguishing various formulations of 
this model, Alexander argues that they are all ultimately equivalent to Ronald Dworkin’s general 
jurisprudential approach, demanding the articulation of a morally sensible principle that 
encompasses the relevant body of precedent and reconciles it with the immediate case.269 Under 
this approach, a court must identify an admittedly imperfect but neutral governing principle that 
best harmonizes the cases.270 Because a system of precedent implies reliance upon decisions with 
which an applying court might disagree as an original matter, the challenge under the 
reconciliation approach is for the court to reconcile those cases whose outcomes it prefers with 
those cases that it would have decided differently. So viewed, the defects of the facts plus 
outcome approach to precedent are the familiar defects of Dworkin’s project.271
Professor Alexander provides a detailed attack on Dworkin, but for our purposes, it is 
sufficient to focus on one argument. Dworkin’s task, Alexander notes, is to answer the following 
question: “‘Which incorrect political/moral theory is ‘best’ from the point of view of correct 
political/moral theory?’”272 No theoretical apparatus “can answer such a question because the 
question is so bizarre,” Alexander insists.273 We need not assess whether Alexander is correct in 
his assertion, because it is sufficient for our analysis to note that the task of identifying the best 
incorrect theory leaves considerable room for disagreement. The reconciliation approach might 
suffice in doctrinal areas with so few cases that one theory can explain them all. But the 
approach threatens to disintegrate as the underlying doctrinal area expands and gains sufficient 
complexity that it becomes implausible to offer a single theory that can credibly account for even 
267 See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989).
268 Id. at 29-33.
269 Id. at 33-34.
270 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (providing an overview of Dworkin’s jurisprudential approach).
271
 For a critique of Dworkin’s attempt to make the law coherent, see Ken Kress, Why No Judge Should Be a Dworkinian 
Coherentist, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1999).
272
 Alexander, supra note x, at 39.
273 Id.
97
the vast bulk of cases. In many areas of law, commentators can agree only that the law is a 
“mess,”274 and while some commentators and jurists offer positive accounts that they trumpet as 
less messy than existing doctrine, or perhaps even neat, they generally will concede that even 
their new approach cannot explain all existing cases.275
But even if one could devise a comprehensive framework with which to embrace all or 
even most of the cases in a complex field, the reconciliation approach would remain normatively 
problematic. Perhaps ironically, it becomes problematic precisely because of the potential to 
develop such a comprehensive theory. Thus, in a system that truly cared only about a theory that 
could reconcile the facts and outcomes of decided cases, the law review article through which a 
professor best or most comprehensively reconceptualizes a seemingly problematic body of case 
law would—or at least should—have as much, and perhaps more, weight than admittedly partial 
judicial explanations. Even the most ardent law-and-economics positivists would not claim that 
their recapitulations are the law. Rather, the invariable claim is that such efforts best explain the 
law. Nor is this distinction semantic.276 Judges generally cast their opinions in the language of 
legal doctrine, rather than that of meta-theory, whether economics, moral philosophy, or some 
other methodology.277 And the incrementalism of doctrine necessarily imposes constraints that 
operate in tension with any theoretical claim to robustness. Moreover, academic claims to 
robustness are as contested as the doctrines themselves, and given the incentives of those 
proffering such explanations, they should be. Predictable doctrine in a reconciliation world 
would likely be impossible, at least in doctrinal areas involving complex and conflicting policy 
concerns.
274 See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial 
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1010 (2002) (calling the law of standing a “jumbled mess”); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of 
Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002) (“Everyone has heard the grumbling about the vagueness or
messiness of the doctrine of regulatory takings.”); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the 
Fourth Amendment, 3 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 291-92 (citing various sources agreeing that Fourth Amendment law is a “mess”). 
275 See, e.g., STEARNS, supra note x, at 251 (positing that “we cannot expect entirely consistent standing case law,” while 
presenting a theory intended to better harmonize existing standing case law).
276
 For an interesting case illustrating this difference, consider Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 
1985), in which after providing a comprehensive analysis based upon law and economics criticizing an Illinois rule invalidating 
treating certain liquidated clauses as penalties, Judge Posner applies the Illinois rule to strike down such a clause.
277
 For a defense of seeking agreement on doctrine rather than on broader principles, see Sunstein, supra note 192, at 1746- 51. 
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2. Factual Materiality
The reconciliation approach, however, is not always treated as a license for courts to 
accept just any theory that reconciles the case law. Seventy years ago, Arthur Goodhart offered a 
variant on the facts-plus-outcome approach that he saw as producing some predictability.278 Parts 
of his analysis appear dated,279 but because Goodhart furnishes an important early and often 
incisive effort to distinguish holding and dicta, his analysis deserves close attention. Goodhart 
addresses some of the problems we have identified, and he offers important insights without 
providing a complete resolution.280 We begin with an algorithm that Goodhart claims can be used 
to identify the holding of a case, and thus to reduce the scope of uncertainty that underlies the 
facts-plus-outcome approach. In considering Goodhart’s view, we implicitly assess the more 
famous, though less formally explicit, methodology of his contemporary Karl Llewellyn, who 
like Goodhart focuses on a consideration of the materiality of various facts.281
Goodhart rejects the view that we can ignore a judge’s reasoning altogether, noting that 
the judge necessarily makes law in his selection of the facts of the case to report.282 For 
278
 Goodhart, supra note 11.
279
 Goodhart carefully analyzes the precedential value of cases where courts have not issued opinions and where different 
reporters indicate different versions of the facts, small problems today. See id. at 169-70. Another limitation is Goodhart’s failure 
to recognize the possibility that mixed questions of fact and law provide a category somewhere in between those of facts and law. 
See, e.g., id. at 171 (classifying as a question of fact what would now generally be regarded as a mixed question). Goodhart’s 
assumption that the resolution of some mixed questions are simply fact findings prevents him from recognizing the possibility 
that the finding itself might have precedential value in other cases.
280
 For example, Goodhart implicitly recognizes the problem of biconditional statements. Id. at 180 (“[I]f in a case the judge 
holds that a certain fact prevents a cause of action from arising, then his further finding that there would have been a cause of 
action except for this fact is an obiter dictum.”).
281 See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 215, at 47-50. Llewellyn also distinguishes between holding and dicta explicitly, but the 
distinction he offers is of little assistance:
When [a court] speaks to the question before it, it announces law, and if what it announces is new, it legislates, it makes 
the law. But when it speaks to any other question at all, it says mere words, which no man needs to follow. Are such 
words worthless? They are not. We know them as judicial dicta; when they are wholly off the point at issue we call 
them obiter dicta—words dropped along the road, wayside remarks.
Id. at 42. The question, of course, is how to determine when a question is properly considered before a court. While Llewellyn 
does offer additional insights on the holding-dicta distinction, we pay less attention to his analysis than to that of Goodhart 
because Goodhart has offered a clearer methodology. We recognize that Llewellyn’s method is less subject to the objection 
below that Goodhart’s method is wooden, but that is largely only because it is less precise. Llewellyn himself was skeptical of 
Goodhart’s more mechanical approach. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 14 n.9 
(1960) (criticizing Goodhart for exalting the appellate opinion “into providing a Never-Never Single Answer,” and dismissing 
Goodhart as “hopelessly off target,” but not explaining further). We also disagree with the characterization that a court 
“legislates” when creating law in the course of resolving questions implicated in cases properly before it. In our view, judicial 
lawmaking is distinguished from legislating and is legitimated by the process through which it takes place, namely the need to 
resolve issues that arise in those cases through factors beyond the court’s control. See supra Part III.A. See also STEARNS, supra 
note 37, at 198 -202 (distinguishing legislative from adjudicatory lawmaking based upon the process through which each 
institution is called upon to make collective decisions).
282
 Goodhart, supra note 278, at 168-69. 
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Goodhart, “[i]t is by his choice of the material facts that the judge creates law,”283 and a holding 
is thus the proposition that given the set of material facts, the result of the case obtains.284 The 
challenge is thus to determine which case facts are or are not material. Goodhart recognizes 
judicial discretion in identifying facts as material, and suggests a resolution that takes the form of 
the following rebuttable presumption: “the facts of person, time, place, kind, and amount are 
presumably immaterial.”285 Conversely, other facts are presumed to be material.286
In either case, the presumption is rebuttable. Thus, Goodhart asserts that the court can 
treat as immaterial facts that are generally presumed material,287 and can specify that facts 
generally presumed to be immaterial are material in the actual case.288 In either instance, 
Goodhart claims, the court’s statement of materiality or immateriality controls. Goodhart’s 
analysis can perhaps best be conceived as an intermediate position between one that allows 
courts to articulate the ratio decedendi and one that instead limits the case to the facts plus 
outcome. While Goodhart would allow the judge to articulate a rationale that links the case facts 
to the judgment, the purpose of the announced rule is just that. It is a vehicle through which the 
judge, with some discretion in choosing among the various case facts, can weed out particular 
facts as immaterial.
Goodhart’s approach has been subject to two related critiques. Julius Stone argued that 
facts may be identified at different levels of generality, and that different views about the 
generality of facts will produce different holdings.289 Goodhart’s method is therefore potentially
indeterminate. And A.W.B. Simpson criticized Goodhart’s distinction between a judge’s 
identification of facts and a judge’s statement of principles of law as wooden.290 The judge’s 
enunciation of legal principles, Simpson argues, is what makes particular facts material,291 and, 
as a result, Goodhart’s approach is equivalent to what Simpson refers to as the “classical 
proposition” that the ratio is the “principle of law which the judge considered necessary to the 
283 Id. at 169.
284 See id. at 174-75 (giving examples of collection of facts and showing how different sets of material facts may make for 
broader or narrower holdings).
285 Id. at 174.
286 Id. at 178.
287 Id. at 175.
288 Id. at 177.
289
 Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decedendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597, 603 (1959).
290 See A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 413
291 Id. at 414.
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decision.”292 As Simpson observes, this merely brings us back to where we started, since there is 
no single formula for identifying the ratio decidendi.293
In a response to his critics, Goodhart denied that accepting a judge’s statements of legal 
rules (a commonly held view of precedent) was equivalent to Goodhart’s preferred approach, 
deducing principles based on the material facts.294 And while Goodhart acknowledged the 
possibility of indeterminacy under his system, he insisted that no method could produce perfect 
determinacy.295 We agree with Goodhart on these two points, but we read his critics to make a 
broader claim. Stone and Simpson imply that ignoring judicial pronouncements of law in favor 
of the material facts that the judge has elected to report is an arbitrary method through which to 
identify holdings, and further, that the method is unlikely to achieve consensus even if everyone 
agreed to adopt it. Thus, while Goodhart’s approach is systematic, it seeks to impose order 
without adherence to either the common practice of accepting a judge’s articulated reasoning in 
achieving a decision or seeking an alternative normative justification with which to reconcile the 
prior result. 
The weaknesses in Goodhart’s model becomes manifest when Goodhart seeks to reach 
conclusions about specific issues. For example, in treating the issue of alternative holdings, 
Goodhart insists, “it is incorrect to say that either one of the conclusions involved a dictum 
because the one preceded the other or because the one was based on broad grounds and the other 
on narrow grounds.”296 While Goodhart does not explain this conclusion, he suggests that the 
judge who issues alternative holdings found both sets of facts to be material. Yet this observation 
alone cannot serve as a justification for according alternative holdings precedential status. The 
292 Id. at 413 (internal quotations and citation omitted). For an addition argument to the same effect, see J.L. Montrose, Ratio 
Decidendi and the House of Lords, 20 MOD. L. REV. 587, 592 (1957). We consider the possibility of defining holdings with 
respect to necessity below. See infra Part IV.A.3. Simpson’s statement of the classical position adds a wrinkle, counting only 
what the judge considered necessary to the decision. Requiring an analysis of judicial intent, however, is unlikely to promote 
clarity in distinguishing holding from dicta. See infra notes 316-317 and accompanying text.
293 See A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 148, 159 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (“There may indeed be as many ways of finding the ratio of a case as there are 
ways of finding a lost cat; certainly the ratio of some cases seems as elusive.”). Despite Simpson’s admonition, some computer 
scientists recently have tried to find algorithmic approaches to identifying a case’s ratio decidendi. See, e.g., L. Karl Branting, 
A Reduction-Graph Model of Ratio Decidendi, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 40 (1993), available at http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/393344.html. This literature 
considers the legal literature without questioning it, using it as a basis for identifying the task of the computer 
models.
294
 Arthur H. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV. 117, 121 (1959).
295 Id. at 124 (“If it were possible to devise a method by which all precedents would become determinate, then the difficulties of 
interpretation would disappear, but I believe that this is a vain hope.”).
296
 Goodhart, supra note 278, at 180. 
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conceptual difficulty with this holding category arises because two sets of material facts 
redundantly lead to the same result. Goodhart’s methodology has no means of assessing the 
implications of redundancy.
We agree that Goodhart’s approach is excessively mechanical, or “wooden,” and that 
reliance upon reported material facts—even with the benefit of Goodhart’s rebuttable 
presumptions—cannot alone resolve the many difficult questions that arise in defining holding 
and dicta. As our preceding analysis suggests, however, we also recognize that the identification 
of material facts provides an important early step in constructing such a set of working 
definitions. Goodhart’s central contribution is in recognizing that judges inevitably have some 
discretion in selecting the issues for which they will make law, and  that discretion is constrained, 
although not eliminated, by the facts presented. The difficulty, which lies at the core of the 
various critiques we have reviewed, is that facts, material or otherwise, do not speak for 
themselves. A system of rebuttable presumptions concerning potentially material and immaterial 
facts cannot form the framework for identifying either the governing theory of a case or the level 
at which, whichever theory is chosen, it should be expressed. Judges do not merely identify 
material facts, but they develop legal reasoning that applies the facts and that eventually reaches 
a particular result. A satisfactory definition of holding and dicta must therefore examine the 
reasoning that connects the material facts to the result, rather than relying solely upon the 
selected material facts.
3. Necessity
The most influential definition, perhaps largely because of its inclusion in Black’s Law 
Dictionary,297 identifies “dictum” as a statement in a judicial opinion that is “unnecessary” to the 
case resolution. The focus on whether a statement is necessary dates at least to Eugene 
Wambaugh, who explained, “So far as the opinion goes beyond a statement of the proposition of 
law necessarily involved in the case, the words contained in the opinion, whether they be right or 
wrong, are not authority of the highest order, but are merely words spoken, dicta, obiter, or 
297 Black’s provides “obiter dictum” as an alternative definition for “dictum.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (Bryan A. Garner 
ed., 8th ed. 2004). “Obiter dictum” is then defined as “[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that 
is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be persuasive).” Id.; supra text 
accompanying note 12.
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obiter dicta.”298 Perhaps the main virtue of Wambaugh’s test is its simplicity. As Wambaugh 
asserted, the test allows “even the beginner [to] determine whether it is possible for a given 
proposition of law to be involved in a given case”299: 
In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully the supposed proposition of 
law. Let him then insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him 
then inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be good, 
and had had it in mind, the decision could have been the same.300
Wambaugh thus establishes a high threshold for necessity: If the decision could have been the 
same with the negation of a proposition, then the proposition was not necessary to the disposition 
and thus counts as dicta. In this analysis, sufficient but not necessary propositions are dicta.
While frequently cited by courts, Wambaugh’s approach (and along with it, that of 
Black’s Law Dictionary) proves the easiest to falsify. For that reason, we should not be surprised 
that it is inconsistent with standard judicial practices, including that of according precedential 
status to alternative justifications.301 Judge Kozinski noted the problem of alternative 
justifications in his disagreement with Judge Tashima in a recent en banc Ninth Circuit case. 
Judge Tashima invoked the “necessary” definition of holding,302 and Judge Kozinski pointed out 
the inconsistency:
Under his rationale, which is that everything not necessary to the result is dicta, 
both alternative holdings are dicta because neither is necessary to the result. We 
can test this proposition by asking the question: Would the result change if either 
of the alternative holdings were removed? The answer, of course, is no. Since 
either could be removed without affecting the result, neither is necessary, and so 
under Judge Tashima's reasoning, dicta.303
298 WAMBAUGH, supra note x, § 13, at 18-19.
299 Id. § 11, at 17.
300 Id.
301 See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1940) (“[W]here a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be 
relegated to the category of obiter dictum.”); see also In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2004); Whetsel v. Network Property 
Services, LLC, 246 F.3d 897, 903 (7th Cir. 2001).
302
 United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 920 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Tashima, J., concurring). As Judge Tashima noted, the 
Ninth Circuit had invoked the Black’s Law Dictionary definition previously. Id. (citing Export Group v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 
F.3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir.1995)). Judge Tashima, however, did not consider whether that selection of a definition was itself a 
dictum.
303 Id. at 915 (Kozinski, J., concurring). The same analysis applies when a court grants standing and then denies relief on the 
merits or when a court finds harmless error. The “holding,” which grants standing or finds error, can be reversed without 
affecting the case judgment, namely denying relief.
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Writing for the Court, Judge Kozinski instead adopted an earlier case definition that, in the spirit 
of legal fictions, redefined “necessarily” to mean “only that the court undeniably decided the 
issue, not that it was unavoidable for it do so.”304
Judge Kozinski’s alternative appears untenable or at least incomplete.305 While Kozinski
rescues Black’s use of “necessary” in defining “dicta,” he does so as an exercise in creative 
redefinition. Wambaugh’s test, in contrast, was based upon the actual meaning of “necessary,” 
and the court’s attempt to escape from Wambaugh’s approach reflects the deficiency of a 
necessity-based definition of holding. Wambaugh himself maintained that alternative 
justifications were dicta,306 but that the existence of alternative possible justifications was 
irrelevant.307 The latter conclusion appears to be in tension with Wambaugh’s test, however, 
because whenever there is an alternative possible justification, it is at least possible that the court 
could have reached the same result even if it had negated the conclusion on the alternative issue 
that it did explore.
It is possible to devise a test that generally requires necessity as a precondition to 
attaching the status of holding, but that exempts alternative rationales from this general 
requirement to avoid the anomaly of concluding that the court has expressed no holding in such a 
case. But even if we can thereby avoid a particular problem associated with the necessity 
requirement, we still need a normative justification for necessity in the first place. The failure of 
the necessity approach to accord with a fundamental practice in distinguishing holdings from 
dicta reveals that the approach does not match our intuitions about the holding-dicta line. Thus, 
304 Id. (citing United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.1995)). Of course this is no more fictitious than Chief Justice 
Marshall’s earlier effort to define “necessary” to mean “convenient, or useful, or essential.” M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat. 316, 413 (1819). Judge Tashima’s definition is akin to convenient or useful in the sense of being “conducive to” the 
ultimate case disposition.
305
 Judge Kozinski attempted to rescue it with the following clarification: 
Of course, not every statement of law in every opinion is binding on later panels. Where it is clear that a statement is 
made casually and without analysis, where the statement is uttered in passing without due consideration of the 
alternatives, or where it is merely a prelude to another legal issue that commands the panel's full attention, it may be 
appropriate to revisit the issue in a later case.
The problem with this approach is that it offers no attempt to constrain judges’ power to render decisions on any issues they 
please, as long as they are not casual or unanalytical in doing so. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the importance of constraint).
306
 The endorsement is somewhat equivocal:
If the court finds error as to two or more points, the case cannot be an authority of the strongest sort upon any of them, 
if it is impossible to say that the court considered any particular one of them conclusive. Yet as to each of the errors 
pointed out by the court the decision certainly does have some authority.
WAMBAUGH, supra note x, § 25, at 33. Wambaugh does not explain how one might determine whether “the court considered any 
particular one of them conclusive.” Applying his own test, neither would be conclusive, as neither would necessarily be 
determinative.
307 Id. (“If, however, the opinion definitely says that the reversal rests wholly upon one point, the case does become a precedent 
as to that point.”).
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even setting aside alternative justifications and alternative possible justifications, consider the 
case of an unnecessarily broad holding that is clearly embraced within an announced opinion.
Any time a case could be resolved on narrower grounds, the broader rationale can be claimed 
unnecessary. Much judicial reasoning is unnecessary in the sense that a court could have 
resolved a case on narrower grounds, for example by issuing a fact-specific ruling without 
making the legal basis of a decision clear, or simply by declining to announce a broad rule when 
a narrower alternative is available.308
We have already concluded as a normative matter that judges should be allowed to create 
holdings broader than necessary, but it is worth also showing that judges are, in fact, allowed to 
do so in practice. To illustrate, consider the Hopwood decision, in which a split panel of the Fifth 
Circuit struck down the University of Texas Law School affirmative action program.309 Two
panel members claimed broadly that race could not be used in furtherance of diversity, and that
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion was not controlling. Concurring in the judgment, Judge Wiener
maintained instead that the challenged program was invalid even under Bakke and that the 
majority’s approach was improperly broad and unnecessary to achieving the case result.310 Our 
point, of course, is not to defend the majority decision in Hopwood.311 Rather, it is that whether 
or not the majority panel correctly interpreted Bakke, there is no question what it held. The 
court’s holding was not the narrower position embraced by the concurrence. Instead, the holding 
was the broader and unnecessary view—unnecessary in the sense that the court could have 
achieved the same result with a narrower view that did not call the precedential status of 
Powell’s Bakke opinion into question—embraced by the majority to resolve the case.312
308
 This harkens back to the difficulty with Goodhart’s effort to rely upon selected material facts as the basis for identifying a 
holding; even if one agrees on which facts are material, this fails to resolve the level of generality at which the holding of the case 
should be cast. See supra text accompanying note 289.
309
 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
310 Id. at 963, 967-68 (Wiener, J., specially concurring). 
311
 Indeed, as we have made clear, we do believe that Powell’s Bakke opinion expressed the holding of the Supreme Court, and 
thus was binding on the lower courts. See supra note 37.
312
 In dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, Chief Judge Politz complained, “The majority of the panel overruled Bakke, 
wrote far too broadly, and spoke a plethora of unfortunate dicta.” Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 724 (Politz, C.J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). Politz’s only specific claim about dicta, however, was as follows: “This ‘injunction’ is wholly 
unnecessary to the disposition of the matter appealed and thus is clearly dictum . . . .” Id. at 722 (Politz, C.J., dissenting from 
failure to grant rehearing en banc). At first glance, this language appears to ignore the distinction between the reasoning of a case 
and its disposition. It is the reasoning of the case, rather than the disposition, that must be classified as holding or dicta. The 
looseness of language here, however, lies in the word “injunction,” as the panel in fact denied an injunction. See Hopwood v. 
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 958-59 (5th Cir. 1996). Chief Judge Politz’s complaint is that “two members of the three-judge panel 
determined to bar any consideration of race in the Law School's admission process,” 84 F.3d at 722, and the word “injunction” 
reflects, however imprecisely, that the decision would have sweeping effects. Nonetheless, Politz makes no clear argument that 
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We know of no rule that suggests that the holding of a split appeals court panel is 
expressed in that opinion that resolves the case on the narrowest grounds when the remaining 
two jurists agree to an alternative, albeit broader, rationale. Indeed, the narrowest ground rule, 
announced in Marks v. United States,313 implies just the opposite. The rule states: “When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.”314 The negative pregnant of the 
announced rule is that when the Supreme Court is not fragmented (meaning that it issues a 
unanimous or majority decision), and thus when a majority embraces a single governing 
rationale, the holding is expressed in the majority opinion. Critically, this is so even if a justice 
concurring in the judgment would have preferred instead to resolve the case on a narrower 
ground. Extending this rule to the three-judge circuit court panel, the Hopwood majority, despite 
its broader holding and despite the narrower special concurrence,315 stated the holding.
Applying Wambaugh’s approach to cases like Hopwood would potentially make a court’s 
decision to address a case on relatively broad grounds irrelevant to the precedential effect of the 
announced rule when a narrower alternative can be imagined. As suggested above, the Marks 
rule would then have to be adapted to apply even to majority decisions when a judge concurring 
in the judgment offers a narrower means of achieving the same result. Indeed, the implications 
might be broader still. The availability of an unarticulated narrower ground (as might occur, for 
example, in a case decided by a unanimous court) would potentially prevent the broader 
articulated ground from having precedential status. Thus, a law review article suggesting a 
narrower rationale that could have been used to achieve the outcome in a Supreme Court case 
could in theory state the law, rather than the opinion under review. A narrower ground suggested 
in an opinion concurring in the judgment would then prove a sufficient, but not a necessary, 
condition for disregarding the broader rationale embraced in a majority opinion.
the fact of sweeping effects is sufficient to classify any of the panel’s statements as dicta.
313
 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
314 Id. at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
315
 The circuit court uses “special concurrence” in the same manner as the Supreme Court uses concurrence in the judgment. 
Indeed, at the end of Judge Wiener’s special concurrence, he states, “Thus I concur in the judgment of the panel opinion but, as to 
its conclusion on the issue of strict scrutiny and its gloss on the order of the remand, I disagree for the reasons I have stated and 
therefore concur specially.” 78 F.3d. at 968 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
106
Taken to its logical conclusion, this understanding of necessity would call into serious 
question twin premises of legal realism, first that judges make law, and second, that they have 
discretion in doing so. Ultimately, the analysis suggests that the necessity approach is no more 
than the reconciliation approach in a disguised form. For a proposition to be necessary to a 
judgment, there must be a unique chain of reasoning from the facts to the judgment dependent 
upon that proposition, or if there are multiple possible chains of reasoning, then each of the 
alternative chains must also be dependent upon that proposition. Thus, when a proposition is 
necessary to a judgment, there is no way to reach the same judgment with respect to the relevant 
facts without including the claimed proposition. Suppose, for example, that after an opinion
containing a proposition that satisfies the necessity test is announced in a given case, another 
court would prefer to resolve a later case in a manner that depends upon the negation of the 
established proposition from the earlier decision. Assuming adherence to precedent, the second 
court would then be unable to resolve the subsequent case in the preferred manner while 
harmonizing the two cases. Thus, a proposition can be necessary to a judgment only if that 
proposition would also be controlling in a reconciliation-based precedent regime.
Wambaugh clarifies his test by providing that “a case is not a precedent for any 
proposition that was neither consciously nor unconsciously in the mind of the court.”316 If we 
adopt this interpretation of necessity, then it becomes even more difficult to establish a precedent 
under the necessity regime than under the reconciliation regime.317 Even if a judge logically 
could not have reached the case outcome without endorsing a particular proposition, that 
proposition still would not be considered a holding if the judge did not at least subconsciously 
consider that proposition. The difficulty of determining subconscious processing aside, 
Wambaugh’s test would result in creation of a holding only when a judge must have adopted a 
proposition to arrive at the case outcome and in fact did adopt and articulate that proposition.
Although this approach, unlike the reconciliation approach, pays some attention to a court’s 
articulated chain of reasoning, it cannot be squared with any approach that credits the 
discretionary choices judges actually make in resolving cases.
316 WAMBAUGH, supra note x, § 17, at 24.
317The “mind of the court” approach is reminiscent of the “meeting of the minds” concept in contract law. Both are fictions that 
are intended to capture objective indicia of the approach the court necessarily took, or that the parties agreed upon, respectively.
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4. Preclusivity
In developing his test for determining which portion of a court’s articulated reasoning 
should be credited as holding, and which portions should be discounted as dicta, Professor Dorf 
imports the doctrine of issue preclusion.318 In particular, Dorf focuses on a provision from the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments: “When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and 
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the 
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a 
different claim.”319 Dorf also relies upon a comment to this section that endorses the converse 
proposition. Specifically, when the articulated criteria for issue preclusion are not met, the 
determination is not deemed to have been resolved conclusively in subsequent litigation between 
the parties on the same or on a different claim.320 The explanatory comment explains that 
determinations that do not satisfy the criteria for issue preclusion are not deemed to have been 
resolved conclusively because “such determinations have the characteristics of dicta.”321
While we agree that issue preclusion provides the basis for insights into distinguishing 
holding and dicta, Dorf fails to provide a foundation for relying upon preclusion law to develop 
his definition of holding. Dorf does note that preclusion law requires the applying court to 
distinguish more important or more central rationales from less important or less central 
rationales. That may suffice to show that preclusion law sheds some light on the holding-dicta 
analysis, but it does not establish the preclusion law analogy is sufficiently strong as to provide a 
sound normative basis for the definitions of holding and dicta. While the sets of concerns that 
these two bodies of law address overlap, they remain critically distinct.
Preclusion law seeks to provide rules for which issues are deemed conclusive to the 
parties in future cases; it does not aspire to provide rules for which issues will bind nonparties. 
There are sound normative justifications for defining issues in the preclusion context more 
broadly than governing rationales in the context of defining holding. One of the policy 
318
 Dorf does not wholeheartedly endorse importing preclusivity. Instead, he states, “Perhaps we can gain some insight from a 
related field: preclusion law.” Dorf, supra note x, at 2041. Earlier in the article, Dorf describes the portion discussing preclusion 
law as “explain[ing] what it means to say that a proposition is essential to the rationale of a case.” Id.
319 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982), quoted in Dorf, supra note x, at 2041.
320 Id. § 27 cmt. h, quoted in Dorf, supra note x, at 2041 & n.159.
321 Id. Reliance upon the quoted provisions is potentially circular. Thus, Dorf relies upon issue preclusion to define holding and 
dicta because the relevant provision in the Restatement helps to explain what counts as “essential” within an opinion; meanwhile 
the same provisions base their discussion of what is essential, as needed to determine issue preclusion, upon the distinction 
between holding and dicta.
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justifications for preclusion is to encourage parties to air their legal disputes in a cost-effective 
manner, one that minimizes the burdens on judicial resources.322 Potentially redundant claims 
should therefore be minimized, and one way to achieve that is to construe “issue” sufficiently 
broadly that parties are encouraged by issue preclusion to present closely related claims in one 
proceeding.
At the same time, the normative considerations that are central to the holding-dicta 
distinction are reduced in the preclusion context. Preclusion doctrine, for example, is not 
particularly concerned with judicial incentives to reach out and resolve issues not closely tied to 
the material facts of a case. It may be worthwhile for appellate judges to anticipate issues that 
will arise immediately on remand, and there is thus an argument that law-of-the-case doctrine 
should be broader in its definition of holding than the holding-dicta distinction that we have been 
considering.323 Given that Dorf’s primary project was to criticize excessively narrow definitions 
of holding, it is not surprising that he carefully considered preclusion doctrine in his analysis.
Our concern, however, is that in doing so, Dorf might have been led into endorsing an 
indefensibly broad definition of holding.
In considering the question of alternative justifications, for example, Dorf cites the 
Restatement for the proposition that “when an appellate court bases a decision on two grounds, 
each of which, standing alone, would support the judgment, preclusive effect will be given to 
both determinations.”324 He then posits that this alternative judgment rule from preclusion law 
can effectively be extended to distinguish holding and dicta in such cases.325 While Dorf 
acknowledges that given alternative holdings in a single case, “neither rationale is essential to the 
Court’s conclusion,”326 he nonetheless argues in favor of treating both rationales as holdings 
because “[t]he Court gave careful consideration to both rationales” and because “a decision 
322 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS at Introduction (“Indefinite continuation of a dispute is a social burden. It consumes time 
and energy that may be put to other use, not only of the parties but of the community as a whole.”); see also Robert G. Bone, 
Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 196 (1992) (noting that “increasing 
concern about the social costs of litigation” explains recent tendencies to increase the scope of preclusion, but that “[c]ourts have 
hesitated to expand nonparty preclusion—the preclusion of persons who were not parties to the first lawsuit—even though 
current nonparty preclusion rules . . . tolerate extensive relitigation at substantial social cost”).
323
 The U.S. Courts of Appeals have generally held that dicta is not law of the case. See, e.g., Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. Hutson, 
229 F.3d 321, 326 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The law of the case doctrine does not apply to dicta.”); United States v. Rice, 1996 WL 
44452, *4 (10th Cir. 1996) (listing numerous additional citations from various circuits). We have seen, however, that 
conventional definitions of holding and dicta are ambiguous.
324
 Dorf, supra note x, at 2042.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 2044.
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based on either ground would have been legitimate.”327 While we ultimately agree with Dorf’s 
conclusion on alternative justifications, we find his explanation less persuasive. Our analysis has 
emphasized that a central concern of the definition of dicta is to minimize judicial overreaching 
and to ensure legitimacy in the construction of actual holdings. Careful consideration, standing 
alone, cannot suffice to elevate a judicial assertion into a holding.328 Otherwise courts could 
resolve any issue for which they hold strong views by presenting a well reasoned opinion 
concerning its resolution.
In other respects, issue preclusion is too narrow to serve as a basis for the holding-dicta 
distinction. Even twentieth-century expansions of issue preclusion, for example nonmutual 
offensive issue preclusion,329 which allows a nonparty to a prior suit to preclude a party to that 
suit from relitigating an adversely resolved issue,330 will not permit someone who is neither a 
party nor in privity with a party in the prior suit to be bound by any issues that were determined 
in that suit.331 This limitation cannot logically be applied in the holding-dicta context, because the 
distinction between holding and dicta applies to both parties and nonparties. If the holding-dicta 
distinction were defined without reference to that criterion, much of issue preclusion doctrine 
would be redundant, at least in cases within the same jurisdiction as an initial decision. If 
findings in a lawsuit were conclusive against parties and nonparties alike, nothing would turn on 
whether a party actually litigated a lawsuit, an issue to which the Restatement not surprisingly 
pays considerable attention.332
Even if preclusion law were not significantly over- and under-broad (another way of 
saying that it provides the wrong set of rules) for evaluating the definitions of holding and dicta, 
it would nonetheless prove an inadequate guide because the legal doctrines it establishes are too 
ill defined to provide meaningful guidance. Recognizing this, Dorf suggests that preclusion law 
327 Id.
328
 If it did, anything that a court carefully considers would count as holding rather than dicta. It is more plausible to imagine 
careful consideration as one among many elements in identification of holdings, but we do not think that such a balancing test is 
necessary. Rather, lack of clear judicial consideration matters because it tends to leave ambiguous the level of abstraction at 
which a court decided a case, making it harder for subsequent courts to classify a holding at a particular level. See infra Part 
IV.B.1 (noting that there may be ambiguities about the level of generality at which a court resolved a particular issue).
329 See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (approving of the use of nonmutual offensive issue 
preclusion, where not unfair to the defendant).
330 See generally Comment Note—Mutuality of Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a 
Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3D 1044 (2004) (detailing the decline of the mutuality rule, and the current state of the law).
331 Id. n.7 (“The party asserting issue preclusion must establish that . . . the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.”). 
332 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27 (using “actually litigated” language).
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can provide guidance based upon examples if not from clear rules.333 One difficulty, however, as 
Dorf himself recognizes, is that the case law sometimes contradicts the Restatement , even on the 
simple problem of alternative justifications.334 Looking to a body of law that itself is murky does 
not seem an edifying approach for the courts to adopt in resolving the holding-dicta distinction 
when the concern is that courts currently draw this distinction too imprecisely. 
Even where the Restatement directly anticipates interpretive problems, it does not always 
offer clear resolutions. For example, statement c of § 27 acknowledges, “One of the most 
difficult problems . . . is to delineate the issue on which litigation is, or is not, foreclosed by the 
prior judgment.”335 Delineating any given issue, that is determining which conclusions about a 
particular issue are conclusive, is as important in defining the holding as is determining whether 
a portion of a case contains a holding at all. Statement c merely suggests a balancing test in cases 
in which the issues are not identical from one case to the next. The elements of the balancing test 
are open-ended and, as is appropriate to preclusion law but not to evaluating holding versus 
dicta, are geared to situations in which the same parties are litigating both cases.336
While Dorf appears to recognize some of the inherent limitations of the Restatement in 
providing guidance for defining dicta and holding, he nonetheless relies upon the principle of 
essentiality, which underlies much of preclusion analysis. One example that Dorf considers 
anticipates what we have called the problem of structured analysis, and more specifically the 
problem of ordered tests.337 Specifically, Dorf posits a case in which an appellate court 
determines that a lower court committed harmless error.338 Because the finding of harmlessness 
results in an affirmance, the question is whether the finding of error, which but for the 
harmlessness would produce a remand and perhaps a reversal, is nonetheless a holding. Dorf 
concludes that it is because “[i]t forms an essential ingredient in the process by which the court 
333 Thus, Dorf observes, “Fortunately, preclusion law consists of more than abstract statements of principle. At least in its widely 
accepted canonical form, the Restatement of Judgments, preclusion law takes clearer shape from examples.” Id. at 2041-42. 
334 Id. at 2042 n.160. Dorf points out that some cases do provide preclusive effect to alternative judgments of trial courts. Id.
(citing Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 703 F.2d 1189, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1983) and noting a “division of authority”). 
335 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c.
336
 For example, the comment asks, “Could pretrial preparation and discovery relating to the matter presented in the first action 
reasonably be expected to have embraced the matter sought to be presented in the second?” Id. There are two problems with 
applying this to the holding-dicta distinction. First, there is no indication of what may “reasonably be expected.” Second, the 
focus on pretrial preparation makes far more sense when the same parties are litigating an issue.
337 See supra Part II.A.2.b.i.
338
 “The appeals court rules: (1) the trial court erred by admitting the confession because it was coerced, but (2) the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, so the conviction is affirmed. Is part (1) dictum?” Dorf, supra note x, at 2045.
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decides the case, even if, viewed from a post hoc perspective, it is not essential to the result.”339
Again, we agree with Dorf’s ultimate conclusion, but we find his analysis question-begging in 
much the same way that Dorf himself claims at a different point in his analysis that essentiality 
proves question-begging in the Restatement.340 If one determines that finding error is essential, 
that follows from the intuition that even if courts are permitted to assume error and then assess 
harmlessness, harmless error analysis in criminal appeals remains substantially ordered.341 Our 
analysis, in contrast, allows jurists and legal scholars to pinpoint exactly why the harmless error 
question is difficult, namely that one might dispute just how ordered the test is.
B. Necessary Conditions for a Holding
Having now considered several definitions of holding and dicta, we will set out our own. 
This definition seeks to capture in an easily applied manner the resolutions of the problem 
categories that we have suggested above.342 A holding consists of those propositions along the 
chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the 
facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case 
counts as dicta.
Each of the three numbered prongs is premised upon the power of the deciding jurist or 
court to select among one or more potential decisional paths in resolving a case. The first prong
thus requires that for a proposition to be credited as a holding, it must be actually decided along 
the chosen decisional path or paths.343 The second proposition then limits the permissible range 
of articulated propositions that can be credited as holding by insisting that they be grounded in 
339 Id. The purpose of this example apparently is to reinforce Dorf’s conclusion that alternative rationales are not unique by 
illustrating an additional situation in which part of a court’s rationale is not essential to the result.
340 Id. at 2041.
341
 The point is quite similar to that raised in the context of the strict scrutiny test. The word “harmless” modifies the word 
“error,” and so lawyers might conclude, rightly or wrongly, that it makes logical sense to see whether an error exists before 
determining whether it is harmless. See supra text preceding and accompanying note 73.
342 See supra Part III.C.
343
 We recognize that in selecting as part of our formulation the words “along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning” 
we are employing language that does not form part of commonplace definitions of holding. That said, we are confident that our 
chosen language better captures the intuition that underlies most judicial constructions of holding and dicta. In addition, while the 
term “path” is perhaps new to the problem of construing holdings, the concept is quite familiar to lawyers. For example, it is 
common to speak of a chain of reasoning, which like a path or paths of reasoning implies a progression of steps from facts to 
disposition. We have selected the term “path” rather than “chain” because a chain connotes links, and specifically, the risk that 
one link might be broken, thus affecting the disposition. Path instead emphasizes the choice among means of getting from one 
place (the case facts) to another place (the judgment). Because the determination that an assertion is a holding or is dicta does not 
turn on the power of the reasoning with respect to each step (an indefensible proposition in a poorly reasoned case can 
nonetheless be a holding), a weak link will not undermine the judge’s selection of the route from facts to disposition for purposes 
of identifying what constitutes a holding in a case.
112
the facts of the case. And the third proposition, by linking the ultimate disposition to the selected 
decisional path, both constraints and broadens judicial discretion. While this prong ensures that 
holdings are limited to issues that lead to the judgment, it also recognizes that particular findings 
might move us away from the judgment as the means of traveling along a path that eventually 
gets to that judgment. By analogy, a trip from a southern to a northern destination will sometimes 
require turns south, east, or west, depending upon the configuration of, and the relationships 
among, the various roads along the chosen route. So it is with legal reasoning. Thus, our 
definition allows a judge to draw one or more conceptual lines (or paths) from case facts to 
judgment, and to credit all issues resolved along the chosen path or paths to produce holdings. At 
the same time, it discounts as dicta issues on paths that do not originate in the facts in the case or 
lead nowhere.
Our construction of a definition around the concept of a decisional path reflects the 
insight that judges, while bound by the presentation of cases as the means for creating law, often 
retain substantial choice in the means of using cases to make law. Our analysis is consistent with 
the premises that courts and legislatures have distinct lawmaking functions and that judicial 
decision making is legitimated by the passive quality of resolving cases presented by actual 
litigants.344 Nonetheless, when a case admits of more than one path to a particular resolution, or a 
broader or narrow arc in forming the path from facts to judgment, we believe that judges should 
be afforded appropriate flexibility in crafting holdings when selecting the governing path or 
paths. Without this concession, we would be forced back to one of the definitions of the holding-
dicta distinction that we have criticized above both on theoretical and practical grounds.345 If 
judges cannot choose among paths, there will be virtually no holdings in cases of even modest 
complexity, and if judges cannot choose the appropriate level of breadth, then cases will almost 
always be distinguishable based upon factual differences that most would agree have little or no 
relevance in terms of providing a material basis for different legal treatment.
While our definition is easy to articulate, each element proves more complex than it may 
first appear. In addition, while we are confident in the general structure and meaning of our 
proffered definition, we recognize that our approach does not and cannot be used to dictate
344 See supra Part III.B.1.
345 See supra Part IV.A.
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results in every conceivable case. The inherent breadth of the terms that we employ will 
necessarily invite some good faith disagreements among courts in determining how to treat
statements presented as holdings in a prior case. We do not consider this a weakness, because we 
are as concerned with facilitating meaningful analysis of dicta and holding, using a common 
framework, as we are in applying that framework to resolve all cases. Indeed, we have 
intentionally phrased our definition in sufficiently broad terms to permit disagreement on the 
closest analytical issues that we have identified. That said, we will offer proposed resolutions to 
concrete questions that our definition poses.
Finally, we note that as with other matters of judicial administration,346 institution-
specific concerns might also affect the manner in which some courts treat dicta and holding.
While we believe that our approach can be applied generally, we recognize that for some courts, 
some adaptation might be required. An important example is the United States Supreme Court. 
Arguably, because the Supreme Court has the power to define the rules governing the distinction 
between holding and dicta, when the Court explicitly provides that a statement is in one category 
or the other, the statement is in that category, regardless of whether the Court’s conclusions 
accord with the general definitions of holding and dicta that we, or others, have offered. It might 
even be appropriate for the Court to stretch the definition of holding given the Court’s unique 
role in judicial administration. Because the Court sits at the apex of numerous pyramidically 
structured judiciaries and must make and clarify law through a relatively small number of cases, 
the Court might require greater latitude than other courts in determining the scope of its 
holdings.347 This might provide a normative justification, for example, for allowing Powell 
broader flexibility to define the holding in Bakke than would have been the case applying our 
general definition. We have focused on the application of the normative factors that we have 
346
 For example, justiciability doctrines in the federal courts are often said to emanate from the requirements of Article III. See,
e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 447 (1994) (considering justiciability doctrine specifically for the federal courts). We thus agree with Dorf, supra 
note x, that Article III similarly may have implications for the appropriate distinction between holding and dicta. 
347
 Michael Solimine has noted that the size of the Supreme Court’s docket could affect the Court’s ability to monitor inferior 
courts’ compliance with Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in 
the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 358-59 (2002) (noting, however, that the Court has managed to control the state 
courts by considering only a very small percentage of state cases). If the Court encountered difficulty controlling the lower 
courts, whether because of increasing caseloads or increasing defiance, there might be an argument for a broader definition of 
“holding” for the Supreme Court. Alternatively, however, the Court’s need to monitor courts while maintaining a small docket 
might call for broad deference to Supreme Court dicta. See infra note 410.
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identified to courts in general, rather than to particular courts, and we leave to future analysis 
whether these factors have different implications for particular courts.
1. Actually Decided
We turn now to the question of what it means for an issue to be actually decided. Within 
the context of a chosen decisional path, the requirement that a proposition be actually decided
includes within a case’s holding conclusions that courts explicitly reach. When an issue is 
actually decided along a chosen decisional path, the possibility of an alternative path does not 
undermine the status of those issues actually decided along that chosen path. Unlike the 
reconciliation approach, our definition credits as holding conclusions that a court does in fact 
reach, even if the court might have resolved a case by taking fewer paths or by choosing a
narrower ground. Thus, alternative possible justifications, alternative justifications, and breadth 
do not provide bases for classifying issues actually decided as dicta.
As long as a judicial opinion reports a summary of facts and the disposition, the opinion 
provides at a least a facts-plus-outcome or reconciliation-based holding.348 Even in the absence of 
any reasoning on a particular issue, a case at least stands for the proposition that under certain 
facts, a particular party should prevail on the relevant source of law upon which he or she relies.
We recognize that there may be arguments favoring a limit on the precedential weight of cases 
that fail to articulate at least somewhat generalizable propositions. First, such cases may reflect 
less careful judicial attention than cases directly addressing propositions of law with clear 
applicability to multiple cases.349 Perhaps courts tend toward case-by- case decision making that 
fails to result in more generalizable precedents when parties’ briefs do not explore the broader 
implications of a case, or when the facts are such that judges deem the case an inappropriate 
348A case might not qualify if it fails to meet the minimum conditions of internal consistency. Suppose, for example, the court 
acknowledges a general rule that on the facts of a case, a particular result should obtain, but then reaches another result without 
providing any justification, such as a factual or legal point, for that result. In this case, a precedent-setting court faces a dilemma: 
Is the rule announced by the court the holding, or is the inverse of the rule the holding since that is what the court did? In such a 
case, there is a strong reason to conclude that because the reasoning and outcome of the case are in direct opposition, the case 
does not clearly produce any holding at all. This is a very rare exception, however. It must be distinguished from the much more 
common situation in which a court produces reasons that the court thinks support the outcome it reaches, and a later court 
concludes that those reasons are bad or even point in the opposite direction properly conceived. Precedent means that even bad 
reasoning may control, so it is only in cases in which the reasoning cannot even be understood that the case fails to produce a 
holding.
349
 Such an argument might help to explain the increasing use of unpublished slip opinions in the United States Courts of 
Appeals. See COHEN, supra note x, at 72-81 (documenting increased reliance upon slip opinions in Courts of Appeals). 
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vehicle through which to consider them.350 Second, narrow fact-based decision making frees 
judges to resolve cases where the facts or equities on the one hand and the law on the other pull 
strongly in opposite directions or where the law is open and substantial equitable arguments can 
be advanced on both sides.351 Providing precedential effect to such decisions might lead to bad 
decisions in other cases. This argument reflects the familiar maxim that hard cases make bad 
law.352
While these factors counsel in favor of denying precedential effect to decisions with fact-
based reasoning, other factors pull in the opposite direction. First, granting judges the power to 
resolve cases without creating any precedent at all threatens to undermine the rule of law, as 
judges may resolve cases based on factors that they would not want to admit serve as the basis of 
their decisions. Second, narrow decisions are often more carefully considered and will produce 
only narrow precedents, thus leaving considerable leverage for future decision makers.353 When a 
court fails to offer any broad propositions for its holding, then a later court can distinguish that 
decision on the basis of any difference manifested by the facts. Although precedents will 
necessarily constrain deciding courts, facts-plus-outcome holdings leave courts with a great deal 
of flexibility.354 In our view, legal policy is best advanced by requiring judges, at least in cases 
with precedential value,355 to set precedents, but to give judges flexibility to offer narrow and 
easily distinguished precedents.
While our definition allows a court to articulate broad propositions of law or make 
narrow holdings with fact-intensive reasoning, we do not suggest that determining which type of 
reasoning a court embraced will always be a straightforward task. Judges frequently debate the 
scope of past holdings, and whether a case stands for a broad or narrow proposition sometimes 
becomes clear only over time. Of course, part of the reason for such debate is that the line 
350
 Within the Supreme Court, the combined features of docket control and the ability to dismiss certiorari as improvidently 
granted (DIGs) reduce this risk relative to courts generally.
351
 For an illustration, see infra part V.C (discussing Penn Central).
352 See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 W & M 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406 (Ex. of Pleas 1842) (Rolfe, B.) (“Hard cases, it is 
frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”). Alternatively, this argument might flip the maxim to suggest the self-evident 
proposition that bad law makes cases hard.
353 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the case for judicial minimalism).
354 See supra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that a requirement of reconciling cases is a regime in which generalizations in judicial 
opinions never count as holdings).
355
 We do not here enter the debate on whether judges should be permitted to label some opinions as not having precedential 
value. See, e.g., The Hon. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (1999) (listing and 
responding to various criticisms of unpublished opinions).
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between holding and dicta is uncertain, and the purpose of this project is to provide more 
definitive guidance on that question. But it would be impossible to produce mechanical rules that 
would allow for unambiguous classification of every ambiguous judicial statement. Once again, 
our project is to classify statements given the resolution of ambiguities. Our project demands not 
just the prior resolution of semantic and syntactic ambiguities, but also the resolution of 
ambiguities about whether a court actually decided a particular issue, or instead resolved the case 
on some other ground.
There may also be ambiguities about when an issue that is not discussed is actually 
decided. Consider, for example, a case in which a court resolves the merits without even 
mentioning the issue of standing, despite the court’s obligation to consider sua sponte issues of 
subject matter jurisdiction.356 The issue is close,357 but we do not think that such an opinion has 
actually decided the issue of standing. Although an opinion produces at least one holding on 
every issue considered, the court in this example has failed to consider an applicable issue, and 
so the only holding in such a case would be the holding on the merits. One might argue that such 
a case supports an argument that the plaintiff had standing. The court at least has revealed that it 
took for granted that standing existed, and this may make a later argument that would deny 
standing seem inconsistent with existing intuitions and understandings. But it would be a stretch 
to say that the court held that the plaintiff had standing, and in the Supreme Court, there is 
precedent establishing that only decisions that actually address and decide threshold issues create 
precedent with respect to those issues.358
“Actually decided” does not mean “expressly stated.” The “actually decided” 
requirement is broader in the sense that it includes implicit holdings that a court never quite 
explicitly announces. But it is narrower in that it excludes some statements that figure in the 
reasoning of the case but that a fair construction of the opinion would not find to lie on the path 
from case facts to case disposition. An “actually stated” rule might prove overinclusive—and 
356 See, e.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804) (providing a classic statement of this principle).
357 A still closer case would be one in which a three-part test is applicable but a court only discusses two of the three parts, even 
though all three logically were necessary to the disposition the court reached. In such a case, it may be that the court has thought 
the issue so straightforward as not to require any discussion, and there is thus an argument that the court has actually decided the 
issue. But it also may be that the court simply has forgotten one of the parts of the test. If that is so, then the court has not actually 
decided the omitted part. In practice, however, the court will at least have created a facts-plus-outcome holding, and thus the case 
at least implies the resolution of the omitted part, so the distinction may be of little practical consequence.
358 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that he existence of unaddressed 
jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect.”) (citations omitted). 
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perhaps destabilizing—if construed to turn even high-level abstract reasoning into holdings. The 
“actually decided” approach permits a court to engage in abstract reasoning, perhaps even 
invoking abstract principles of justice,359 without threatening to enshrine every proposition in that 
reasoning into law. A judge who claims analytical consistency with, or inspiration from, the likes 
of Aristotle or Kant, or who relies for insight upon such thinkers as Rawls or Dworkin, has not 
thereby elevated that philosopher’s observations to the status of law, although any concrete 
applications of theory to issues presented can rise to the status of holding provided that they 
otherwise meet our definition.
In addition, a judge’s selection of a particular interpretive methodology will not 
necessarily credit that methodological choice as a holding. For example, imagine a Supreme 
Court statutory interpretation case in which the language of the statute points in one direction, 
while the legislative history points in the opposite direction.360 If a majority of five looked to 
legislative history in construing the statute, while the remaining four justices in dissent eschewed 
reliance on legislative history, does this establish a precedent that judges must consider 
legislative history? We do not think so. We do think, however, that the case does at least imply
that where text and legislative point in opposite directions, a court is permitted to consider both 
sources and sometimes may choose the interpretation suggested by the legislative history over 
that set out in the text. 
One might label this more modest conclusion an “implied holding.” The question then 
arises how one determines the scope of a holding that is implied rather than expressly stated. Our 
view is that when a court selects a particular path from facts to judgment and the resolution of 
one step along that path is implied, the proper rule of construction for lower courts is to find, at a 
minimum that the court implicitly held on the narrowest proposition needed to render the opinion 
internally consistent. While a lower court could construe the implied holding, within the context 
of the overall opinion, to be broader, it would be improper for the court to construe the implied 
holding more narrowly or in opposite fashion. In addition, because the holding is implied, we do 
359
 Most cases invoking principles of justice do so only loosely, or borrow a concept without considering its full context. See, 
e.g., Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), for the principle of a veil 
of ignorance, without considering the substance of Rawls’s argument in any more detail).
360
 For an issue that may soon reach the Supreme Court and in which there is wide agreement that text and legislative history 
point in opposite directions, see Olden v. Lafarge Corp., 2004 Fed. App. 0296P (6th Cir. 2004). Olden holds that the federal 
supplemental jurisdiction statute overrules a prior Supreme Court case, despite legislative history indicating that the drafters did 
not intend to do this. The Third Circuit also found the text and legislative history to point in opposite directions, but sided with 
legislative history over text. See Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999).
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not believe that it has the same horizontal stare decisis effect on the issuing court as does an 
express holding. The issuing court is free to reconsider the impliedly resolved issue 
unconstrained by the presumption created in the implied holding in a future case that squarely 
presents the issue, even though the implied holding binds lower courts.361
By limiting the scope of implied holdings in this manner, our definition properly 
emphasizes the importance of providing judges more flexibility with respect to those holdings 
that are actually decided. The “actually decided” approach thus helps to make sense of the 
intuition that courts’ explicit statements about what cases hold retain special importance. These 
statements come in at least three forms. First, sometimes a court will label a proposition as a 
holding.362 We do not think that such a label can transform dicta into a holding, and our proposed 
approach provides a means of testing such assertions. When a statement offered as “holding” 
does not form an essential step on the path from operative facts to case disposition, then, 
consistent with the observed practices regarding the stare decisis norm,363 future courts may 
disregard the labeling and treat the assertion as dicta. Assuming that the issue labeled “holding”
does form an essential step on the selected path, however, then the “actually decided” approach 
allows the court to select the level of abstraction at which the issue is resolved. Again, consistent 
with observed stare decisis norms, this encourages careful articulation of reasoning, thereby 
promoting the important objective of doctrinal clarity. And of course our approach invites courts 
to use language, such as the magic words “we hold,” to make explicit that it has in fact resolved
an issue. Ambiguity will thus arise only when a court has chosen, intentionally or inadvertently, 
not to do so.
Second, a court might explicitly disclaim a proposition as a holding. A common form of 
this is for a court to assume arguendo that a particular proposition holds and then resolve the 
case on that basis. For example, the Supreme Court might accept a case on only one issue and 
then simply assume without deciding that the lower court had made a proper decision on another 
361
 We draw a parallel with the narrowest grounds governing fractured panel decisions. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 
(1977). The Marks doctrine, which dictates that in a fractured panel case, the controlling opinion is the one consistent with the 
outcome that resolves the case on the narrowest grounds, binds lower courts, but does not prevent a future Supreme Court from 
reevaluating the issue absent the presumption of precedent, given that the holding was expressed in an opinion that lacked 
majority support. Similarly here, the implied nature of the holding is sufficient to ensure that lower courts credit at least the 
narrowest implied proposition as a holding, while allowing the issuing appellate court, which did not expressly resolve the issue, 
to reconsider it in a future case unconstrained by a presumption of precedent respecting that issue. 
362 See, e.g., infra note 388 and accompanying text (providing an example).
363 See supra Part III.A.3 (providing a model showing that judges will have incentives to discount overly broad holdings).
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issue.364 We cannot turn this assumption into a holding on the theory that the Court could have 
arrived at its result only by implicitly approving of the lower court holding. Courts generally 
construct assuming arguendo arguments precisely to demonstrate the nondispositive nature of 
the identified (and assumed) issue resolution. Sometimes, a court might disclaim any intent to 
cover a fact situation beyond that presently before it. For a famous illustration, consider the 
following assertion by the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore: “Our consideration is limited to 
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally 
presents many complexities.”365 Whether or not it was appropriate for the Court to do so,366 we 
believe that this conclusion established that the equal protection analysis produced no more than 
an easily distinguishable facts-plus-outcome holding.367 Similarly, although he did not do so, 
Justice Powell in Bakke might have explicitly disclaimed his analysis of the Harvard plan as 
holding simply by indicating that he was not prejudging a future case challenging such a 
program, should one be adopted by a state institution of higher learning.368
Third, courts can make statements about the scope of previous courts’ holdings. For 
example, a post-Bakke court could make an explicit statement that Bakke held that plus factor 
programs are narrowly tailored to advance the goal of diversity. A court might make this 
statement regardless of whether the post-Bakke court’s analysis were consistent with the holding-
dicta distinction that we advance here. Of course, to be persuasive, such a statement would 
require a foundation. A court also might label a proposition in a prior case dicta. These 
statements by the precedent-citing courts themselves might count as holding or dicta, depending 
on whether they independently satisfy the governing criteria that we set out in this section. But 
364 See, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 n.12 (2004) (“That issue is not before us, however, since the petition for 
certiorari did not raise it for our review. We assume without deciding that the Fourth Circuit was correct to hold that Doe’s 
complaints in this case did not rise to the level of alleging actual damages.”).
365
 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
366 Compare ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 at 81-84 (2001) (arguing 
that the limitation was unprincipled), with Peter Berkowitz & Benjamin Wittes, The Lawfulness of the Election Decision: A Reply 
to Professor Tribe, 49 VILL. L. REV. 429, 448 n.72 (2004) (disagreeing with Dershowitz).
367 See Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democracy: The Top Ten Constitutional Lessons from the California Recall 
Experience, 92 CAL. L. REV. 927, 956 n.129 (2004) (“[S]uch an admonition to a lower court should move the lower court judge 
to find the narrowest, most fact-specific, but still principled way to read the decision.”) (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109). 
In Southwest Voter Registration Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated by 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc), a Ninth Circuit panel did rely on Bush v. Gore to stay a special gubernatorial election in conjunction with an effort to 
recall the Governor. The Ninth Circuit, however, quickly took the case en banc and produced the opposite result. Notably, while 
the court cited Bush v. Gore in describing the panel decision, see id. 917, it found no equal protection without expressly 
distinguishing, or indeed even discussing, Bush v. Gore. See Southwest Voter Registration Project, 344 F.3d at 918.
368
 Even with Justice Powell’s failure to disclaim an intent to make a holding, his statements may have still been dicta. See infra
Part V.A.
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through this process, courts can over time reduce, even if they cannot eliminate altogether, 
ambiguities that the holding-dicta distinction may not entirely resolve.
2. Based on Facts of the Case
For a proposition to be a holding, it must be “based on facts of the case.” More formally, 
when a general proposition depends on a particular factual predicate, that factual predicate must 
be true on the facts of a case,369 or the factual predicate must be assumed to be true.370 This 
requirement should be one of our least controversial. In part, this is because it provides a 
straightforward way of formalizing Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition that “dictum” is a 
statement “by the way—that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question 
before the court.”371 As a positive matter, when a judicial statement transparently implicates facts 
not involved in the case, courts generally take any conclusions drawn from such discussions to 
be dicta.372
The most straightforward implication of this requirement is that a court cannot resolve 
hypothetical questions,373 or effectively do the same by making broad statements that arbitrarily 
string together separate categories of facts,374 and then claim holding status for that resolution.
The Bakke Court, for example, could not have rejected the Davis plan on the ground that it was a 
quota and then also held that even a nonquota-based affirmative action program would be 
unconstitutional if employed by a public magnet high school. Because Bakke itself did not 
involve a public high school, and because it rested on the constitutionally problematic quota, 
such a statement would be dicta. A court could, however, base a holding on the absence of a fact, 
which of course is in itself a fact. For example, the Bakke Court could have held that if a quota-
369 We do not intend to enforce a strict distinction between “facts” and “law” here, as sometimes the law may be a relevant fact 
in the sense that we are using it here. The Davis plan evaluated in Bakke might be seen as a fact, or because it was created by a 
governmental agency, a law. That should make no difference to our analysis.
370
 In assessing a motion for summary judgment, for example, courts will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (elaborating the summary judgment 
standard). When a court subsequently grants summary judgment, the legal reasoning will depend on assumed facts. Courts, of 
course, commonly resolve legal issues by assuming the facts to be as one party argues, and that should be enough for the legal 
analysis to be considered based on the facts of the case. 
371 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW 
BOOKS 304 (3d ed. 1914)).
372 See, e.g., Gabbs Exploration Co. v. Udall, 315 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“[A]n expression as to the law based on other 
facts is regarded as dictum and not controlling on lower courts . . . .”).
373 See supra Part III.C.5.
374 See supra Part III.C.7.
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based affirmative action plan did not involve a public high school, then it was unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Bakke Court could create a holding in ruling that because the Davis plan was not a 
plus-factor plan, it should count as an unconstitutional quota.
The “based on the facts of the case” requirement thus still affords a court substantial 
flexibility. The Bakke Court might reach the public high school case depending upon the chosen 
path and the level of abstraction for deciding the case. Had the Court said, for example, that 
equal protection prevents any use of race by a government official, and that for that reason the 
Davis program is unconstitutional, the now broader holding would presumably bring in our 
hypothetical magnet high school. While this suggests that the same result prohibited through 
forging distinct categories can be reached by expanding the level of breadth, there is no reason to 
fear a tendency toward case resolutions at the broadest levels. Had the Bakke Court resolved the 
case in the broadest possible manner, it might have prevented the later Supreme Court from 
issuing rulings allowing the benign use of race in government contracting based upon a lower 
threshold than strict scrutiny,375 at least without overruling this hypothetical Bakke. While 
Adarand v. Pena eventually rejected precedents allowing a threshold lower than strict scrutiny
for challenges to benign federal race-based classifications,376 Justice Powell in Bakke was 
unwilling to close the door on all race -based policies.
3. Leading to the Judgment
The requirement that a statement lead along the decision path of reasoning to the 
disposition reinforces the approach that we have adopted for determining whether a statement is 
a presumptive holding, namely whether a statement creates a supportive proposition as we have 
defined that term.377 We have combined the concept of a path or paths of reasoning with the 
phrase “leading to the judgment” to clarify that we mean to include as holdings some 
nonsupportive propositions that meet these criteria. As with a traveler who must initially go 
south on an eventual northern route, so too jurists frequently must establish nonsupportive 
propositions en route to their eventual judgment.
375 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (approving of minority ownership preference policy), overruled in
Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (finding constitutional minority business 
enterprise set-aside provision).
376 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
377 See supra II.A.2.a.4 (distinguishing supportive from nonsupportive propositions).
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Thus, where a court undertakes a strongly ordered analysis and resolves one proposition 
in the opposite direction of the ultimate disposition, we find that proposition to lead, along the 
selected path, to the disposition. For example, where a court finds that a plaintiff has standing 
and then rejects the plaintiff’s claim on the merits, the standing inquiry leads to the disposition in 
the sense that it is a necessary first step to the subsequent inquiry.378 This is so even if finding 
standing would not have been necessary had the court selected an alternative decisional path, 
including most obviously, basing the judgment directly on the absence of standing. As an 
additional example, where a court creates a test in a biconditional statement, and one half of that 
biconditional statement is a supportive proposition, we count the biconditional statement as a 
whole as leading to the disposition. We believe that combining the notion of a decisional path
with the words “leading to” naturally embraces our earlier resolutions of these admittedly 
difficult issues, while still allowing some room for debate.
V. APPLICATIONS
To demonstrate that our definition not only meets our normative concerns, but also 
functions well when applied to complex cases, we now revisit Bakke, and then introduce several 
additional cases. We have selected this group of cases both because they are familiar to many 
readers and because they embrace a range of analytical concerns that test the difficulties of any 
proffered definition of holding.
A. Bakke
We turn now to Bakke, the case with which we began our analysis and which we used to 
establish the various categories of judicial assertions that helped us explore which should be 
credited as holding and which should instead be discounted as dicta. Our definition makes the 
analysis of Bakke straightforward, though it does so in part by revealing that certain propositions 
in Bakke require subjective judgments before they can be classified as holding and dicta. Our 
goal is not so much to convince readers of our ultimate conclusion, as Bakke includes 
propositions that are very close to the conceptual line separating holding and dicta, but to 
378
 At the same time, our definition excludes some presumptive holdings from holding status on the basis of the problem of 
ordered analysis. For example, where a court finds no standing and then rejects the claim on the merits, we would find the merits 
resolution not to lead to the disposition. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83 (describing the problem); notes 222-223 and 
accompanying text (offering a resolution of the problem).
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identify the key issues and to offer insights that could be employed in a meaningful analysis of 
the most difficult questions that remain.
Continuing to rely upon Justice Powell’s opinion as controlling,379 we conclude that the 
vast majority of those articulated propositions that we identified as potential holdings in Bakke
do in fact meet our definition of holding. Consider, for example, Justice Powell’s conclusion that 
remedying the present effects of past discrimination is not a compelling interest. Powell 
unmistakably actually decided the issue. The issue, moreover, was based on the facts of the case. 
Powell’s analysis of the issue implicitly assumed, without deciding, that the program would 
remedy the present effects of past discrimination, and we have concluded that when a court 
assumes facts based on one party’s argument, that suffices for the resulting legal argument to be 
considered based on the facts of the case.380 Finally, the resolution of the issue led to the 
disposition, as the issue reflected the court’s choice of a path (focusing on the compelling interest 
prong rather than the narrow tailoring prong) to a result that was necessary for the disposition.
Most of the other propositions in Bakke are clearly holding under similar analysis. The 
only propositions in Bakke that remain complicated involve Powell’s discussion of the Harvard 
plan. Justice Powell’s conclusion that diversity is a compelling interest counts as dicta under our 
definition, because it does not lead to the judgment. That conclusion would point toward the 
opposite disposition, and Powell’s decision to resolve it thus does not reflect a decision merely to 
pick one or more paths from the case facts to the judgment. This conclusion, however, reflects 
our admittedly subjective judgment that strict scrutiny is not a sufficiently ordered test to make 
treatment of the compelling interest prong a holding when it points in the direction opposite 
Powell’s conclusion. If one were to conclude that the test is ordered, then the identification of a 
compelling interest would logically precede the necessary narrow tailoring inquiry, and based 
upon that analysis would count as holding. Under our alternative analysis, treating the test as not 
strictly ordered, because Powell’s broader conclusion that a plus-factor plan such as Harvard’s 
would be constitutional followed from his compelling interest conclusion, that conclusion also 
does not lead to the disposition and thus also counts as dicta.
379 See supra notes 35- 38 and accompanying text.
380 See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
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Powell’s narrow tailoring analysis, however, should count as a holding. The issue appears 
to be actually decided, in that Powell has indicated precisely how a Harvard-like plan should be 
treated.381 We would reach a different result if Powell had included language suggesting that he 
was offering only a possible resolution of a hypothetical issue, or perhaps even if he had left 
ambiguous whether the issue was actually decided. Because Powell unmistakably resolved the 
issue and defended the resolution by explaining that the use of race in admissions was an issue in 
the court below, Powell in fact actually decided the issue. The propositions, moreover, were 
based on the facts of the case. We have noted that the absence of a fact itself counts as a fact, and 
Powell’s reasoning was based on the implicit conclusion that the Davis plan was not a plus-
factor plan. Finally, we have already concluded, although we concede that the issue is close, that 
the discussion of the Harvard plan effectively created a test for whether the use of race is 
narrowly tailored to the diversity objective,382 and because that test led to the disposition, it 
counts as a holding.
In sum, we conclude that Powell’s conclusion that diversity is a compelling interest is
dicta, but the conclusion that the test for determining narrow tailoring to further diversity based 
on whether a plan is a quota or a plus factor should count as a holding. Although we would not 
expect courts to employ the more complex system of classification set out in Part II, it is worth 
noting that the results here are consistent with those in Table 4, which summarizes that 
discussion. The analysis reveals that the problems of alternative possible justifications, 
alternative justifications, and of antecedent breadth are readily resolved applying our definition.
The problem of ordered analysis turns out not to apply to the strict scrutiny test. The problem of 
biconditionals, meanwhile, means that the inverse statements of holdings count as holdings when 
the two are resolved together as a biconditional. And Justice Powell was entitled to issue a broad 
holding on narrow tailoring rather than a narrower one. 
B. Roe
We will now analyze Roe v. Wade,383 based upon our definitions of holding and dicta.384
Although Roe presents some of the same issues as Bakke, it turns out to be simpler. The analysis 
381 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant passage of Justice Powell’s opinio n).
382 See supra Part III.B.6 (addressing the problem of biconditional statements).
383
 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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reveals that there are no persuasive reasons to change any propositions from their initial 
presumptive status as holding or dicta. This should reinforce that Bakke presents an atypically 
high level of difficulty, and even cases with multiple-part holdings ordinarily can be easily sorted 
out.
1. Justice Blackmun’s Opinion for the Court
In Roe, Jane Roe, a pseudonym for a pregnant woman who brought a class action lawsuit, 
was alone granted standing to challenge a Texas statute that criminalized procuring or attempting 
to procure an abortion, unless necessary to save the mother’s life.385 Writing for a majority of 
seven, Justice Blackmun not only struck down that statute,386 but proceeded to use the Roe case 
as a vehicle with which to articulate a comprehensive approach to assessing state abortion laws. 
In Section XI of the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun stated: “[t]o summarize and repeat:”, 
and then presented the synopsis of his detailed set of rules in outline form, including numbered 
parts and subparts.387 Lest anyone doubt the Court’s intent, the sentence following the outline 
referred to “[t]his holding.”388
The outline itself spelled out Roe’s famous (or infamous) trimester framework. The Court 
began by identifying two legitimate state interests: protecting maternal health and the potential 
life represented by the fetus. The Court concluded that the first became compelling only after the 
first trimester, the point at which morbidity rates for carrying a fetus to term exceeded those for 
the termination of pregnancy through abortion. The Court further concluded that the second 
interest became compelling only at the moment of viability, the point at which the fetus is 
capable of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.389 After further concluding that the right 
to terminate a pregnancy falls within the right of privacy initially articulated in Griswold v. 
384
 To avoid unnecessary exposition in the text, we develop, primarily in footnotes, a more detailed analysis of Roe that is similar 
to our analysis of Bakke in Part II. This more detailed analysis verifies that our intuition captures the nuanced judgments that we 
have reached about individual categories of holdings.
385
 410 U.S. at 118-18 and 123-28. 
386 Id. at 164 (“The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.”). 
387 Id. at 164-65.
388 Id. at 165.
389
 Justices have since pointed out that the point of viability may depend on developments in medical science. See Akron v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that technology advances mean that 
“[t]he Roe framework... is clearly on a collision course with itself”). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Srvcs., 492 U.S. 
490, 554 n.9 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “the threshold of fetal viability is, and 
will remain, no different from what it was at the time Roe was decided”).
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Connecticut,390 and extended to nonmarried couples through equal protection in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird,391 the Court weighed the two identified two state interests against the woman’s right to 
abort. The Court then reached conclusions for each of the three identified trimesters of 
pregnancy.
In the first trimester, the right to abortion is absolute: “the abortion decision and its 
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending 
physician.”392 In the second trimester, “the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the 
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to 
maternal health.”393 Finally, in the third trimester, “the State in promoting its interest in the 
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where 
it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.”394
2. Applying the Definition
The “actually decided” issue is easy to apply to the articulated Roe propositions because 
the Court made unmistakably clear that it intended its articulated rules for each of the three 
trimesters to count as holdings.395 Ambiguities might remain about other aspects of the opinion, 
however, such as the following statement: “This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we 
feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to 
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”396 The decision leaves some room for interpretation about whether the Court 
conclusively determined that the right of privacy is found in the Fourteenth Amendment. There 
is no doubt that the Court endorsed a view that the Fourteenth Amendment houses the privacy 
right—the Court’s language “as we feel it is” makes its view clear—but one might argue about 
390
 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
391
 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
392 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
393 Id.
394 Id. at 164-65.
395 See supra note 388 and accompanying text.
396
 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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whether the Court actually decided the issue for purposes of issuing a holding.397 The Court 
might have been indicating a tentative view on the issue but not resolved it in the immediate 
case, perhaps based upon the intuition that recognizing a right—without regard to its doctrinal 
underpinnings—was adequate to the task of resolving the constitutionality of the challenged 
Texas abortion statute. Because the classification difficulty stems from the ambiguous wording 
of the opinion itself, we do not believe that our analysis resolves this specific question.
Roe might also present a problem under the “based on the facts of the case” prong. The 
Court resolved statements about each of the three trimesters of pregnancy, even though Roe 
herself must have filed suit during a particular single trimester. On this theory, the court might 
issue a single broad holding covering the first two trimesters, which together constitute the 
category of pre-viability, but cannot issue a separate holding for each of the three trimesters. We 
reject this analysis, however, and conclude that for two different reasons, all three trimesters 
were before the Court.
First, Roe was heard and decided after the plaintiff’s pregnancy had ended. Indeed, as a 
precondition to resolving Roe on the merits, the Roe Court articulated an exception to general 
mootness doctrine. Given the short duration of pregnancy, as compared with the protracted 
process of litigation, the Court held that review is proper in an otherwise moot case when the 
issues are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”398 Accepting this justification for avoiding 
standard mootness doctrine, we can reconceptualize Roe as presenting a single plaintiff who, at 
progressive points in her pregnancy, is challenging the state law prohibitions against obtaining an 
abortion.399 Second, the Court found its reasoning sufficient to strike down the statute in its 
entirety.400 The Court thus implicitly found that Jane Roe presented a facial, rather than an as-
applied, challenge to the statute. In a facial challenge, any constitutional defect is potentially 
397
 This would matter, for example, if a future case arose in which a privacy founded on the Fourteenth Amendment would afford 
protection, while a privacy right founded on another source would not. 
398
 410 U.S. at 125. This does not mean that anyone can raise an ephemeral issue in litigation. The issues must be capable of 
repetition yet evading review for the particular litigant who but for mootness satisfied all of the remaining justiciability 
requirements in the case.
399
 The opinion itself notes that Roe was pregnant “as of the inception of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of that 
year.” 410 U.S. at 124. Because it does not indicate when she became pregnant, it is not clear from the facts of the opinion itself 
whether she was in the second trimester of her pregnancy at the time of the hearing. 
400
 410 U.S. at 164 (“The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.”).
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sufficient to strike down the challenged statute, and, as a result, even hypothetical facts can be 
embraced within the facts of the case.401
Even though all three trimesters were properly before the Court, however, not all 
conclusions drawn concerning each trimester necessarily constitutes a holding under our 
definition. Under the third prong of our definition, to be a holding, a proposition must “lead to 
the judgment.” The Roe Court based its decision to struck down the Texas abortion statute on 
regulatory defects in the first two trimesters. The Court was certainly able to select more than a 
single path, provided each selected path led to the judgment. The difficulty is that Blackmun’s
analysis of the third trimester abortion regulation did not lead to the judgment. The Texas statute 
did in fact contain an exception to the prohibition against abortion as needed to preserve the life 
or health of the mother. No path of reasoning that the court selected had as an essential element a 
finding that one aspect of the Texas abortion statute—in this case the exception for the life and 
health of the mother in the final trimester—withstood constitutional scrutiny.402
These conclusions withstand the type of closer analysis that we offered in Bakke. Rather 
than treat Roe’s articulated three-part holding on the constitutionality of abortion regulations at 
various points in the pregnancy as a handful of holdings, one can break down that decision’s 
nuanced test of constitutionality into several discrete propositions.403 This breakdown makes 
401
 Richard Fallon argues that whether a challenge is “facial” or “as applied” depends on the applicable constitutional doctrine, 
rather than on some trans-substantive rule. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As- Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party 
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000). On this view, a court might strike down a statute based on hypothetical facts, but only 
because the plaintiff’s case presents facts that implicate doctrine that necessarily requires that such hypotheticals to be assessed.
402
 Of course, the Court’s third trimester analysis might indicate that a hypothetical statute, one unlike the challenged Texas 
statute, would be unconstitutional. If so, the analysis fails under an alternative prong of our holding definition because it would 
not be based on the facts of the case. See supra Part IV.B.2. Under either analysis, the Court’s resolution of the third trimester 
counts as dicta.
403
 The propositions are as follows:
(1) Because the right of privacy extends to abortion, a state law restricting abortion must satisfy strict scrutiny to be sustained.
(2) The state’s interest in protecting maternal health is not compelling in the first trimester.
(3) The state’s interest in protecting maternal health is compelling after the first trimester.
(4) The state’s interest in protecting potential human life represented by the fetus is not compelling in the first and second 
trimesters.
(5) The state’s interest in protecting potential human life represented by the fetus is compelling in the third trimester.
(6) Even when the state interest in the potentiality of human life represented by the fetus is compelling, the state may not pursue 
that interest at the expense of the life or health of the mother.
(7) In the first trimester, the right to abortion is absolute.
(8) In the second trimester, the state may regulate abortion in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(9) In the second trimester, the state may not regulate abortion in ways that are not reasonably related to maternal health. 
(10) In the third trimester, the state may regulate abortion through a statute that provides an exception to preserve the mother’s 
life or health.
(11) In the third trimester, the state may not regulate abortion through a statute that does not provide an exception to preserve the 
mother’s life or health.
(12) The statute regulates abortion in the first trimester.
(13) The statute regulates abortion in the second trimester in a way that is not reasonably related to maternal health.
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quickly apparent that the Court’s conclusion that the right of privacy extends to abortion is a 
presumptive holding,404 as are almost all of the court’s conclusions as to the first and second 
trimesters.405 In addition, the exceptions count as a holding based on our resolution of the 
problem of biconditional statements.406 The conclusions relating to the third trimester, however, 
are nonsupportive propositions.407 Although one might argue that some of the key provisions can 
be rescued as inverse propositions to other holdings, we would disagree.408
(14) The statute regulates abortion in the third trimester, but provides an exception to preserve the mother’s life or health.
(15) The statute unconstitutionally regulates abortion in the first trimester.
(16) The statute unconstitutionally regulates abortion in the second trimester.
(17) The statute constitutionally regulates third-trimester abortion.
(18) The statute is unconstitutional.
As before, we recognize that it would be possible to create a more detailed set of propositions, but we believe that we have 
included all the statements, some explicit and some implicit in the opinion, necessary to understanding the case. Note that the 
presentation above divides biconditional statements into two, so that we can evaluate each half of the biconditional statement 
separately. For example, statements (2) and (3) jointly form the biconditional “the interest in protecting maternal health is 
compelling if and only if the pregnancy is at a point after the first trimester,” and so too with statements (4) and (5).
404
 Statement (1) (right of privacy extends to abortion), is necessary to statements (7), (9), and (11), which identify particular 
statutory practices as unconstitutional.
405 Statement (2) (maternal health interest not compelling in first trimester) and statement (4) (interest in protecting fetal life not 
compelling in first and second trimesters) are necessary to statement (7) (right to first-trimester abortion is absolute). Statement 
(7) and statement (12) (statute regulates first-trimester abortion) are both necessary to statement (15) (statute unconstitutionally 
regulates first-trimester abortion), which is sufficient for statement (18) (statute is unconstitutional). Similarly, statement (4) 
(interest in protecting fetal life not compelling in first and second trimesters) is necessary to statement (9) (state may not regulate 
second-trimester abortion for reasons other than maternal health). Statement (9) and statement (13) (statute regulates abortion in 
the second trimester in a way that is not reasonably related to maternal health) are both necessary to statement (16) 
(unconstitutionally regulates second-trimester abortion), which is also sufficient for statement (18) (statute is unconstitutional). 
406
 Statement (3) (state’s interest in protecting maternal health is compelling after the first trimester) is necessary to statement (8) 
(state may regulate second-trimester abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health). Statement (8) is a nonsupportive 
proposition, because it does not justify any other statement in the opinion or affect the need for any additional analysis, but it is 
the inverse of statement (9), and the two together create a test in the form of a biconditional statement. Statement (3) should thus 
count as a holding as well.
407
 Now, we can consider the propositions related to the third trimester. Statement (5) (state’s interest in protecting fetal life is 
compelling after the second trimester) is necessary to Statement (10) (state may regulate third-trimester abortions if providing an 
exception to preserve mother’s life or health). Statement (10) and statement (14) (statute regulates abortion in the third trimester 
while providing an exception to preserve mother’s life or health) are necessary for statement (17) (the statute constitutionally 
regulates third-trimester abortion). Because the Court ultimately strikes down the statute, however, statement (17) is a 
nonsupportive proposition. Statement (3) (state’s interest in protecting maternal health is compelling after the first trimester) and 
statement (6) (compelling interest in maternal health trumps compelling interest in fetal health) are both necessary to statement 
(11) (state may not regulate third-trimester abortions without providing an exception to preserve mother’s life or health). Because 
the statute at issue does provide an exception, statement (11) is a nonsupportive proposition.
408 One might seek to label statement (10) (state may regulate third-trimester abortions if providing an exception to preserve 
mother’s life or health) as an inverse proposition to a holding, and then statement (11) (state may not regulate third-trimester 
abortions if not providing an exception to preserve mother’s life or health) as an inverse proposition to a holding. This analysis is 
somewhat more complicated, however. The Court effectively endorsed the proposition “if a pregnancy is in the first or second 
trimesters, then a ban on properly regulated abortions is unconstitutional.” This entails the narrower proposition “if a pregnancy 
is in the first or second trimesters, then a ban on properly regulated abortions not needed to protect the mother’s health or life is at 
risk is unconstitutional.” The inverse of this proposition is “if a pregnancy is in the third trimester, then a ban on properly 
regulated abortions not needed to protect the mother’s health or life is constitutional,” which implies statement (10). By 
rewording the conditional in statement (10), we reach the proposition “if the state provides an exception to preserve the mother’s 
life or health, then it may regulate third-trimester abortion.” Note that the inverse of that statement—“if the state does not provide 
an exception to preserve the mother’s life or health, then it may not regulate third-trimester abortion” is statement (11). If 
statement (10) indeed were a holding, we would agree that statement (11) would be a holding as well, because the Court has 
effectively announced a test for the third trimester. But because statement (10) is not part of any biconditional test that the Court 
has effectively announced—we can see that it is the inverse of a holding only by noting that the Court has endorsed a holding that 
entails a narrower proposition—we would conclude that neither it nor statement (11) should count as a holding.
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We do not mean to suggest that a post-Roe court confronted with a statute containing a 
third-trimester prohibition on abortion without an exception to preserve the life or health of the 
mother would have acted appropriately if it had glibly concluded that the Court’s assertions were 
dicta and proceeded to ignore them. There are two reasons that a court arguably should not do 
this. First, even though our analysis suggests that the third-trimester propositions were not 
holdings, the Supreme Court’s position at the apex of the judicial hierarchy may give it the 
power to define what is a holding and what is not.409 Our analysis may suggest that the Supreme 
Court overreached, but a lower court ignoring the Supreme Court’s delineation of holdings 
would be overreaching as well. Second, even Supreme Court dicta may have substantial 
persuasive influence on lower courts.410 Once the Supreme Court has carefully considered and 
resolved an issue, there are strong prudential reasons for lower courts to follow the Supreme 
Court’s lead, even when that resolution technically would count as dicta.
C. Penn Central
The definition of holding or dicta is tested when applied to a case in which a court 
identifies a set of controlling factors, some pulling in one direction and others pulling in the 
opposite direction, and then balances these factors to rule for one side. While this can occur 
when legal doctrine points in one direction while the equities point in the other, it is most likely 
to occur when doctrine fails to provide clear guidance in the immediate case and when 
substantial equitable arguments can be advanced to support either side. The landmark takings 
case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,411 illustrates  the limited nature of holdings
that arise in such balancing test cases.
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court addressed whether applying New York City’s 
Landmark Preservation Law412 to designate Grand Central Terminal an historical landmark and 
to prevent the construction of a high rise office building above the Terminal constituted a 
409 See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
410
 Commentators frequently stress the need for lower courts to give substantial deference even to Supreme Court dicta. 
Consider, for example, the following admonition:
A federal Court of Appeals is not bound by dicta in United States Supreme Court opinions, although such expressions 
are worthy of serious consideration. Federal appellate courts are, however, bound by the Supreme Court’s considered 
dicta, almost as firmly as by the court’s outright holdings, particularly when a dictum is of recent vintage and not 
enfeebled by any subsequent statement.
AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 603 (2004).
411 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
412 N.Y. City Admin. Code ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976).
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“taking” for which just compensation was required.413 Justice Brennan, writing for a majority, 
divided the case into two issues.414 Brennan first considered whether the designation constituted a 
taking for which just compensation was required because the burdens imposed upon Penn 
Central were greater than the generally shared burdens associated with zoning restrictions. 415
Concluding that the differential treatment did not automatically trigger a taking, Brennan then 
considered whether the particular burdens were sufficiently substantial to require an “an exercise 
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].’”416 The Court resolved both questions in 
the negative and thus found that there was no taking.417
The landmark designation was part of a city-wide scheme, similar to laws in all fifty 
states, pursuant to which several hundred historic properties were designated as landmarks and 
thus restricted from development without approval of the Landmarks Preservation Commission 
(the “Commission”).418 A landmarks designation imposed considerable burdens on the owner 
both concerning the maintenance of the property and requiring that any development be 
approved by the Commission.419 When the Landmarks Commission rejected each of two 
proposed plans to construct a multistory high rise above the Penn Central Terminal,420 appellants, 
Penn Central, and its lease partner, UGP Properties, Inc. (“UGP”),421 filed a suit challenging the 
application of the landmarks law to it as a taking. 422
413 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122.
414 Id. at 136.
415 Id. at 114.
416 Id.
417 Had the Court instead determined that the application of the Lamdmark Preservation Law to Penn Central constituted a 
taking, it would then have had to resolve the separate question whether the conferral upon Penn Central of transferable 
development rights (TDRs) satisfied the requirement of just compensation. See id.
418 See id. at 111.
419 Id. at 111-12.
420 Id. at 117. Pursuant to the landmarks law, Penn Central and UGP applied for a “certificate of no effect on protected 
architectural features,” which required that they demonstrate that the proposed changes “will not change or affect any 
architectural feature of the landmark and will be in harmony therewith.” Id. at 112. In addition they applied for a “certificate of 
appropriateness,” which required that they prove, based upon “aesthetic, historical, and architectural values,” that the proposed 
alternations “would not unduly hinder the protection, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the landmark.” Id. The Landmarks 
Commission denied both permits for each proposed plan. Id. at 117. 
421
 In January 1968, Penn Central and UGP, a wholly owned subsidiary of Union General Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom 
corporation, entered into a 50 year renewable lease and sublease agreement, under which UGP would construct a multistory 
office building atop the terminal and would pay Penn Central $1 million per year during construction and at least $3 million per 
year thereafter. These rents were intended to offset losses in rentals from concessionaires who would be displaced by the new 
building. See id. at 116.
422Penn Central did not seek judicial review of these denials and because Grand Central Station ”remained suitable for its past 
and future uses, and was not the subject of a contract of sale,” Justice Brennan explained that “no further administrative remedies 
available to appellants as to [these] plans.” Id. at 118. 
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Justice Brennan placed the landmarks law between two sets of takings principles.  The 
Court has generally not required just compensation in cases presenting challenges to zoning laws
because zoning generally imposes approximately equal burdens on landowners, thus ensuring 
that a small group of owners are not unduly burdened for a public benefit.423 Conversely, the 
Court has found that compensation is required when the nature of the governmental action is 
such that the resulting harm undermines the owners’ investment backed expectations.424
Examples include physical invasions of property or regulations that effectively thwart the ability 
to use the property in the manner that was anticipated based upon expressly retained rights.425
While the case law is not entirely consistent, the Court has found takings where the state has 
engaged in a physical invasion of property,426 and where the challenged regulation entirely 
thwarts the expected use of property based upon the reserved rights of the property owner.427
After holding that just compensation was not required any time a landowner is restricted 
in his use of property “to a greater extent than provided for under applicable zoning laws,”428
Justice Brennan addressed whether “severity of the impact of the law on appellants’ parcel” was 
of such a magnitude as to rise to the level of a taking, thus requiring just compensation.  Brennan 
resolved the latter issue against Penn Central by applying a balancing test.429
Brennan reasoned that because the landmark designation did not limit the “the present 
uses of the Terminal,” it did not undermine “Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the 
use of the parcel.”430 Brennan added that the designation not only permits a profit from the 
Terminal, but also a “reasonable return” on Penn Central’s investment.431 In addition, Brennan 
observed that whatever loss appellants suffered from their inability to construct a high rise above 
the Terminal, the conferral of transferable development rights (TDRs), allowing the possibility 
423 Id. at 123-24 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
424 Id. at 124.
425
 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), for example, the Court found a taking where, following the sale of 
property that included the reservation of mining rights, the state enacted a law preventing coal mining that caused subsidence of 
adjoining property given that the law directly thwarted the owner’s investment-backed expectations.  In contrast, the Court did 
not find a taking in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), where a group of homeowners were forced to cut down ornamental 
red cedars that produced cedar rust fatal to nearby apple trees. 
426 Thus, in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court found a taking where the government had allowed flights 
directly over claimant's land in a manner that prevented its then present use as a chicken farm.
427 Id.
428 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 114.
429 Id. at 136.
430 Id.
431 Id.
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for similar development on adjoining properties, provided some offsetting value, even if that 
value would not rise to the level of just compensation in the event of a taking.432 After 
concluding that the application of New York City’s Landmarks Law did not effect a taking for 
which just compensation is required,433 Brennan added that “our holding today is on the present 
record, which in turn is based on Penn Central’s present ability to use the Terminal for its 
intended purposes and in a gainful fashion.”434
Applying our definition, Justice Brennan chose a decision path from facts to judgment 
that required rejecting either of the two bases for ruling for Appellants, first finding that any 
substantial differential treatment among property owners, relative to traditional zoning laws, 
automatically constitutes a taking, and second, finding that in the facts of the case, the burdens 
were sufficiently severe as to constitute a taking. Because a contrary ruling on either prong 
would have produced a judgment for Penn Central, and because each prong was actually decided 
based upon the facts of the case, applying our definition, each prong is a holding.
In applying the balancing test, Brennan listed a number of factors that satisfied the Court 
that the restrictions imposed were substantially related to promoting the general welfare and 
permitted the reasonable beneficial use of the Terminal and other properties. Justice Brennan 
identified the following burdens that the designation imposed on Penn Central: (1) the obligation 
to maintain the Terminal consistently with the requirements of the landmarks law; (2) the 
requirement that any development be approved by the Commission; and (3) the rejection of two 
proposals to construct a multistory office building above the Terminal, which would have 
enhanced the Terminal’s profitability. Against these burdens, Justice Brennan weighed the 
following factors, which counseled against finding that the historic landmark designation 
imposed a sufficiently serious burden as to be treated as a taking: (1) that the designation did not 
interfere with the Terminal’s primary use; (2) that the restrictions preventing the construction of 
the two proposed developments above the Terminal did not prevent a reasonable return on the 
owner’s investment; (3) that while the Commission rejected two specific high rise proposals as 
432 See id. Brennan noted that the TDRs were “transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of 
which have been found suitable for the construction of new office buildings.” Id. Brennan thus maintained that the TDRs 
“undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into 
account in considering the impact of [the] regulation.” Id. at 137.
433 Id.
434 Id. at 138.
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inconsistent with the historic designated landmark, nothing in their actions suggested that they 
would altogether prevent any development in the airspace above the terminal; and (4) that while 
they might not constitute just compensation, the landmark designation included valuable TDRs.
Because the Court does not place weights on any of the factors that it identified in its 
analysis, it is possible that in a case with any difference in the identified factors or even with 
factors that were entitled to somewhat different weights based upon the particular facts might 
produce a different result.  As a result, articulating the second Penn Central holding requires
qualification based on both the identified factors and the emphasis attributed to those factors 
based upon the specific case facts.  For example, it is possible that on otherwise indistinguishable 
facts, the Court would find a taking if the Commission had prevented a substantially more 
modest construction in the air space or if the TDRs were less plausibly useful in adjoining 
properties.
We do not wish to suggest that any distinction would be sufficient for a contrary result. A 
case with otherwise identical facts, but a proposal for a building only slightly less ambitious than 
those submitted would appear insufficient to warrant a contrary result. Of course, courts do 
sometimes devise disingenuous distinctions, and balancing test cases might simply make that 
task easier. To the extent that the test is intended to have meaning, however, we argue that an 
implicit substantiality requirement arises in efforts to distinguish future cases based upon 
differences in the weights attached to those factors that a court identifies in announcing a 
balancing test. And certainly over a group of cases, courts will give those factors more meaning, 
and that will help to guide future courts.
Finally, it is worth considering whether the direction of any identified factors itself 
constitutes a holding.  If for example a case presented otherwise identical facts except that the 
restriction involved a more ambitious construction plan, it would be hard to reconcile a holding 
that the new presented a taking with Penn Central, which found no taking based upon a less 
restrictive imposition on the landowner.  The converse proposition, however, does not hold.  In a 
case that is otherwise indistinguishable from Penn Central, but in which the owner of the 
designated property did not receive any TDRs (which favor the property owner), it would be 
possible to rule either way without running afoul of Penn Central. Finding no taking would 
simply mean that the TDRs were relevant but not controlling in Penn Central, while finding a 
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taking would mean that Penn Central was sufficiently close that changing this one factor 
changed the outcome.  Because this factor goes against the Penn Central judgment, we know its 
direction, but based solely on Penn Central, we cannot know whether its absence would be 
determinative of the outcome.  
Thus, where a factor in the balancing test weights in favor of the result (the presence of 
TDRs weights in favor of the result of finding no taking), future courts can reconcile the same or 
an opposite outcome in a case in which that factor is removed.  Conversely, where a factor 
moves against the result (the extent of the restriction on construction in the airspace weighs 
against finding no taking), a future court could not reconcile opposite holding in a case in which 
the weight of that factor is exacerbated.  As a result, the direction and weight of those factors that 
operate against the judgment in a balancing test case might themselves constitute a form of 
holding.
D. Blakely
The holding-dicta distinction often arises when a court must consider two cases from a 
higher court that are in tension with each other.435 Consider, for example, a debate in the 
aftermath of Blakely v. Washington,436 the recent case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down the State of Washington’s sentencing guidelines system. Immediately after the issuance of 
Blakely, commentators recognized that there was a strong argument that the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines also violated the Sixth Amendment under the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning.437 The question remained, however, whether lower courts should have considered 
themselves free to consider the issue. Lower courts are required to follow all Supreme Court 
precedents, even when manifestly inconsistent with more recent Supreme Court doctrine, unless 
and until the Supreme Court explicitly overrules its earlier precedent.438
435
 In addition, it often arises when a court must consider two of its own cases that are in tension with one another. For example, 
in a recent case concerning whether U.S. district courts had habeas jurisdiction over detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the 
Justices debated whether the Court had previously implicitly overruled a prior case. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2693-95 
(2004) (arguing that Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct., 410 U.S. 484 (1973), implicitly overruled Johnson v. Eistrager, 339 U.S. 
763 (1950)), with id. at 2702-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority). Case B can be thought of as overruling 
case A if a holding of case B and a holding of case A are inconsistent. Explicit application of the holding-dicta distinction that we 
develop here could discipline analysis in cases like Rasul.
436
 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
437 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2004).
438 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); supra note 111.
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The government took the position that this principle meant that the lower courts should 
not reconsider the constitutionality of the Federal Guidelines in the wake of Blakely.439 There had 
been numerous Supreme Court cases applying the Sentencing Guidelines, and litigants in one 
such case, Edwards v. United States, even raised Sixth Amendment issues.440 The Supreme Court 
in Edwards did not mention the Sixth Amendment, but did state that “we need not, and we do 
not, consider the merits of petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims.”441 In a Seventh 
Circuit case considering this argument, Judge Posner concluded that Edwards did not create a 
holding on the Blakely issue, noting, “[a]n assumption is not a holding.”442 As Judge Posner’s use 
of the word “holding” reflects, a lower court faced with an apparent tension in the jurisprudence 
of a higher court must examine the higher court’s case law to identify what holdings the higher 
court has reached. As long as an earlier case does not contain a holding inconsistent with a later 
case’s holding, the lower court faces no dilemma about which case to follow.
We agree not only with Judge Posner’s recognition that the case presented a question of 
what counts as a “holding,” but also with his conclusion that there was no holding in Edwards 
that Blakely can be seen even to have implicitly overruled. In dissent, Judge Easterbrook thought 
that Edwards did bind the Seventh Circuit to continue to follow the Guidelines. “The Court’s 
opinion in Edwards acknowledged that constitutional contentions had been advanced,” 
Easterbrook argued. “Edwards held that a judge nonetheless may ascertain (using the 
preponderance standard) the type and amount of drugs involved, and impose a sentence based on 
that conclusion, as long as the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.”443 Under our 
definition, however, a court must actually resolve an issue for the case to create a holding, and 
when a court explicitly says “we need not, and we do not, consider the merits of petitioners’ 
statutory and constitutional claims,” any subsequent explanation that the claims do not seem 
strong must count as dicta. Under our analysis, then, lower courts remained free even before 
Blakely to rule that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional for Sixth Amendment 
reasons.
439
 Memorandum to All Federal Prosecutors from James Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., July 2, 2004, available at 
http://talkleft.com/dojmemojuly2.pdf.
440
 Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998); see also Brief for Petitioners at 30-32, 1997 WL 793079, Edwards (No. 96-
8732).
441
 523 U.S. at 515.
442
 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 514 (7th Cir. 2004).
443 Id. at 516 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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That does not necessarily, however, justify Judge Posner’s decision to find the 
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional, even assuming that this is the logical import of the 
Blakely decision.444 There may be prudential reasons for a lower court to honor Supreme Court 
dicta,445 and there may be even stronger prudential reasons for a lower court to honor the taken-
for-granted assumptions of higher courts. There were at least signals in Supreme Court cases that 
the Justices did not think the Sixth Amendment argument against the Sentencing Guidelines
meritorious. On the other hand, federal courts are obligated to honor a convicted defendant’s 
constitutional rights even if in dong so they effectively force the Supreme Court’s hand in the 
resolution of an issue that it previously assumed had no merit. What matters for our purposes is 
that our definition provides a way of determining when a lower court has the power to follow the 
logical implications of recent Supreme Court decisions over seemingly inconsistent earlier 
decisions. That issue does not resolve when a lower court should exercise the power if it exists.
E. Grutter and Gratz
While the recent Grutter446 and Gratz,447 each issued by majorities, effectively remove 
any doctrinal significance from the inquiry whether Justice Powell’s independent analysis in 
Bakke was dicta or holding, the holding-dicta distinction remains important for affirmative action 
law. Consider, for example, Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter that “[w]e expect that 25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.”448 Is this bold assertion holding or dicta? One problem in answering this 
question is that it is not at all obvious even what Justice O’Connor’s assertion means. It might 
even have been purposely ambiguous.449 It might not be surprising therefore that Justices 
Ginsburg450 and Thomas451 disagreed as to O’Connor’s meaning.
444
 At least one circuit court reached the issue of the Sentencing Guidelines’ constitutionality but found that they were 
constitutional despite Blakely. See United States v. Piniero, 377 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir. 2004). 
445 See supra note 410.
446
 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
447
 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
448
 539 U.S. at 342.
449
 Justice O’Connor may have wanted to send a signal stronger than a mere expression of hope, yet recognized that the Supreme 
Court, unlike Congress, does not provide bright-line sunset provisions. See Vikram David Omar & Evan Caminker, 
Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice O'Connor's Closing Comments in Grutter , 30 HASTINGS L.Q. 541, 554 (2003) (asserting that 
“[w]hile Congress occasionally enacts sunset provisions into its work product, the Supreme Court usually does not.”).
450
 “From today’s vantage point,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s 
span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.” 539 
U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). By casting the uncertainty as whether we can forecast the end of a need for affirmative 
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Our analysis of holding and dicta can, however, help determine the consequence of any 
suggested interpretation. If, for example, the sentence is interpreted to mean that affirmative 
action survives for twenty-five years and no more, then O’Connor might be attempting to issue a 
biconditional statement that transforms an “if, then” assertion into an assertion that “if and only 
if a Michigan Law School-like affirmative action program is in place no later than 2028, is it 
constitutional.” This, however, would seem to be a biconditional statement that provides an end-
run around the exclusion of hypotheticals from holding, so there is a strong argument that the no-
later-than-2028 restriction is not based on the facts of the case and counts as dicta. If, meanwhile, 
O’Connor’s statement is interpreted as a mere personal hope or prophesy, then the issue is not 
actually decided. What is a holding today should remain so in 2028, and the statement setting out 
a time limit itself should be relegated to the status of dicta. Such dicta, of course, may have 
inspirational but not precedential effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our own hope for the future is more modest. In this Article, we have argued that the 
distinction between holdings and dicta helps to prevent judges from evading the principle of 
stare decisis. If judges were uniformly to adopt our definition and our proposed resolution of 
particular problems, courts would apply the holding-dicta distinction more consistently and in a 
manner more faithful to the underlying function of the distinction. Uniform adoption is unlikely 
at best, however, and many courts will likely continue to cite the Black’s Law Dictionary 
definition of the distinction. We recognize too that the more definitions of the distinction that 
exist, the easier it will be for courts to find one that suits its purposes. Nonetheless, we hope that 
because we have exposed the structural issues inherent in the distinction between holding and 
dicta, the courts at least will consider those issues directly. Over time, such consideration can 
action or merely hope for such an end, Ginsburg signals that she does not view O’Connor’s remarks as providing for an end to 
affirmative action regardless of the developments in the interim.
451
 Justice Thomas made his interpretation of Justice O’Connor’s comment patent: “I agree that in 25 years the practices of the 
Law School will be illegal,” adding, “No one can seriously contend, and the Court does not, that the racial gap in academic 
credentials will disappear in 25 years. Nor is the Court’s holding that racial discrimination will be unconstitutional in 25 years 
made contingent on the gap closing in that time.” 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also seizes on a 
quotation included in Justice O’Connor’s opinion, that the “the acid test of [affirmative action preferences’] justification will be 
their efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic preferences at all.” Id. at 342-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting, citing 
Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to 
Professional Schools, 58 CHICAGO BAR REC. 282, 293 (May- June 1977)). 
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only clarify the holding-dicta distinction and further the decisionmaking discipline that the 
distinction can provide.
